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
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THE

# WORKS

OF

# CHARLES FOLLEN,

WITH A

## MEMOIR OF HIS LIFE.

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

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# LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

# LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

## LECTURE I.

POPULAR lectures on Moral Philosophy may seem, to many, almost a contradiction in terms. Moral Philosophy, and the principal subjects comprehended in the terms, Religion, Morals, and Law, have grown unpopular under the professional care of theologians, lawyers, and moralists. Sound principles of religion, morals, and law, are easily recognised, whenever we meet with them in real life; but who can find them out under the disguise of theological literature and law books? Can it be denied that religion, which is indeed, as the gospel calls it, "the light of life," has been hidden from the simple and single hearted, by the scholastic subtilties, and the controversial storms of theology? And the law, which, in some of the ancient law books of Europe, is technically called the mirror, — a mirror in which every man should behold his own moral likeness, — has it not continually been troubled by the pedantry and priestcraft of the profession, so that it reflects only a distorted image, and, in fact, suits none but

those who love to fish in troubled waters? Morality, too, is fallen from its state of simplicity into sophistical casuistry; it has lost its life and soul under the palsying influence of a cold, tame, and worldly policy, misnamed Moral Philosophy. Lastly, philosophy itself comes in for the largest share in the unpopularity of the subject. Religion, Morals, and Law, though they are the very sources of eloquence in the pulpit and at the bar, have usually become uninteresting in the hands of scholars, who, instead of seeking the truth in the rich fields of experience, where it thrives amid the sunshine and the storms of life, have sought to astonish the world by publishing the experiments of their philosophical laboratories. They have brought philosophy into disrepute, making it a sort of alchymy, or search after the philosopher's stone; so that to philosophize about a thing, seems to be considered the same as to set aside common sense and the truth. "A thing may be true in theory, yet false in practice; of what importance then can the philosophy, or the mere theory of a thing be, to one, who cares only for what is true in practice?" So the practical man reasons against the theorist or philosopher. — Now if I should succeed in showing that nothing can be true or false in practice, but what is true or false, also, in theory; that every one is, or should be, a philosopher, that is, a seeker after reasons; and that every one is, or should be, a theologian, a lawyer, and a moralist, — I shall have done something, however little, toward making the subject of Moral Philosophy popular.

Considering the practical character of the subjects discussed in these lectures, I intend to treat of them, as I should of any other subject, generally acknowledged to be practical; as if I had come to propose to you some scheme of internal improvement, or some commercial project, or a voyage of discovery. Indeed, it requires but a moderate stretch of the imagination, to see a resemblance between the subject of Moral Philosophy, and those projects of enterprise and industry which I have just mentioned. A science, which has for its object the investigation of the moral powers, and the cultivation of the inner man, has as good a right, perhaps, as any other scheme, to be classed under the contested head of internal improvement. And with the same poetical license, if not justice, the subject of Moral Philosophy may be considered as the greatest commercial enterprise. If it is the object of commerce, to establish a safe, easy, and profitable intercourse between the inhabitants of distant parts of the earth, Moral Philosophy may be said to carry the true principles of Free Trade into the intercourse between all rational beings. For the object of Moral Philosophy, is no other than to ascertain the real interests and respective rights of all; to square the account between virtue and happiness, vice and misery; and to hold up, with a high hand, the eternal balance of justice in the moral world. Again, those who enter together upon the study of Moral Philosophy, may truly be said to set out on a voyage of discovery. They launch upon an endless and pathless element, in the light bark of reason, with

nothing to guide them on their doubtful way but the loadstar in their own breast, and that Spirit of Truth which never deserts those who do not desert themselves, but who steer right onward in pursuit of those treasures, which, as the Psalmist says, are "more to be desired than gold, yea, than much fine gold."

One disposed to make sport of our subject, might say that Moral Philosophy also resembles that late scheme of discovery, which, for want of any thing of importance to be explored on the surface of our globe, directs the restless adventurer to an unknown world in its interior. Let us not reject the sportive comparison, but improve it. The moral world which it is the object of this branch of philosophy to explore, is indeed a world within this world. And though the scheme or system that I have to propose to you, should be something like the dominions of the Great Khan of Tartary, described by Marco Polo, still, if it be pursued with the lofty faith of Columbus, it may lead, as it did in his case, to a continent of truth, a world of freedom, and a happy home.

But it is time I should return to the simple and sober purpose of this introductory address, hoping that the previous desultory remarks will pass, with my indulgent hearers, as the ornamented initials of an old manuscript, whose curious flourishes seem to be calculated to beguile the unwary reader, with its grave, and, sometimes, unpalatable contents. My intention is, first, to give a clear and succinct account of the subject of these lectures; then to make some remarks on its importance; and lastly, to lay before you the

plan and method which I intend to pursue in discussing it.

First, the subject of these lectures is Moral Philosophy, or an inquiry into the elements of Morals, Religion, and Law. Not much need be said in explanation of these terms. We all know that the words, morals and morality, refer to human conduct, as right or wrong, virtuous or vicious, conformable or opposed to the dictates of conscience and duty. We speak of morality sometimes as the practice, and sometimes as the principle or doctrine, of duty. Morality, in the latter sense of the word, may be taught, either as it is in the ten commandments, by enumerating certain rules of conduct; or, by inquiring into the foundation of our moral ideas of right and wrong, virtue and sin. It is then called ethics or moral philosophy, that is, the science of duty. A philosophical inquiry into the foundations of morals necessarily takes in, also, the elements of law and religion.

We understand, by morals or morality, all the duties of man, enjoined by conscience and reason, whether he find them prescribed or not by what he conceives to be the will of God, or by the laws of society. It is conscience, the moral lawgiver in his heart, that makes it his duty to obey the laws of society, which his reason approves as just, and to adopt, profess, and exercise that faith, which, from the best use of his reason, he thinks to be the truth. Still more, by a thorough investigation of human nature and the relations of life, he is able to ascertain what state of society, what laws, and what form of government

are most truly moral, that is, most conformable to conscience and reason, from their being best adapted to the true interests of man. This system of laws, which ought to be called the laws of nature, the only legitimate foundation of the existing laws of society, is entirely the result of moral philosophy. While philosophy thus enables us so to order our civil and political affairs, that our social condition may deserve the name of a moral state, it teaches us, on the other hand, to form a just conception of the moral government of the universe. The moral nature of man bears a prophetic testimony to the designs of the Creator; it enables us to recognise, in our approving or condemning conscience, the judgment that is to come, and to form a faith in divine justice, which is strong enough to triumph over the false teachings of a short-sighted experience of the success of virtue and vice in this world, that, in the end, when reason shall become vision, and we behold every thing even as it is, we shall see what He, who made it, saw from the beginning, that all is "good."

It is evident, therefore, that all our various duties, our civil and religious obligations, are connected by an intimate and indissoluble bond, and that this is essentially a moral bond. We have seen, that the elements of law and religion exist in the moral nature of man, and therefore must be the object of moral philosophy.

So much for the subject of these lectures. Few remarks are necessary to set forth its importance. That it is important to the lawyer and the theologian,

is obvious. By ascertaining the principles of natural law, it affords to the lawyer the only true test, the eternal standard, of the laws of man in every age, and in every part of the world. To the theologian it opens the book of the law and of prophecy, which the Author of his faith and his being has enshrined in the heart of man. But the law of nature, the law of God, is the same to all men. Moral philosophy, then, is more important to the lawyer and the theologian, only in so much as others forget, that the essential rights and duties, implied in these professions, are not confined to the pulpit and the bar. This self-forgetfulness is particularly culpable in a people, when the law of the land, being a transcript of the law of nature, unites with the faith of Christ in declaring, that all men are born equal, and all consciences are free; that all are kings and priests, clothed with native majesty, and invested with holy orders, by Him, who has made man a living spirit in his own likeness. One glance at society at large, as well as in its most private circles, must satisfy every one, that, if the moral principle were not superior to every other power in the world, every kingdom and every house would be divided against itself, and could not stand. Is it said, that it is the law and the magistrate, supported by military force, which secures freedom to the just, and slavery to the unjust? What is it, I would ask, that gives power to the law, which is to lay down, to the sentence of the judge, which is to apply, and to the military, which is to enforce, the rule of right? Is not the sense of justice, the moral

principle in the people, the creative power which calls forth, from the chaos of the crude elements of society, this finished world which we call the state? And is it not the same invisible principle, which alone can sustain the social order itself has created? The same principle, which has given birth and still gives aliment to our civil institutions, is manifested every day in those transactions of men which do not come under the cognizance of the law of the state. It imparts power to the mere word of a man where there is no witness; so that every agreement, made in good faith, becomes, in effect, the most solemn indenture, though the counterparts of it exist only in the hearts of him who spoke the word, and him who heard it. Thus, the moral principle invests the word of man with a power to control all his future actions; it gives to a transient breath of air a real, a living, an immortal existence.

I have spoken of morality as the invisible foundation of the law and the state. What, let me ask, are religion and the church without a moral basis? What, without it, is the offering we bring every Sabbath to the altar of God? It is the offering of Cain, unaccepted, unblessed, concerning which, the Lord hath spoken, "If thou dost not well, sin lieth at the door." Religion, without morality, exclusive fanaticism, is the spirit of Cain, rising from the worship of his Father to slay his brother, his fellow-man, who worships God in a different way, within the temple-gate of his own conscience. History has over-abundantly shown what religion is, and what she will do,

when disjoined from morality. But history has not yet shown what religion is, and what she can do in the world, when allied, for offence and defence, with the principles of morality ; when Christianity shall no longer be the willing handmaid of power, accommodating itself to every form of society, however vicious and perverse ; when the kingdom of this world shall establish, in time, the same principles which the kingdom of heaven secures for eternity.

Let us now turn from society at large, from church and state, to its smaller and stiller circles. What is the moral principle to domestic life ? It is the guardian angel that hovers around the cradle of human existence ; it is the cherubim, with the flaming sword before the paradise of pure affection, "to keep the way of the tree of life."

What is the moral principle to the individual man ? The human soul consists of an infinite variety of powers and tendencies, and, under the equal sway of morality, resembles a well-regulated commonwealth ; whereas the prevalence of any other principle tyrannizes over and enslaves the soul ; whilst the entire absence of some ruling principle throws the whole into anarchy and confusion. Of all the human faculties, the moral principle is the only one which is liable to no excess. There cannot be too much virtue, too strict an adherence to duty, while it is the only one which keeps every other from running into extremes, interrupting the order, and breaking the peace of the soul. It is, in the inner man, what the administration of justice is in society. For it

does justice to his whole nature, his lower, as well as his higher interests. Not only the animal appetites and selfish propensities, such as the love of gain, of power, and of show, distract and debase the soul, if they usurp the supremacy; but even the higher, the intellectual and spiritual tendencies, if they wander beyond their appointed path, disturb the beautiful system of the soul. Thus, excessive study is apt to indispose the mind for active duties; and, on the other hand, excessive devotion to business tends to impair the love of information. Attachment to our own family, if excessive, will destroy or weaken our interest in the community; and too great zeal in politics may blunt our tender sympathies with our nearest friend. The same is true of the religious principle, if it is indulged in to the neglect of our intellectual and social duties and enjoyments. For, while the various powers, which are mysteriously bound up in the germ of human existence, are branching out in all directions, religion was implanted in man to raise the tree of life from earth to heaven; but not to absorb, in its upward growth, all the nourishment intended for the perfection of the whole, for branches, blossoms, and fruits, and thus to send up a lofty stem without the power to support itself, without use, and without beauty. I repeat, it is the moral principle which prevents each tendency of the soul from running into excess; but this control is widely different from that artificial system of checks and balances, producing a state of rest, which some of the ancient philosophers deemed the highest good. The true object of mo-

rality is to marshal all the various powers of the soul, in order to lead them in a steady progression to the severest of all struggles, and the most glorious of all triumphs, the conquest of self, and a continual approach to divine perfection.

But enough, and perhaps more than enough, has been said of the importance of the moral principle in society, and in the character of the individual. Words are lost where reality speaks so loud. But of what importance can the philosophy of morals be to us, in particular, who possess in the Gospel a perfect code of duty? I do not hesitate to say, that the Gospel itself enjoins the study of moral philosophy. For what is true philosophy? It is to "judge of ourselves what is right"; it is, to "prove all things, and to hold fast that which is good." Besides, the Gospel is not a complete code of all the particular duties of life, but a revelation of the spirit of morality which is alone able to guide us into all moral truth. This is the true glory of this revelation, and one of the most powerful internal proofs of its authenticity. It is that which distinguishes it from other records held sacred by men, which made the moral perfection of man to consist in the performance of certain commandments specified in the law. Thus, for example, the Gospel does not contain rules to regulate the political affairs of a country, and settle questions of international law. But this one saying of Christ, "Ye are all brethren,"* is sufficient to solve, by a fair and fearless deduction, all the enigmas in politics, and to settle the most complicated relations in the intercourse of men.

To show that the revelation of the great moral principle in Scripture, is in reality a revelation of the moral nature of man; and, by a continuous train of reasoning, to deduce from these premises all the various duties of life, — this is the object of Moral Philosophy.

I have spoken first, of the subject of these lectures, and then of its importance. I will now briefly set before you the plan and method I intend to pursue in presenting it to you. In point of method, I can only say, that it should be at the same time philosophical and popular. It should be philosophical or scientific, that is, a thorough and systematic course of reasoning, calculated to ascertain the foundation and essence of morality, and display the harmony of all the various duties of life. These lectures should be popular, that is, free from dry and abstruse disquisitions and scholastic terminology. Each principle should be illustrated by pertinent examples, not merely because they attract the attention, but because they are, if properly chosen, some of the very facts from which those principles are deduced, and therefore are best adapted to bring them home to the individual experience of all.

The plan of my lectures is simply this. I shall introduce the subject by an historical account of some of the most remarkable systems of morals and religion ; particularly those of Plato and Aristotle, Zeno and Epicurus, among the ancients, and those of Spinoza and Kant among modern philosophers. I shall endeavour to represent these systems, which have had

great influence on the opinions of men, with historical accuracy, and give a critical exposition of their peculiar excellences and defects. The history of philosophy places the student on the summit of the attainments hitherto made, and opens a view of the whole ; and will therefore save him, as well from a sluggish and slavish acquiescence in any one system, as from a vain and preposterous running after originality. But the history of philosophy is not philosophy itself. In treating of the great philosophical productions of ancient and modern times, it is not my object to fortify, by their authority, any views I have to propose. The vessel in which I wish you to embark, however small, does not sail under the flag of any potentate in philosophy ; nor is the cargo taken upon credit ; still less is she a slave-ship. It is the object of moral philosophy to break the spell of authority, and emancipate reason, that it may establish, by its own industry, a household of truth supported by faithful inquiry.

All true philosophy consists in reasoning from facts, such facts as come under the observation, and consequently within the jurisdiction, of every sound mind.

The various topics I intend to discuss, naturally fall under these three heads, first, the *foundation* of morals and religion in human nature ; second, the developement of these principles by *education ;* and thirdly, their *establishment* in society, chiefly by civil and religious institutions, church and state.

The first of these three subjects of inquiry, the foundation of morality, leads to the discussion of

some questions of controversial philosophy. Are religion, morality, and law, founded in the nature of man, or are they productions of education and civilization? Is there any essential difference between right and expediency? Is there any between conscience and reason? Is man a moral free agent, or is his character the necessary result of circumstances? What influence has the cultivation of the taste and the fine arts, upon the morals of the community?

Under the head of education I shall discuss the general principles, and the peculiar, comparative, and united advantages of domestic and public education.

Under the third head, treating of the establishment of morals and religion in society, I shall discuss, first, some topics relative to civil and political institutions, such as the natural rights of men; the rights and duties [illegible] from the domestic relations; the foundation of property and of civil obligations; the mutual obligations of the buyer and seller, particularly with regard to the disclosure of advantages contemplated by each in the bargain. I shall treat, also, of the right to inflict capital punishment; of the foundation of political constitutions and government; the right of general taxation for the purpose of public education; and lastly, the right to resist measures of government and to change its form. I shall then speak of religious institutions; of the mode of spreading true religion among men, and perpetuating it by associations and forms of worship. These investigations derive an immediate interest from the actual fermentations in the political and religious world. Church and state

seem striving after new and more enlarged forms, and a deeper foundation. Perhaps a thorough inquiry into the principles of human nature, on which those establishments are grounded, may enable us to lift the veil of futurity, or at least bring us nearer to the solution of the great enigma of our time.

These are some of the most prominent subjects to be discussed. Others of the same nature will be examined in connexion with these, so far as the limits of the course will allow.

I have endeavoured to bring before you, my respected hearers, the subject of these lectures, its importance, and the plan I intend to pursue. What I have now set before you are but a few rough sketches, taken in haste, to be drawn out more fully hereafter, in travelling over a vast territory, whose riches, to speak only of those displayed on the surface, have never been compassed by the exploring mind of man; and whose hidden treasures are known only to him whose wisdom has laid the foundations of earth and heaven, and fathomed the mighty deep of truth.

Allow me to sum up these scattered remarks in the language of that great friend of every friend of truth, whose day-labor was not finished after light was denied to his mortal eyes. It is the object of the moral philosopher "to imbreed and cherish in a great people the seeds of virtue and public civility, to allay the perturbations of the mind, and set the affections in right tune;" — "whatsoever in religion is holy and sublime, in virtue amiable or grave, whatsoever hath passion or admiration in all the changes of that which

is called fortune from without, or the wily subtilties and refluxes of man's thoughts from within; all these things with a solid and treatable smoothness to paint out and describe, teaching over the whole book of sanctity and virtue, through all the instances of example, with such delight to those especially of soft and delicious temper, who will not so much as look upon truth herself, unless they see her elegantly dressed; that whereas the paths of honesty and good life appear now rugged and difficult, though they be indeed easy and pleasant, they will then appear to all men easy and pleasant, though they were rugged and difficult indeed." What is said here of "the paths of good life," is true also of moral philosophy, which is, indeed, as we have seen, the science of good life. To enter with me upon these seemingly difficult, though truly pleasant paths, I now cordially and respectfully invite you. True, our journey is through a wilderness of doubt, and this life can lead only to the borders of the promised land. Still, it is the highest success granted to mortal man to rescue himself and his generation from the bondage of error; and, at the end of his pilgrimage after truth, from the eminence he has attained, to see before him, as Moses did, the bright regions which those who follow after him, are called to explore and possess; while he reads in the setting sun of this life a promise of higher glories, the earnest of a new creation of light, to which the night of death can alone introduce him. But, lest there arise a dispute among the disciples of truth, who shall be the first, let it be remembered that

not he who assumes the office of a teacher, but he from whom we learn the most, is the leader; and thus it may prove that a little child shall be the first in the commonwealth of truth, as it is the first in the kingdom of heaven.

# LECTURE II.

I HAVE stated, in my introductory address, the reasons which make me consider an acquaintance with the history of Moral Philosophy, as the best preparation for the study itself. We, in this way, possess ourselves of all the treasures, which our predecessors in the pursuit of truth have laid up for their posterity, to save us from wasting our strength in speculations, which have been already successfully accomplished by others, or in those, which the examples of their errors should teach us to avoid. It prevents our ploughing over again, the ground that has been tilled already, or that which the most faithful toil has found absolutely barren; that we may begin the work of intellectual culture where others have left it; and having put our hand to the plough, strike deep and press forward.

In this investigation of the philosophical attainments of former times, in morals, religion, and law, I am limited by the extent of this course, both as regards the principles of which I shall give the history, and the works in which they are made the subject of inquiry. This historical sketch can embrace only the general rules of conduct, the leading principles and

fundamental truths of morality; and the most interesting systems advanced in ancient or modern times. I proceed to give a brief account of the Moral Philosophy of antiquity, that is, before the introduction of Christianity.

When we compare the attainments in Moral Philosophy, as well as in every other department of knowledge, in different ages and parts of the world, and endeavour to ascertain in what quarters this light was first kindled and successively received, our investigation lights upon Asia, and more particularly India, as the mother country of religion, science, and the arts; and upon Greece, as the first independent colony of civilization in the ancient world. It was the enterprising industry of Greece, which improved by their own inventions, and spread all over the world, the native intellectual, as well as physical wealth of Southern Asia and Egypt, which was there concentrated in a few hands. We trace the beginnings of civilization in this continent to Europe; ancient Europe owed it, in the next place, to its own watchful sentinel in the east, the genius of Greece; whose early culture was, in a great measure, the production of settlements from Asia and Egypt; and whose sages, when it had attained to maturity, still resorted to the same fountains of knowledge. Abraham, the founder of the Jewish faith and nation, came from the interior of Asia; and in Egypt itself, the social institutions and religion bear marks of an eastern origin. This seems to be the result of those researches into the origin of nations, language, and civilization, which are going on

in the old world with ever increasing zeal, as if to show forth the perpetual analogy between the human race and the individual man, who in his old age, loves to go back in memory to the scenes of his childhood. According to these historical researches, the choice plant of civilization, which, in every other country appears to be an exotic, more or less naturalized, is the indigenous growth of India.

The religious and moral ideas of the ancient Hindoos are embodied particularly in the Vedas, or Hindoo scriptures, and in the laws of Menu. These records are written in Sanscrit, a language which is no longer spoken, but which seems to contain the roots of the most ancient languages of Asia and Europe, and is perhaps richer than any other, not only in figurative, but in abstract expressions, to signify the attributes of mind and of the Deity. Notwithstanding the fables with which national vanity has disfigured the chronology of the Hindoos, their sacred writings seem to be older than those of any other nation. The oldest of them, the Vedas, contain partly religious and moral speculations, and precepts, and partly the law of sacred rites and observances. In these books and their ancient commentaries, the simple and sublime doctrines of one God, the immortality of the soul, and a future retribution, are distinctly and impressively taught. But this doctrine is mixed up with symbolical attributes and an allegorical cosmogony, in which we see the foundations of the popular superstition, which to this day prevails in India.

The law of Menu is a code which contains the re-

ligion, morals, and the law of private and public rights ; and particularly the division of the nation into higher and lower castes, as they were found in all the great kingdoms of Asia, and in Egypt. This division, which confines every person, according to his descent, to the hereditary employment of his caste, condemns the large majority of the people to ignorance and error, particularly to a degrading idolatry, artfully and forcibly kept up by the more enlightened and powerful castes. Those in the higher walks of life attracted to themselves all the rays of intellectual light from former ages, and let the whole shade fall upon the lower classes. With regard to such a state of society, it may be observed, in general, that the most elevated and refined views of religion and morality, if they are the prerogative of a few, and artfully withheld from the many, are apt soon to become merely a matter of expediency, and at last degenerate into hypocrisy, the cover of atheism and sensuality.

Examples to illustrate this truth may be found, not only among heathen nations, but among the Jews, at the time when the Scribes and Pharisees, contrary to the institutions of Moses, had, in fact, established such a distinction between themselves, as the only legitimate interpreters of the law, and the people at large. The same sad effects have been experienced in the Christian world, wherever an ambitious priesthood has held the consciences of men spell-bound to its usurped and entailed authority.

To return to the laws of Menu ; examples of the most just, beautiful, and sublime thoughts, together

with the most unjust and absurd notions, may be found in every part of this code. A high state of refinement, for example, is implied in this passage of the law, from the chapter on marriage ; " Where females are honored, there the Deities are pleased ; but where they are disrespected, there all religious acts become fruitless." But how different a system is displayed in this passage, from the chapter on Penance and Expiation ; " A priest who should retain in his memory the whole of the Rigveda, (a portion of the sacred writings,) would be absolved from guilt, even if he had slain the inhabitants of the three worlds, and had eaten food from the foulest hands." Other examples might be quoted, to show the strange mixture of contradictory sentiments ; but want of time obliges me to refer you, for the laws and philosophy of the Hindoos, to works devoted to this interesting subject, particularly those of Sir William Jones, and the " Asiatic Researches" of the Society in Bengal, and the " Hindoo Library," edited at Bonn in Germany.

I close this subject with a few of the best passages from the Vedas themselves. " There is one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts or passion, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the Maker and Preserver of all things."

" Let us adore the supremacy of that divine Sun, the Godhead, who illuminates all, who recreates all, from whom all proceed, to whom all must return, whom we invoke to direct our understandings aright, in our progress to his holy seat."

" May that soul of mine, which mounts aloft in

my waking hours, and which, even in my slumber, has a like ascent, soaring to a great distance, as an emanation from the Light of lights, be united by devout meditation with the Spirit supremely blest and supremely intelligent."

The moral foundation of the doctrine of a future state, is exhibited in these passages.

"The pure, enlightened soul assumes a luminous form, with no gross body, untainted by sin, itself being a ray from the infinite Spirit."

"To those regions, where the evil spirits dwell, and which utter darkness involves, will such men surely go after death, as destroy the purity of their own souls."

The foundation of respect and tenderness toward all beings is shown by this passage.

"The man, who considers all beings as existing ever in the supreme Spirit, and the supreme Spirit as pervading all beings, henceforth views no creature with contempt."

To these passages from the Vedas may be added the beautiful Áryá couplet, written at least three centuries before our era, which pronounces the duty of a good man, even at the moment of his destruction, to consist not only in forgiving, but even in a desire of benefiting his destroyer, "as the sandal-tree, in the instant of its overthrow, sheds perfume on the axe which fells it."

It is remarkable, that, among the Hindoos, we find, at an age previous to that of the Grecian philosophy, schools of philosophers dissenting from each other on

the same grounds as did afterwards those of Greece. We find the elements of the Platonic, the Aristotelian, the Stoic, and the Skeptic schools; and with regard to their sacred books, the "Vedas," we find a similar division of religious sects among them as among Christians. There are those who may be called orthodox, others mystics, and others rationalists. From that which is known about them, we see that the human mind, wherever it be unfolded, will differ on the subjects of religion and morals; and that it will differ nearly on the same grounds; each individual, or sect, generally embracing a part of the truth, and mistaking it for the whole. The prevailing philosophical creed in India, however, is pantheism, the doctrine that every individual thing, the human soul included, has emanated from God, and must at last lose its individuality in God;—to state it in the words of Menu, "The man who perceives in his own soul the divine soul present in all creatures, acquires equanimity toward them all, and shall be absorbed at last in the highest essence, even that of the Almighty himself." It is characteristic of all the speculations of the Hindoos, that happiness, or the highest good of man, does not consist in action and exertion, but in passive contemplation.

Ideas, like those in the Hindoo Scriptures, are also expressed in the most ancient religious document of the Medes and Persians, the "Zendavest." In China, too, we find fragments of an excellent system of morals, mixed up with despotic principles, particularly in the writings of the Chinese philosopher

Confucius, who was born about four hundred and fifty years before Christ. In his work on the right mean, we find the passage, "Ask your own heart; judge of others by yourself. It is the first rule of wisdom, never to do to others what we do not wish them to do to us." Confucius thus sums up his system of ethics. "He, who shall be fully persuaded that the Lord of Heaven governs the universe, who shall in all things use moderation, who shall perfectly know his own species, and so act among them, that his life and manners may conform to his knowledge of God and man, may be truly said to discharge the duties of a sage, and to be far exalted above the common herd of the human race." In the *beau idéal* of the Chinese state, as described by Confucius, the domestic power of a father of a family, and the dependence of the family on him, is made the basis of the constitution; the empire being considered as the family of the emperor.

Of a belief in the immortality of the soul, there is no trace in the doctrine of the Chinese philosopher.*

Sublime doctrines of morality, law, and religion, together with gross idolatry and despotism, are found also among the ancient Egyptians. But of the religion and philosophy of the Egyptians, we shall probably be better able to judge, when the late great dis-

* Family registers are kept in China, to record the deeds of the dead, to make them live in the memory; — a semblance of immortality gratifying, and manifesting the deep desire in human nature.

coveries in the art of deciphering the hieroglyphical literature of that interesting country, shall have thrown light, as we hope, on what is still involved in uncertainty.

The ancient history of morals and religion records another document more important than either of the forementioned systems. I mean the Hebrew Scriptures, or the Old Testament; and I here speak of its importance, not on account of the source from which it is derived, but of the moral and religious principles themselves, whose truth and excellence must be the same in the mouth of the ignorant and the hypocrite, as in that of the inspired saint. But I forbear enlarging on this subject, which is sufficiently understood by all who hear me. Only with regard to the importance of the Old Testament in the history of Moral Philosophy, I will observe, that it does not contain a different morality and religion for different classes, as was the case in the great kingdoms of Asia, and in Egypt; it does not contain one law or doctrine for the rulers and Levites, and another for the people, but the same for all. And however peculiar and unsocial many of its religious institutions were with regard to other nations, still, the oldest tradition of this nation, handed down from Abraham, contained a prophecy that pointed to a time, at which such an external separation would be no longer necessary, but all the nations of the earth should be blessed by the same divine faith.

The investigations of the ancient Greeks in morals and religion, which are next to be considered, were

characterized by a truly philosophical tendency, by searching after the elements, and unfolding the harmony, of all things. In morality, it was the object of Grecian philosophy to ascertain the true end of human existence, or, as they termed it, the highest good of man. In the philosophy of religion, or speculative theology, they sought for the great principle of the vast system of creation.

I now intend to present to you, first, the outlines of the most remarkable systems of religious philosophy among the Greeks; deferring the history of their philosophy of morals to my next lecture.

The various speculations on religion naturally fall under these two heads; first, those systems which trace all things and events in the world to a number of causes or elements; and second, those which refer every thing to one self-existing principle.

Under the first head we comprehend two sets of opinions, the ancient polytheism of the people, and the system of those philosophers who thought the world composed of material elements, or atoms. The former believed that those events which are not produced by men, and nevertheless are indicative of design, those in particular which have an influence on human affairs, are brought about by a number of spiritual beings. The elements and powers of the visible world, and the most prominent qualities of the human mind, such as may be considered as the elements of the character, were personified and worshipped as gods and goddesses. The earth was thought to be not merely a dead mass, but a goddess, the mother of all living

things ; the sea and the rivers, the air and the wind, the fire and the sun, were endowed with intelligence and will ; the courage of passion was worshipped as Mars, the courage of wisdom as Minerva. Strange as this idolatry now appears to us, it is the natural growth of a propensity in human nature which is still the same, but manifested more strikingly at a time when it was not restrained by Christianity and modern civilization. We still are prone to deify what we fear, and what we love ; a loyal European looks upon his sovereign with superstitious dread or affection ; love everywhere becomes worship, be its object an individual, or our family, or our country. The practical idolatry of the Naiads and Dryads, of Flora, the Graces and the Muses, only show that the Greeks loved beauty more than themselves.

While, on the one hand, popular polytheism referred all things and events in the world to numberless immaterial beings, that philosophical school which is characterized by the name of the atomistic, derived every thing from material elements or atoms. This system was first advanced by Leucippus, probably a native of Miletus, who was born about five hundred years before Christ ; and was improved by his disciple, Democritus, of Abdera. This system asserted, in the first place, that nothing is real, but what is corporeal or material. The gods are considered partly the creation of the ignorance of men, who, as Democritus says, not being able to explain thunder, lightning, eclipses, and other great phenomena, ascribe them to gods ; and partly the impressions or images of real

objects reflected on the mind in such a natural or accidental connexion, as to give rise to religious ideas. The soul itself is material, possessing the essential properties of fire.

In the second place, all material things, that is, according to this system, every thing, may be divided into parts, and these again into smaller ones, and so on, until they are reduced to the smallest possible particles, the atoms, which are indivisible. For the thing that is divided being finite, the division cannot go on without end; and that which remains at last, cannot be nothing, but must be something; and this something must be of the same nature, that is, material.

Third, the combination of atoms forms bodies; their separation destroys them; and different compositions of atoms produce all the changes in the world. Thus the same letters differently arranged, form a comedy or a tragedy, says Leucippus.

Fourth, these various combinations and separations of the atoms, take place by a power of motion inherent in them, according to a certain necessity, of which Leucippus, who asserts it, says nothing to explain the nature. Democritus says, the atoms possessing individually a repulsive power, a rotatory motion is produced, which accounts for the continual rounds of events in the world.

The philosopher of Agrigentum, Empedocles, contemporary with Democritus, who advanced similar opinions, thought all the combinations of elements and changes in the world, were the work of chance, and

not of design. This complete atheism was not professed by Leucippus and Democritus. Still, as their system acknowledged nothing as real, but material atoms, moving in the empty space, the existence of the Deity is virtually excluded.

Against this absolute materialism, it is sufficient to observe, that through our consciousness we have at least as certain evidence of our thoughts and feelings, and other immaterial operations of our minds, as we have through our senses of any external objects.

The supposition of atoms, or indivisible elements of material objects, is contrary to experience, which knows of no limits to the division and subdivision of matter, as well as to all mathematical conception. For if extent or quantity is, as these philosophers allow, the essential attribute of all that is corporeal, it is impossible to conceive of an absolute indivisible minimum.

I have shown that in Greece, among those who reasoned about the origin of things and events in the world, there were some who assigned them to a variety of causes; the polytheists to immaterial beings, the gods; the atomistic philosophers to material elements. These systems seem to have sprung from a desire to account for particular facts in nature, without thinking of it as one great whole. While so many things in the world, and so many of the powers of nature are opposed to one another, we see a constant harmony pervading and keeping the whole; without which it could not endure. To explain this harmony, and the cause of it, was the object of those

reasoners to whom I have before alluded in opposition to the polytheists and atomistic philosophers.

A perception of the necessity of one supreme power, we find already in the ancient popular belief in a fate or destiny, which controlled the will of gods as well as of men. Among philosophers, Pythagoras of Samos, the great improver of mathematics, who was born about six hundred and eight years before Christ, seems first to have been deeply impressed with the harmony of the universe.

Numbers, that is quantities and proportions, are, according to him, the elements of things. It is well known, that the authority of this philosopher was so great, that the mere assertion, "He has said it," stood for argument with his disciples. But the accounts of his system are so various, and, frequently, incongruous, the more recent authors are so prolix in speaking of it, while the ancient authorities are so remarkably reserved, that it is almost as difficult to know what he has not said, as what he has said.

The various systems which were founded upon the idea of one self-existent principle in the world, may be divided into three classes. The first is Pantheism, the system of those who hold that God and the world are one and the same. The second class embraces those systems which suppose the self-existent and creative principle to be a material element, either water, or fire, or air; and the third class contains those in which mind, the immaterial principle, is acknowledged as God over all.

In the first place, Pantheism was first advanced

as an independent scientific system, by the Eleatic school, or the philosophers of Elea, a colony of the Phoceans in lower Italy. The founder of this system was Xenophanes, who lived about five hundred and thirty years before Christ. It was improved by his friend and disciple Parmenides, and afterwards by two disciples of the latter, Zeno of Elea, (not to be confounded with the founder of the Stoic school,) and Melissus of Samos, who is known also as a general and conqueror of an Athenian fleet. The two first philosophers wrote in verse; the two latter in prose.

Xenophanes deeply felt how unworthy of the Supreme Being were the common ideas of the gods, and every attribute derived from imperfect human beings. He formed the ground of this anthropomorphism, in the predilection of each being for itself and its race. The beasts, he said, if they had hands, and could paint, would lend to the gods a figure like their own. He reasoned further, there can be only one God, because if there were more than one, neither of them could be perfect, neither of them would be God. He is but one, and this one is all that is. According to this assertion of the identity of God with the universe, Pantheism was commonly characterized by the words, "One and all." The Eleatic philosophers, then, considered God as the one absolute being, eternal, filling all space, (and therefore excluding the very idea of an empty space,) indivisible, unchangeable, and immovable. He is immovable, for motion cannot exist, unless there exist a space which is, at least, comparatively empty, or not entirely filled with reali-

ty, — that is, a thing cannot move without a space to move in. He is unchangeable, for an object, in order to become something different from what it is, must cease to be ; it must, at least in part, become nothing. But this is an impossibility, since the very idea of reality excludes that of nonentity.

This idea of God, as the one absolute being, is, according to the philosophers of Elea, a pure conception of reason, unattainable by our senses. By our senses we perceive nothing but what is a part of something else, or dissimilar to other things, changeable, coming into existence and perishing. This contradiction between our experience derived from the senses, and the pure conception of reason of the one absolute being, already induced Xenophanes to doubt the reality of all ideas derived from the senses ; his disciples went further, and declared them all delusion.

As this supposed contradiction between experience and the pure conceptions of reason, is common also to several modern systems, particularly that of Kant, I shall here state briefly what I have to object to it. Our experience is derived from our senses, by which we perceive corporeal things, and from self-consciousness, which reveals to us spiritual realities, the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of our own minds. Having seen many beautiful trees, we find, by reflection, those qualities which are common to all sorts of trees ; and being conscious of many different thoughts, we ascertain, by reflection, what belongs to all thoughts. Thus we form, by reflection, that is, by an act of our reason, the general or abstract idea of a tree, or a

thought; and thus, when we compare all sorts of things within our experience, material and spiritual, we find one quality equally belonging to each one of them. This most general, most abstract quality, is existence. However things may differ in other qualities, which make them stones, or trees, or men, in this they all agree, that they are, or exist.

Now the God of the Eleatic philosophers is nothing but this general and abstract idea of existence, or being, which is one and the same in all things, — absolute, universal existence.

But it is evident from what I have said, that this existence is not a perception of reason, independent of experience, but a quality of which we have no other knowledge, than what we derive from experience, from finding the same in all objects of sense and consciousness. It is the result of reason reflecting upon the facts which are furnished by experience; and can consequently not be opposed to experience, this being its own foundation. The whole reasoning, therefore, from the identity of the universal being, to prove the impossibility of all variety, change, and motion in the world, vanishes as a metaphysical dream. To be, means nothing else than to be an object of knowledge. Now there is no object of our knowledge, of which mere existence is the only attribute; every thing exists in some form, with some qualities by which it is distinguished from other things, — be it water or fire, a circle or a triangle, a particular plant, or a particular animal. Existence does not exclude a variety of qualities in the same thing, nor opposite qualities in

different things. God, therefore, if you ascribe to him existence, can, without contradiction, be supposed to exist in an immense variety of things and properties, many of which are opposed to one another.

Nor does the mere idea of absolute existence exclude that of change in the world, as the philosopher of Elea supposed. If experience shows us that the seed becomes a tree, it indeed ceases to exist as a seed, but it does not cease to exist; it does not become nothing; it continues to be, though it should change all other qualities or modes of existence. All that can properly be called change in the world, is a change in those qualities which every thing possesses besides its mere existence. The sameness of this fundamental quality, and the changeableness of others, rest upon the same evidence, that of experience.

What, then, shall we say to those who argue as the Eleatic philosophers did, that there can be no difference, no change, no action in the world, and that God himself cannot be an active and creative being, because the idea of existence includes that of non-existence, and all change implies a conversion of something into nothing?

We simply say, he who thus argues, has no correct idea either of existence, or of variety and change. He forgets that existence is never formed except in union with other existing qualities, and that all that can be called change affects only those distinguishing qualities; that of existence remaining the same under all variation.

The unnatural rejection of all the evidence of ex-

perience, strengthened the system of materialism as advanced by the atomistic philosophers; and the honest inquirers of Elea themselves, having started from the idea of absolute existence, were at last led by their speculations to the brink of absolute skepticism. For, having rejected all experience, the idea of one God, by which they rose so high above the general polytheism, lost all practical, and even theoretical interest, since they divested his being of every attribute except that of mere existence. As the Eleatic philosophers did not believe in a separate existence of the world, but identified God and the universe, they of course did not believe in the creation of the world, nor in a creative principle. Among those who supposed the world to have taken its origin from one creative principle, I shall speak first of those who considered the final cause a material, and then of those by whom it was held to be an immaterial or spiritual principle.

Among those who believed that the creative principle was material in its nature, history mentions particularly some philosophers in Ionia; Thales, Anaximander, and his friend and disciple Anaximenes, who lived in Miletus between the years 640 and 551; and Heraclitus, a native of Ephesus, who flourished about five hundred years before the Christian era.

According to Thales, water is the essence of all things, from which they all originate, and into which they are again dissolved. Anaximenes thought air was the essence of all things; Heraclitus, fire. The system of the latter, of which the foundation was

probably laid by Pythagoras, has lately been revived by Oken, a celebrated natural historian and philosopher of Germany.

Each of these theories is evidently founded upon a partial observation of a number of phenomena, particular instances, in which certain things are found arising from, and again resolved into, water, or air, or fire. The infinite variety of phenomena in nature, which forbids our supposing either of the four elements to be the essence of all things, was perceived by the self-taught Anaximander. Infinite matter he considered as the substance of the universe, which contains the various elements, and, in a continual change, originates, and again absorbs all things.

But the insufficiency of all systems of materialism to explain the living harmony of the world, was first deeply perceived by a man, who forms a new era, and whose system may well be called a creation of light in the philosophical world. This man was Anaxagoras, born at Clazomenæ, in Ionia, about five hundred years before Christ. The son of a wealthy citizen, he resigned his patrimony to his relations, in order to devote himself to what he declared to be the most worthy calling of man, the contemplation of the heavens, and the investigation of nature. His indifference to the politics of the day drew upon him the reproach of some of his fellow-citizens, that he was forgetful of his country. "O no!" said he, "I am but too mindful of my country," pointing with his hand toward heaven. In his forty-fifth year he came to Athens, the capital of civilization and intellec-

tual life in the ancient world; where he became the teacher and friend of the greatest man of his age, the clear-sighted, intrepid, humane, and patriotic Pericles.

Sun, moon, and stars, which the people revered as gods, he considered as parts of nature; the sun as a fiery mass, the moon as a dark body, containing sea and land, mountains and valleys. Eclipses, those awful and portentous events to his unenlightened contemporaries, he considered as natural and explainable phenomena. As a true philosopher, he never resorted to any supernatural agency, whenever events could be explained from natural causes. But, finding no cause adequate to account for motion, order, and design in the world, he boldly rose beyond it, and declared, that these evidences of perfection could be only the work of intelligence, of a mind wholly distinct from matter and all material elements and attributes, not one and the same with the world, but independent of it. God, or, as he preferred to call Him, the Mind, operates upon matter, which he considered as a dead and uncreated mass, imparted to it motion and life, and combined its inherent, various, and discordant qualities into one harmonious whole. What better criticism, what higher praise could his contemporaries bestow upon this definition of the nature of God, and his relation to the world, than by awarding to the inventor of this system the name which he applied to the Almighty Framer of the world. Anaxagoras was called, first in derision, by the comedians of Athens, and then, with devout admiration by the thinking world, — the Mind.

Much may be said against the idea of Anaxagoras concerning matter, as absolutely dead in itself, and coeternal with the Deity. But his idea of the Supreme Being, as independent of the world which he has formed, as simple and pure intelligence, — this idea was a progress in religious philosophy, which seemed to require but one step more to perfection.

This step, so far as human wisdom could devise it, was taken by Socrates and Plato, two men, whom one of the most ancient fathers of our church considered as having been taught by the Spirit of God.

Anaxagoras had endeavoured to point out the divine essence; Socrates and Plato to ascertain the ultimate motive of all the operations, and thus to establish the character, of God. They summed up the whole result of their inquiries in declaring, that God is good. Anaxagoras knew no name more expressive of the being of God, than that of Mind. Socrates and Plato formed none so worthy of his character as that which they constantly and emphatically applied to him, the simple name of Goodness.

I have set before you some outlines of the ancient history of the philosophy of religion, or speculative theology; its sublime beginnings in Asia; its free developement in Greece.

I have nothing more to say on the subject of religious philosophy among the ancients; and I shall go on in my next lecture to give an account of the ancient philosophy of morals and natural law.

# LECTURE III.

In my last lecture I have given an historical sketch of one branch of moral philosophy, the philosophy of religion, in the ancient world. Besides the relation of man to the Deity, his relation to society and to himself, as a responsible being, and capable of self-improvement, are sources of duty, and, consequently, departments of moral philosophy, the ancient history of which will be the subject of this lecture.

Among the social duties, those which arise from the civil and political relations are particularly to be mentioned in this historical account. In the systems of the moralists of Greece, the civil relations, and the metaphysics of the state generally, form the most prominent and extensive part of ethics. Still more, the chief characteristic of ancient Greece herself consists in the civil polity which distinguished that nation, and afterwards her great disciples in Italy, from all the kingdoms of Asia and Africa. Of this striking difference in the idea of natural law in the ancient world, I can mention here only the essentials.

In the earliest periods of the world, the civil institutions, or what bore a resemblance to them, were

founded upon power, actual superiority ; the strong ruled over the weak. This ruling strength originated and resided chiefly in three things ; first, the power of a father over his family and dependents, which gave rise to the patriarchal government, probably the oldest form of social subordination, as we still find it among the herdmen of middle Asia, and the Arabian tribes. Second, courage and superior strength gave rise to military government, established by conquerors. Third, superior wisdom, particularly practical wisdom, such as the knowledge of physic and astronomy, is the foundation of the ascendancy of priests and hierarchical states.

The father of a family becomes a patriarch, or domestic ruler over many dependents, by a long, successful life, and the increase of his family and his cattle. These, therefore, we find the great objects of desire, of exertion, and prayer, among the Eastern nations. The patriarch is the judge, the priest, and the general of his tribe.

But superior wisdom and power are incalculable endowments of individuals. Warriors and priests rise up from the multitude, and their ascendancy limits that of the patriarch to its original extent, the private rights of the head of a family. Priests and warriors generally combine, in order to reign, by mutual assistence, as the higher *castes*, over the rest of the people. Sometimes the priests have a superiority over the warriors, as in India and in Meroe ; sometimes the warriors over the priests, as in Persia and Egypt, where, nevertheless, the chief of the warriors was obliged to be, or become, a priest.

But that social instinct, which impelled men, in Asia and Africa, to herd together in masses, in lasting subjection to kings and priests, could not control that aspiring race, in whom reason and the free will of man asserted their superiority over custom, superstition, and physical force. The principles of Asiatic despotism vanished before the fearless understanding, as the fleets and armies of Asia sunk under the infant heroism, of Greece. While, in those large kingdoms, the social relations were characterized by uniformity and subordination, the principles of individuality and change were the characteristics of the ancient Greeks. They abolished royalty, and put in its place responsible magistrates; they outgrew the control of priests, who were chosen by the people from amongst themselves. Their associations, as towns and commonwealths, were not merely the productions of circumstances, but of the free agreement of the individuals who composed them. In all their social relations, we find the spirit of competition and rivalry, stirring in their politics, animating their industry and taste, and blazing forth in those lofty exhibitions of republican chivalry, the public games of Olympia. The Commonwealth of Athens, whose citizens appeared and acted like independent states, allied with one another, — and the republic of Lacedæmon, that daring and wonderful contrivance to change the nature of man into a civil and political existence, — are evidences of the emancipated power of reason and will. They showed at once, that, whilst mankind, in other parts of the world, was still

under age, in Greece it had attained to its years of discretion, to that state of maturity, in which nations, as well as individuals, become the responsible authors of their own happiness or misery.

To show the principles of natural law, embodied in the constitutions of republican Greece, allow me to call to your mind a few characteristics of those of Sparta and of Athens, the two leading States, which served as models to most of the others, particularly during the Peloponnesian war.

In the constitution of Sparta, which Lycurgus, in the year 880 before Christ, devised for Lacedæmon, the highest good, or greatest happiness of the citizens was made to consist, not in the developement of all the faculties of man, but in the greatest possible civil freedom of the citizens within the territory of Lacedæmon. This civil freedom should be, for all, the only object of thought, affection, and action.

In order fully to understand this view of the legislator, let us see in what this civic freedom consisted; how far it was to extend, and how it was to be maintained.

The civil freedom of the Spartan citizen consisted in personal liberty, equal property and influence in public affairs. As to property, it is well known that the legislator divided the whole of Lacedæmon into thirty thousand lots, each large enough to support one family. Accordingly, when Lycurgus, at the time of harvest, went with his friend through the fields, seeing the equal sheaves on each of them, he exclaimed, "All Lacedæmon resembles one field, which brothers

have divided amongst themselves in a brotherly manner. Lycurgus would have divided their personal estates in the same manner, but seeing the insuperable difficulties in the case, he preferred to annihilate the value of almost all personal estate. He prohibited the use of all gold and silver coin, and introduced one of iron, assigning to a large piece of iron a small value, so that a large room was necessary to keep a little sum of money, and many horses to transport it from place to place. He thus destroyed all commerce; and no foreign merchant vessel was henceforth seen in the harbours of Lacedæmon. To wear ornaments was forbidden by the laws, except in war, to increase its attractions. Again, he forbade any house to be built, the roof of which required any other tool than the axe, and the door any but the saw. He also ordered that not one should take his meals by himself, but all in common, the provisions being supplied by the state. What these provisions were, may be judged from the saying in Greece, "That it was easy for the Spartans to fight bravely, as it was not so great an evil to die as to eat their black broth." The strictness of this prohibition of private meals appears from the well known anecdote of the Spartan king, Agis, who, on his return to Sparta from a glorious war, sent to the public providers to have his meal sent home to him, in order to dine alone with his wife. The Ephori not only refused, but fined him for his request.

The rights of the Spartan citizen extended over the territory of Lacedæmon. According to Lycur-

gus, the republic should not extend beyond; and later conquests were deviations from the constitution. But the rights of the citizens of Sparta should extend over the whole territory of Lacedæmon; the rest of the inhabitants being held as slaves.

Among the means of maintaining this Spartan freedom, I mention particularly the constitution, and the education of the people. The alteration of Lycurgus in the constitution, consisted in the establishment of a Senate, as an intermediate power between that of the people, and that of the two kings, whose conflicting interests had hitherto kept the state continually wavering between anarchy and despotism. The senate, whose members, since their first appointment by Lycurgus, recruited their numbers in reality by their own choice, while, by a political artifice, they traced it to the people, — this senate was intended to side with the injured party, and thus to prevent the kings from oppressing the people, and the people from wronging the kings. But the difficulty which attends all governments, which rest altogether upon mutual checks in the constitution of its various branches, showed itself also in Sparta. Lycurgus had not provided a check against the abuse, by the Senate, of their power of mediation; and thus it was found necessary to constitute a new controlling magistracy, the Ephori, in whose hands lay, in fact, the highest power.

The second means of maintaining Spartan freedom, was public education, enabling the citizens to understand, obey, and enforce the laws, and preparing them particularly for war, or public self-defence. The

Spartan from his birth ceased to belong to his parents; the state was his father, by whom, and for whom, he was educated. This was the great object of the legislator, for which he sacrificed natural feeling, parental and filial affection, and the sanctity of married life. The slaves, called Helotes, (from the first of the neighbouring towns that was conquered by Sparta,) must toil, and sow, that the citizens might reap and devote themselves wholly to political and military exercises and occupations. The nation should be in a constant state of self-defence; war was the object, and war was also the means to keep it in this state. A continual internal war was carried on against the Helotes, whose increasing number induced the alarmed citizens to institute what is called the Cryptia, or Ambush. Young citizens, in order to try their courage, were sent out by the rulers into the country of Lacedæmon, provided with nothing but some food and a dagger, and instructed to conceal themselves in the daytime, but at night to go into the villages of the Helotes, and murder the most valiant. No wonder that it was said in Greece, that "the Spartan slaves were the most wretched of all slaves, as the Spartan citizens were the freest of all citizens."

It is known that the boys, in order to learn easily the artifices to be practised in war, were obliged to steal their food, under a severe penalty if they were caught in the act; a feature in public education which sufficiently explains the treacherous negotiations of the state with its allies.

But in order to be just, we must attend to the bright, as well as the dark side, of the Spartan character.

Temperance, courage, self-government, love of country, and obedience to its laws, had a home in Sparta. For proof, if any were necessary, we need only to point to the monument of Leonidas with his martyr band; "Traveller, if thou comest to Sparta, relate that we are here fallen in obedience to her laws." — To sum up the whole, the Spartan constitution was designed, and proved admirably adapted, to develope in man one power above all others; a will, subject to the law and the interests of the state, strong enough to keep under, not only the body and the animal propensities, but also the natural affections, the love of refinement and intellectual culture, sciences and the arts, commerce and manufactures, except so far as they served to provide for the most simple mode of life, and the exigences of war.

Instead of a criticism on this institution, I shall give a brief account of that of Athens, the work of Solon, five hundred and ninety-four years before Christ, which was in most respects the opposite of that of Lycurgus.

That man was made for the state, was the maxim of the Spartan lawgiver; the state is made for man, was that of Solon; the Spartan knew of only one virtue, political merit, while all the virtues and graces of life, agriculture, manufactures, sciences, poetry, and the fine arts, were the household deities of Athens. Lycurgus sanctioned idleness by law; Solon severely

punished it. Every citizen had to satisfy the Areopagus whence he gained the means of living. The father who had not taught his son some useful profession, had no right to ask support of him. Solon did not divide all the land among the citizens, but left them to acquire it by their own industry. He allowed every individual freely to dispose of his property by a last will or testament; for chosen friends he said, are worth more than mere relatives.

Finding the state brought to the brink of anarchy, by the rich taking advantage of their poor debtors who had pledged their own personal freedom for their debts, Solon prohibited all borrowing upon the debtor's own person.

The Athenians were given to pleasure, but drunkenness and shameless conduct rendered a person infamous in Athens. Strict laws watched over the sanctity of married life. No dowry was allowed, that marriages might not be founded upon selfishness, but upon love. Politeness and delicacy had nowhere so much honor as in the city of Minerva.

In the war with their bitterest enemy, Philip of Macedon, the king's letters were intercepted by the Athenians. All were opened and read, except one which they sent back unopened; it was a letter of Philip to his wife.

Being asked what country he thought best to live in, Solon answered, "Where those who are injured, as well as those who are not, can accuse the unjust, and bring him to punishment." In Athens, therefore,

a citizen could impeach any other citizen, for having injured or insulted himself or another person.

In order to bind up private interest with the common weal, and perhaps foreseeing that the best regulated states may be ruined by the most virtuous citizens, if they, instead of bringing all their interest to bear on the public mind, stand aloof from public affairs, in a proud separation from the rest of the people, — he ordered that the presence of every one at the legislative and judicial assemblies, should be not only a right, but a duty of all citizens, which they were punished for not performing. He went further; his law threatened punishment to every one, who, in great national discussions, should not take an active part, and side with one of the parties.

The sovereign power Solon secured to the whole people assembled for legislation and judgment. An appeal lay from the decision of every other magistrate to the assembly, consisting of all the citizens thirty years old. When assembled for legislation, they had to decide on all cases previously discussed and matured by the senate. If assembled for jurisdiction, they had to determine upon all those which had been previously examined and laid before the judges selected for the case in question, by the Archons or rulers, who held in this respect, nearly the same office as did afterwards the Prætor of Rome. Solon divided the people into four classes, according to their income, for taxation and relative political influence. Nine Archons or magistrates, invested with the various departments of the highest executive power, were chosen

by the people, first, only from the three higher classes, in later times from the whole.

From each class one hundred senators were chosen, the Prytanes or Elders, to prepare the propositions to be made to the whole people assembled. Another senate, that of the Areopagus, composed of the Archons annually going out of office, watched in general over the sacredness of the laws, religion, morals, and manners of the community. The commonwealth was intended to rest upon the mutual confidence of the citizens; so that six hundred votes were able, without any other reason than public distrust, to banish any citizen from the republic. This was the famous ostracism; an institution showing forth, at once, the jealous love of political freedom and equality, and the immaturity of those principles in a people who did not trust themselves to withstand the dazzling power of eloquence and splendid merits, if the proud servant of the republic should attempt to make them the means of his own elevation above the laws and the people.

These are the great outlines of the state, from which to be excluded for life, was accounted equal to death by its proud citizens. Lycurgus ordered, that his constitution, founded on a bold and ingenious political scheme, should remain the same for ever; Solon, who had built upon the nature of man, demanded a duration of one hundred years for his laws. The whole constitution of Sparta has terminated its splendid course like a meteor vanishing for ever, while many of the principles of the Athenian lawgiver, hav-

ing passed into the Civil law, and thence into almost every other modern code, are still shining over us as guiding stars in the changeable horizon of society.

So much, in general, for the principles of natural law as contained in the existing institutions of Sparta and Athens; which were, or became, the standards of the other republics of Greece. Of some of the principles here mentioned, I shall say more in future lectures.

This state of society in Greece naturally had a decided influence upon Moral Philosophy in general; upon the tendency and the systems of the philosophers, of which I now proceed to give a summary account. I shall speak particularly of Socrates and his disciples.

As there were few rules of public or private life which the Greeks followed instinctively, like the nations of Asia, the doctrine of duty founded upon reason was naturally of much greater practical importance; therefore almost all their speculations on morals had a practical tendency, to teach men their true interest, and persuade them to act accordingly. Hence the immense influence of the teachers of eloquence, morals, and politics, called the Sophists. This word, which, from the abuse of their power by some of the Sophists, has become opprobrious, originally only meant practical sages; so that this epithet belongs not only to such men as Gorgias and Prodicus, but even to Socrates, though this modest man preferred for himself that of a philosopher, or a lover of wisdom.

The republican tendency to persuade men to act according to their true interest, is evident from the fact, that the speculations of all the Grecian moralists, however differing in other respects, all start from and turn upon the question, "What is the highest good of man?" that is, what is of all things most valuable to him, or most conducive to his happiness.

Socrates, (born four hundred and sixty-nine years before Christ,) a man whose holy living and holy dying has pressed upon his memory the seal of immortality, found the highest good in practical wisdom. Socrates considered happiness not only as the result of virtue, but as consisting in and identical with virtue, or resemblance to God, resulting from the performance of his moral laws. Virtue, according to him, consists in these four perfections of man, wisdom, moderation, fortitude, and justice.

First, wisdom, which consists in knowledge, implies the three other moral perfections; for a man who exactly knows what is to be done, never fails to do it; but a full knowledge of that which is good necessarily determines the will. In the second place, moderation, or the control of the passions, is an essential in the character, since without self-government, man is not a freeman but a slave. Third, fortitude is the knowledge of what is to be feared, and of what is not. Practical fortitude is the necessary result of this correct knowledge. Moral evil alone is to be feared; this one fear frees from others. In the fourth place, justice consists in obedience to divine and human laws; and moreover in the adaptation of

the laws themselves to general principles derived from the nature of man.

This is the substance of the Moral Philosophy of Socrates, the whole amount of which it is extremely difficult to give, since the two principal accounts of him, that of Xenophon and that of Plato, do not entirely agree. His disciple Xenophon describes him more in his common, out-of-door life, such as all the people saw him act and heard him talk; admonishing every one to faithfulness in his calling; measuring the worth of all knowledge, such as mathematics, astronomy, and philosophical speculations, even goodness and beauty, according to their direct practical usefulness; worshipping the gods with the people, and sacrificing to them according to the laws of the state; exhorting every one to their strict observance by his words, and still more by his example. For, when he was able to defend himself in such a manner as would have touched the judges with compassion, and induced them to absolve him, he spurned a false humility and a show of respect for those for whom he could feel none. He refused the means of escape from prison; with willing obedience to a law and sentence which he deemed unjust, he took the fatal cup which his deluded country offered him; and, even at that time, Cicero says, "he spoke and appeared not as one that was forced to death, but one that was ascending to heaven."

Plato introduces us to Socrates in the intimate circle of his friends. We hear him speculating on the true, the good, the beautiful; teaching a religion and

a system of law entirely opposed to those of the state he lived in ; wherefore Marcus Cato also said of him, that he had been endeavouring to undermine the constitution of his country.

These two accounts of Socrates are by no means irreconcilable. We know from Xenophon, that he did not wish to force men, but to persuade them, to what he thought right ; for in this, he said, consisted the difference between kingdom and tyranny. He therefore did not teach rebellion against the laws and religion of the state ; but obeyed, and inculcated obedience. When he conversed with the people, he dwelt chiefly upon those things in the established laws and religion which he thought just and true. Meanwhile he instructed those whom he saw fit, in what he thought the true nature and best form of faith and government, with a view to effect through them, gradually, the desired reform. According to Plato's account, it would seem, that in order to effect his purpose, he did not object to what he thought a harmless artifice to benefit the ignorant, as he himself said, in a similar way as children are induced to take some disagreeable but wholesome medicine.

I have said, that Socrates, according to Plato, taught a religion and civil polity different from that of the state. Of this I shall now give the outlines. How much of this account belongs to Socrates, and how much to the reporter, Plato, cannot be ascertained.

The religion he taught, as I have already observed, was purer than any that human wisdom had ever be-

fore attained. He taught the belief in one God, a spiritual and moral being, whose perfection shines through this visible world, which he has framed according to his own eternal ideas, the patterns of all created things, — the provident father, the righteous judge of men. The human soul being the offspring of the divine mind, is destined to a perpetual approach to godlike perfection. The belief in a future state, and a just retribution, pervades the whole moral doctrine of Socrates; his life and his death can be explained only by such a faith. In Plato's "Phædon," and the last book of "The Republic," this great truth is interwoven with picturesque imaginings and a poetical allegory. But it is not the poetry of superstition, as in the descriptions of Orcus and Elysium by Homer and Hesiod, but the free outpourings of a spirit that is so confident of the reality of his faith, that it does not fear even to sport with it, and, of the great themes of his life, to exhibit not only the reasoning but the dreams.

The civil polity which Socrates, according to Plato, represented to his friends as the *beau idéal* of justice, is founded upon a classification of the various powers of the soul, and upon his idea of justice in the individual and in the community. There are three fundamental powers of the soul. First, wisdom; second, the passions which are generous in their nature, such as the enthusiasm for knowledge and noble indignation; third, the animal appetites and selfish propensities. Justice is established in the individual, if each of these faculties performs its natural and ap-

pointed function; that is, if wisdom, supported by the generous passions, reigns over the appetites. With regard to society, if we compare the characters of men, we find that in some, wisdom preponderates over the other powers; in others, the generous passions; and in most men, the appetites. Justice, therefore, is established in society, the *beau idéal* of the state is realized, if the wise, obeyed and supported by the men of generous passions, rule over the multitude that is controlled by the appetites. Men who are born with generous passions, if well educated, become wise. Men are endowed from their birth with a noble nature, which, if cultivated by wisdom, makes them fit to rule over all the others who are base by nature. The rule is, that children of excellent parents inherit the same noble nature; and the children of the base are like their parents. The safety of the true state, then, depends on securing to it a noble offspring, and to this an education to fit it for government; while the children of the base should be neglected or left to perish. If it should ever happen that those of nature's nobility, should have base children, they should be degraded to the serving class, and if the reverse, the noble children of base parents should be exalted.

To accomplish all this, to assign to every one his true place in society, and the occupation for which nature has intended him, and to prevent him from leaving it for any other, — this is the vocation of the wise, the aristocrats and kings.

The rulers, men as well as women, are to live in

the practice of the most arduous duties, the study of wisdom, education, government, and war; without having to work for their support, which is to be furnished by their subjects. Amongst themselves they enjoy the most perfect community of all things. Public education excludes the domestic, for affairs shall be so managed, that parents and children shall not even know one another.

To support this true state, not only persuasion, but artifice and force are allowable and advisable. The establishment of this civil order, and, consequently, the cessation of all social evils, depends on the desired event, either that the philosophers should become kings, or those, who are now called kings, should become true philosophers.

This is the *beau idéal* of justice and civil polity, set forth by Socrates and Plato. How much of this scheme is to be ascribed to Plato alone cannot be ascertained. But it is hardly to be supposed, that the disciple of Socrates should have introduced his master, as he does, teaching all these principles, if the substance of them had not actually belonged to him. A criticism of this scheme of civil polity seems useless; the constitution of Solon, the forms of the republic, in which both Socrates and Solon lived, and which they seemed called by nature to enter into and thus to improve, rises up in judgment against it.

I have said before, that Socrates, as well as all the other Grecian moralists, in their investigations, proceeded from the question, What is the highest good,

or greatest happiness of man? According to Socrates, it consists in practical wisdom, which employs all the powers of the soul. His disciples, in endeavouring to give a more distinct answer to that question, separated and formed different schools, each of them being founded upon one of these three fundamental powers of man, reason, feeling, and will. Plato, and his disciple Aristotle, thought the highest good was found in the exercise of reason, knowledge, and thought; Aristippus and Epicurus, in the pleasant feelings or gratification of our desires; Zeno and Chrysippus in the exercise of the free will to control our passions. As a great part of these doctrines was derived from Socrates, I shall point out here only the most important principles peculiar to each.

Plato and Aristotle both asserted, that virtue is the principal ground of human happiness; but virtue they considered chiefly as an act of reason, the noblest of man's faculties, and, consequently, intellectual perfection as his highest good.

Of Plato I shall say little; since all the moral principles he taught, he represents as the teachings of Socrates. Plato certainly was the first who treated of morals as a science, a system founded upon the elements of human nature. To Plato, also, seems to belong the distinction between those goods, which are such only because they are objects of desire, such as food, motion, and rest, and those which are desired, because they are good in themselves, such as justice and holiness. The desire of what is good in itself, Plato calls heavenly love.

Aristotle states, still more distinctly, that the highest good consists, not in a practical, but in a contemplative life. He thinks it a condescension, in the true philosopher, to devote himself to business, to the administration of the state, and the command of its armies ; though he alone is fit to rule.

By his sound understanding, the wise man perceives, that, in all the various pursuits of life, virtue and happiness are found in the middle between two opposite extremes ; between the too much and the too little. Thus, for example, the virtue of liberality lies between parsimony and prodigality ; fortitude between fear and fool-hardiness. This doctrine of the true or the golden mean, characterizes the philosophy of Aristotle.

His system contains many excellent practical remarks. He treats of morals, not as a subject of an infinite and ideal nature, as Plato had done ; but, reasoning on the ground of experience, he investigates the various relations of life, that of husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant, and the various political relations. He was the first who distinguished between the three fundamental powers or functions of the state, the legislative, the judicial, and the executive departments ; a division which has wrongly been ascribed to Montesquieu.

He was the first who defined a free action, not as Plato did, as a virtuous action, but as one which proceeds from our choice, unconstrained either by ignorance or force. With reference to this acknowledged freedom of the will, he declares, that virtue is the

free work of the individual; but he inconsistently again abandons the ground, in declaring, that the goodness of the will depends on that of the understanding, which perceives the true ends of life, and which is a gift of nature, that has enabled some of her children to be wise and good, and to rule over the rest. Thus, he continually wavers between considering the character as a product of the free will of the individual, or of nature and education.

In opposition to Plato and Aristotle, as well as to the Stoic philosopers, Aristippus, a disciple of Socrates, thought the highest good consisted in pleasure. He was followed by Epicurus, who enlarged his system. In estimating the pleasures of the body and those of the soul, Aristippus decided in favor of the former, Epicurus for the latter. Epicurus is said to have declared, that the wise man is happy even on the rack. But to him is ascribed, also, the saying, "If you take away the pleasures of the palate, sensuality, hearing, and beautiful forms, I do not know what you call good." The few remains of the voluminous works of Epicurus do not enable us to account for these two sayings, which, perhaps, are not so altogether incompatible as they seem, considering the great difference between the sufferings of a wise man and a fool, and the vagueness of the expressions, "good" and "happy."

According to Epicurus, virtue is a good, and crime an evil, so far only as the former is conducive to pleasure, and the latter to pain. Thus, injustice is no evil, except so far as it exposes to detection, and is therefore a cause of constant fear.

The true character of virtue, according to Epicurus, consists in wisdom, or the investigation of the nature of various pleasures, as more or less desirable for the whole amount of happiness, and in moderation, or that restraint which secures the greatest and most enduring pleasure.

There are two degrees of pleasure ; the first consists in pleasant excitement ; the second and highest, in freedom from all excitement as well as pain, in perfect rest and ease. His views on religion are essentially those of Democritus ; materialism and atheism.

A full criticism of this system of Aristippus and Epicurus I reserve for future lectures. At present it may suffice to give the great outlines of the system of the most decided antagonists of the Epicureans, the philosophers of the Stoic school.

While Aristippus thought to find the highest good in the gratification of all desires, another of the disciples of Socrates, Antisthenes, sought it in entire independence of them. He and his followers renounced all the refinements and luxuries of life, to confine themselves to the simplest wants of nature, to dress in a sheep-skin, to live in a tub ; a mode of life which drew upon them the name of dogs or cynics. The well-known stories of Diogenes need not be repeated here. Notwithstanding the singularity of such an uncalled for life of retirement and wretchedness, which not unfrequently springs from an immoral fear of the temptations of the world, and gives rise to ostentation, or a rude contempt of all refinement, the Cynics distinguished themselves by exemplary morals, and an ardent love of liberty.

Attracted by the moral charms of this ascetic school, Zeno also became its disciple; but he soon threw off the mere garb of austerity, and became the founder of a new system, known by the name of the Stoic school. This system was confirmed and improved first, in a philosophical point of view, by Chrysippus, and then in its practical bearings, amongst the Romans, particularly by Epictetus, Seneca, and Antoninus.

According to Plato and Aristotle, the highest good consists in the exercise of reason; according to Epicurus, in pleasure; according to the Stoics, in free will. By this they mean, not the power of choice, but the virtuous will, which, according to them, not only conquers, but annihilates the appetites and passions.

The free will then is the moral agent; and the moral law is right reason, or the will of God, that is, the divine reason in all nature; or as Epictetus more simply expresses the moral law, "Follow conscience, without any regard either to pleasure or pain."

Virtue, according to the Stoics, is the only real good, sin the only real evil, the one to be desired, the other to be shunned, for its own sake. All other things, such as wealth and honor, are indifferent, that is, not necessarily connected with either good or evil, happiness or misery. But of these indifferent things there are some which reason counsels us to choose, rather than others, for example, health rather than sickness, honor rather than dishonor.

Among the moral actions, there are some which

Chrysippus particularly distinguishes as heroic virtues ; those which require a conquest of natural desires, self-denial or self-sacrifice.

Virtue rests on the conviction of the absolute value of morality ; it is its own ultimate end, entirely independent of the result of an action. Virtue and true happiness can neither be diminished by adventitious evil, nor increased by adventitious good. There are no degrees either in virtue or sin ; to kill a cock and to kill a man is equally criminal ; that is discordant to right reason. Of the fault in this mode of reasoning, I shall speak hereafter.

Real, that is, moral happiness, cannot be increased or diminished by time.

This principle implies a great truth, that the highest moral happiness can be enjoyed at every moment of moral free-agency. But over-looking the dependence of our own happiness on continual improvement, this principle contributed much toward making the Stoics indifferent to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul.

According to the Stoics, every violation of the moral law, is a violation of the dignity of man. The foundation of the state lies in the nature of man and of God. There is a relation of right between the rational beings of whom the Deity is the head. Beasts, and all other irrational creatures, have no rights. The earth is the common property of mankind ; this common property can coexist with the private property of individuals, as, in a theatre, the place which a person takes, is considered for the time as his own.

The system of the Stoics closes my account of the Moral Philosophy, the principles of religion, morals, and law, in the ancient world.

I have said that the sages of Greece, even in the height of her intellectual glory, went to the east, to Asia and Egypt, to learn wisdom ; but the wise men of the east, and the simple and the wise from all quarters of the world, turned away from all other guides, and went with their offerings to hail that true light which came to light every man that cometh into the world.

In my next lecture I intend to give a brief account of the moral philosophy of the Gospel, and then of some of the modern systems, particularly those of Spinoza and Kant.

# LECTURE IV.

THE Gospel is the connecting link between the ancient and modern history of the human mind.

In endeavouring to exhibit a sketch of the religious and moral philosophy of the Gospel, I think it my duty to treat of it simply as an historian and a philosopher, and, for this purpose, to restrain my own personal feelings, as a Christian whose affections and eternal hopes are all bound up in this faith. I wish my representation to be such as a fair-minded heathen, disposed to examine the records, would acknowledge, as one that a fair-minded heathen might have given. As philosophy is the business of reason, reflecting upon the results of a faithful observation of facts, I can treat here only of those doctrines of the New Testament, which Christians of all denominations allow to come within the ken of reason, and such an observation of facts as may be made by every one at all times, apart from all historical, natural, or supernatural accounts. Whether, then, we Christians be right in believing that we possess in the Gospel an immediate divine revelation of truth and love, confirmed by miracles, or the skeptic be right, in believing it an act of reason or imagin-

ation, — the account of Gospel philosophy should stand the test of doubting, as well as believing reason.

Two subjects, which always have commanded, and always will command the greatest effort of observation and reason, the being and character of God, and the nature, destiny, and duty of man, constitute the deep ground of Gospel philosophy. The substance of all that the Gospel has revealed on these dark subjects, seems to be contained in this saying of Jesus, "Be ye perfect, even as your father which is in heaven is perfect."

God, according to this declaration, is a heavenly being, that is, a pure spirit; he is perfect; he is the father of men. Man is here described as the child of God; he is commanded to be perfect, even as his father in heaven is perfect; that is, to bear some resemblance to him in spiritual excellence, to which he consequently must be able to attain; and he must be responsible for falling short of this divine vocation; or in other words, he is represented as a being capable of infinite improvement, and, as a moral agent, a fit subject of reward or punishment, for the performance or neglect of his duty.

Perfection, then, according to the Gospel, is the essential attribute of God. Godlike perfection is the final, or rather the eternal aim of the free efforts of the human mind, the object for which it was created.

Let us endeavour to fix and define a little more explicitly this idea of divine perfection, and the intended likeness of it in the soul of man. Let us contemplate, in the light of the Gospel, first, the being and

character of God, and then, the nature, destiny, and duty of man.

God, according to the Gospel, is one being, distinct from the world. God is a person, so far as a word expressive of the individual being of man can be applied to him. He is not a mere thought, or simple and undefined existence, as the Eleatic philosopher supposed him to be; but a self-conscious being, that thinks, feels, and wills, with absolute freedom.

God is perfect, that is, infinite in wisdom, goodness, and power.

God is the creator of the universe, not only of the mind and all that is spiritual, as Anaxagoras and Plato supposed; but of the whole, the material, as well as the spiritual world. The Christian system acknowledges no original opposition or radical enmity between matter and mind, which idea is prevalent in Eastern and in Grecian systems of religion, and which led to the further supposition of two creators and governors, one of the material and evil, and the other of the good and spiritual world. Christianity acknowledges one creator and governor, and one creation, the image of his own perfection. God has impressed the traces of his own being and perfection upon all his works, the inanimate as well as the living creation. He has created man in his own image, having endowed him with a nature more closely related to his own, with reason, affections, and will, capable of infinite improvement, and, through his moral freedom, the framer of his own character, and consequently of his own eternal happi-

ness or misery. His own relation to mankind in general, and to each individual, is that of a father to his children. The parental character of God comprehends these three attributes. He is the guardian, the judge, and the friend of man.

God is his guardian; he provides the means, and educates him for the great object of his creation. God is the judge of man. The laws of nature by which virtue generally produces happiness, and vice misery, together with the voice of an approving or condemning conscience, are, according to the Christian system, the earnest of a perfect retribution in the life to come; they are the dawn of the day of judgment, when every one shall reap as he has sowed, good or evil according to his deserts.

God is the friend of man; all his dispensations, joy and sorrow, temptation and encouragement, reward and punishment, are designed for the perfection and happiness of his children. Such, according to Jesus, is the being and character of God. The soul of man, according to Jesus, is a being distinct from the body, as God is a being distinct from the world; an immortal spirit, capable of continual approach to divine perfection, free to choose between those things which, according to his own knowledge, lead to perfection or imperfection, and responsible for his choice. Being destined to grow in perfection, in the likeness of his God, all his actions should proceed from the same source. They should flow from love, or a vital interest in perfection. Love, according to the Gospel, is the foundation and the spirit of duty. The spirit of

duty, the law of love, enjoins adoration of God, whose existence alone affords to the idea of perfection a corresponding reality ; it enjoins the culture of the seeds of divine excellence in man, in ourselves, and in others ; it enjoins a tender regard for every trace of perfection in nature.

I will add a few remarks on the duties enjoined by the love of nature, of man, and of God. I begin with our duties towards nature, or the inferior creation. When we read in the Gospel, " Behold the fowls of the air, they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns ; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them ; " and when we are told, that not a sparrow is forgotten before God, do we not feel a silent restraint laid upon our hearts, forbidding us to destroy animal life, which is the care of him who created it, unless its destruction be the promotion of higher objects of creation ? And when we read, " Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow ; they toil not, neither do they spin ; and yet I say unto you, that even Solomon, in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these ; " and when we, at the same time, bear in mind with what distant reverence the Jews, to whom these words were addressed, were wont to gaze upon the raiment of the anointed king and priest of the Most High, — can we fail to find, also, in this inimitable description of the simple beauties of nature, a specimen of true Gospel poetry, a revelation of the will of God ? Do we not learn from it, that even in what we call inanimate nature, there are traces of perfection, which, not to acknowledge, not to love with tender reverence, is a

violation of that law of God, which would unite by bonds of kindred and family feeling, the human heart to all the secret virtues and modest graces of nature. Accordingly the duties towards inferior creatures, which form so prominent a part in Eastern systems of religion, in which the duties of man to himself and his fellow-men are very imperfectly recognised, are taught also in the Gospel, but by its spirit rather than by special commandment. The whole strength of the Gospel bears upon the love and the duties required toward man and toward God. The love of man comprises our duties toward ourselves, and our fellow-men. To ourselves we owe, according to the Gospel, purity of heart, or freedom from all contaminating desires. It enjoins humility, or willingness to see and acknowledge our imperfections, together with an ardent aspiration after holiness. It enjoins fortitude in struggling against the evils of this world, and pious resignation under those which can be overcome only by patient endurance to the end.

Toward our fellow-men the Gospel enjoins the same love, the same interest in their perfection and happiness, which we feel in our own. It enjoins justice, which insists upon the same true measure in all the dealings of men; which allows to all, and demands from all, the same rights; and that kindness which is ready to give more than mere justice can demand; which is ready to sacrifice all, even life itself, at the altar of brotherly love. It is evident that not only the duty of kindness or brotherly love, but also that of justice, is more perfectly taught in the Gospel,

than it was professed by Grecian philosophers, and the republics of Greece and Rome. They, indeed, established equal freedom (*ισονομία*) among the citizens, but the slaves, the allies, and the provinces experienced a treatment which showed that the love of liberty and equality among the citizens was in a great measure a spirit of domination, checked by actual power and a selfish prudence; that it was not founded upon a frank and single regard for the rights of man, that perfect republicanism which is taught by the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Finally, the love of nature and of man are concentrated in our highest affection, the love of God, of Him who is perfect in himself, and the author of all perfection.

This is what I have presumed to call the Moral Philosophy of the Gospel. I have not spoken, either of the external evidences of Christianity, or of those doctrines from whence Christians derive their different denominations. I have said nothing of the nature of Christ, or of his individual influence upon the destiny of man, — simply because these doctrines, important as they are, did not seem to me to belong to my subject. One distinguishing feature, however, is to be mentioned here, which characterizes Christianity in the history of Moral Philosophy. In examining the ancient systems of morals and religion, we have found many clear and exalted views, simple and sublime thoughts of heathen sages, which no one should be so ready to recognise and extol as a Christian. But the elevated and refined views of the highest classes among the Hindoos and other Asiatic

nations, were confined to the enlightened few, who suffered or caused utter darkness to settle upon the multitude. Even in the very centre of civilization and republicanism, in Greece, in Athens, the deepest results of religious wisdom, were the sole possession of the initiated.

Jesus came. He chose his friends, not among the highest classes of the people, not as Plato did, or intended to do, among the few whom he thought qualified by nature to rule over the rest, — but among the fishermen of Galilee. He rejoiced that the truth which had been hidden from the wise and the mighty of this world, was revealed to the poor and the simple. For what was the burden of his divine mission? Not to set off those things in the constitution of man and in society, by which individuals are distinguished from one another; but to bring to light, and do justice, to the common elements of the nature and character of man, making them the foundation of one universal and immortal brotherhood. He therefore would not hide under a bushel the light that should enlighten and save mankind, — but to all nations and generations of men, he declared the glorious tidings, "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." The history of Moral Philosophy, since the introduction of the Christian religion, exhibits everywhere the influence, partly of the systems of antiquity, and particularly that of Christianity itself, upon the minds of men. As the limits of this course allow me to dwell on a few only of the most interesting productions in this department of knowledge, I have singled

out for a summary review, two systems which seem to be distinguished before others by their independence and extent of reasoning, as well as by the influence they have exerted and still continue to exert in the philosophical world, and in other departments to which inferences from these systems have been applied. I mean the systems of Spinoza and of Kant.

Baruch Spinoza, a Jew, born at Amsterdam, in the year 1632, devoted his exemplary life, and his powerful mind, wholly to philosophy. At first a disciple of Descartes, he became the founder of a system, the ground plot of which I now wish to lay before you.

Like the philosophers of Elea, Spinoza aimed at finding one true idea, from which every other could be deduced with mathematical certainty. Now the conception of God, the universal being, is the most comprehensive of all. The idea of God is a true one ; because it can be clearly conceived in the mind, without contradicting any other truth. God is the one only substance of all that is, or, he is the only self-existent being ; while all other things and qualities in the world are only attributes, or modifications of his being.

The two most general attributes of the Deity are extension and thought. Extension is the essence of all that we call material things. Take, for example, a mineral, a plant, and an animal, they differ in many qualities from one another. But in this they all agree, that they fill a certain space, have some form, or extension, without which no bodily or material thing can

be conceived of. Extension, therefore, is the essence of matter and of the material world.

On the other hand, all these things or phenomena which we call intellectual or spiritual, are only modifications of thinking. To like or dislike, to desire or abhor a thing, means nothing else than to think, to assert, or deny. Our affections and intentions, then, are nothing but thoughts or ideas. Thinking, consequently, is the essence of all intellectual or spiritual things.

Extension and thought, then, are the two most general attributes of being. Spinoza accordingly thus defines the Deity ; God is the thinking and extensive substance. All the various things and their qualities, are modifications of thinking or extension. The soul of man is a thought, or a modification of the thinking nature, and, as his body is a part of extensive nature, the whole world is a system in which every thing is so necessarily defined and limited as to exclude all chance and free will. God is not a being distinct from the world, but the inherent cause of all things. God himself is not a free agent, but necessarily determined by the laws of his nature. The same is the case with man, who thinks himself free to act, because he is conscious of a will of his own, but ignorant of the laws by which it is necessarily determined. Neither man, nor the Deity, act for any purpose, with any end in view, but each thing acts according to the laws of its nature. If God acted for any proposed end, he would act in order to attain something which he does not already possess ; he could, therefore, not

be perfect. To act according to the laws of his nature, is the natural right of each being, whether God, or man, or inferior creatures. Thus, says Spinoza, "the fishes, with the highest natural right, occupy the water, and the large devour the small ones." He, who is by nature unjust, has as good a right to practise injustice, as he who is born with a good disposition, to live and act according to his nature. Accordingly Spinoza sees the only safety of the just in combining all their power (this being the whole extent of their right) to check all criminal desires by threatening those who should transgress the laws, with evils which are more dreadful than the gratification of the criminal propensity can be desirable.

It is easy for every one to carry out this system of necessity and pantheism, and apply it to all cases. Its foundation is so simple, and the whole so harmonious. In the history of philosophy it is of great importance, particularly, because it is evidently the result of deep and fearless thought, that does not wish to disguise any of its consequences. It would be easy to mention a great number of systems of morals and religion, of which the doctrine of Spinoza forms the basis, but without his consistency, and still more, without his uprightness. I will only point out the two radical defects of the system.

In the first place, the criterion of truth proposed by Spinoza, is unfit for the purpose. He mistakes that which is technically called logical truth, for reality. He says an idea is true, if it can be conceived of clearly without contradiction. But it is evident that

I can form, without contradiction, as clear a conception of one of the characters in the "Midsummer Night's Dream," as of a real person; and nobody would be tempted to admit that the existence of the idea of Oberon and Titania in my own mind, proved their existence without it.

In the second place, the assertion that man is a moral free agent, is founded upon the simple evidence of our own consciousness. His supposition then, that man only thinks himself free because he is ignorant of the causes which determine his will, requires proof which no one ever has presented. For the fact, that a free will is not found in any other creature we know, only corroborates that belief. For if you trust the evidence of your observation when it shows you that no free will exists in other creatures, how can you reject its testimony in a case which you have better means to ascertain than any external fact, since you can put it to the test at every moment, by observing your own mind, whether you are free to choose between different modes of action or not? It is evident, that this system, as well as every other that denies moral freedom, excludes the possibility of all moral distinctions of virtue and vice, the moral capacity of man, and the moral character of God. Many faithful and deep investigations of the nature of our desires and passions, and excellent moral reflections are contained in the second part of Spinoza's works, particularly in the two chapters on human liberty, human servitude, and the affections. But want of time obliges me to pass over these special

merits of a system, which, as a whole, seems to me untenable, particularly on account of the two defects I have already mentioned.

The wrong supposition that the clear conception of an object is a proof of its reality, this mistake of mere logical reasoning for real knowledge, is found in many systems, before and after that of Spinoza. This fault was the cause, as it was the effect, of a confusion of ideas, which unsettled the belief of many in the reality of philosophical knowledge. It gave rise on the one hand to mysticism, or a belief in metaphysical dreams, and on the other to skepticism. In this state of things, it was natural that the greatest philosophical mind of the last century, devoted his extraordinary powers, not so much to the enlargement of knowledge in the old way, but chiefly to an inquiry into the extent of our faculties to attain to real, and particularly to philosophical knowledge, nothing less than an accurate cosmography of the human mind. This man was Emanuel Kant, born at Koenigsberg in Prussia, in the year 1724.

In order to form a correct idea of the moral system of Kant, it is necessary to be at least superficially acquainted with his system of intellectual philosophy, of which I will therefore give a few characteristic outlines. Kant was induced, particularly by the acute skepticism of Hume, to inquire if there be no general and necessary truths, independent of the changes of external things, and of our own sensations. That there are such truths, seemed to be sufficiently proved by the mere existence of mathematics, as well

as by some principles approved by common sense, as being without exception; for example, that no event, no change, can take place without a cause.

Whence, then, do these, and other principles, derive their universal and necessary character? Not from the senses, by which we receive only single and changing impressions, but no general principle.

Now, all that we call experience, we conceive to be a result, partly of external things impressing our minds, and partly of our own faculties of perception. As general and necessary principles cannot originate from without, that which makes them general and necessary must exist in our own minds. If we examine our intellectual faculties, we find that they, as well as every power in nature, are exercised according to certain laws. And what are these laws or forms of perception? They are innate ideas, according to which we view every thing without and within us. For us, therefore, as we cannot perceive any thing except by our own faculties, these innate ideas are general and necessary truths. In order to show what they are, Kant divides the faculties of perception into two classes, and enumerates the forms of perception, or innate ideas, belonging to each faculty. He distinguishes between the senses, as the lower faculties, and understanding and reason, as the higher powers of perception.

First, with regard to the senses, he says, that, besides the five external senses, by which we perceive things and events in the world without, we have an inward sense or consciousness, by which we no-

tice every change within our minds, thoughts, feelings, and purposes. Now we know, that we cannot perceive any thing that is, or comes to pass in the world, without the idea of space and time; nor any event in our own minds without the idea of time. Space and time, however, are not objects of either of our senses; while they are the necessary conditions of our perceiving any thing through our senses. Time and space, therefore, must be considered as innate ideas, as the necessary forms of sensation.

In the second place, by our understanding we reflect upon the objects which we perceive through the senses, we distinguish them from one another, and arrange them in our minds, according to the relations which they bear to each other, just as we class a number of plants, in our herbarium, according to their characteristics. Now the same train of reasoning, that led us to perceive, that time and space, the attributes of all our perceptions by the senses, do not exist in the things themselves, but in our senses; the same train of reasoning shows, that the relations, which the objects of perception bear to each other, do not exist in them, but in our own reflecting minds. They are innate ideas, the inherent forms of the human understanding. Thus, our senses tell us, that one event follows another, for example, that one body striking against another, produces sound; but the perception, that one always of necessity follows the other, that they are connected as cause and effect, this perception originates in our own understanding, which is compelled, by its own laws, or inherent

forms of perception, to view such events under the connexion of cause and effect. The same is true with regard to the distinction we make between things or qualities, as being more or less essential ; for example, when we say, that an action should be at the same time just and pleasant, but that it should rather be just and unpleasant, than pleasant and unjust.

Now Kant has ascertained, that there exist twelve such original ideas, which determine the relations which all things bear to one another, according to which, we view, distinguish, and arrange all the objects of perception, and which must be considered as the inherent laws of our understanding. These twelve primitive ideas he calls categories, according to Aristotle, who had attempted a similar analysis of our perceptions, and was followed in this attempt by Hobbes. But it was reserved for Kant to accomplish this difficult task of intellectual anatomy. Of this system of categories I shall give a full and popular account in my next lecture. It is the peculiar function of reason, according to Kant, to apply these categories (particularly three of them) to objects supposed to be of an infinite nature ; to the thinking mind, to the mutual connexion of all the events in the world through cause and effect, and to the relation of all things to the Supreme Being.

From this analysis Kant infers, that all the materials of our knowledge are derived from the senses, but that the relations, in which we see them, are laws, or forms of our own intellectual faculties ; that our reasoning, therefore, can be true only so far as it re-

lates to our experience, that is, to our knowledge derived from the senses. As for the assertions of reason beyond our experience, the conceptions of the freedom of the human mind, of a causal connexion of all events in the world, and the existence of one universal Being ; the reality of these conceptions, which he emphatically calls ideas, can neither be proved nor disproved. Reason has no other ground for asserting them than its own inherent nature and law. But with regard to objects of experience, such as are derived through the senses, we are conscious that they are not productions of our own minds alone, but of our own faculties coöperating with impressions from other objects.

It is easy to perceive here the strong leaning of Kant's doctrine to absolute idealism. For the assertion, that our experience is not the sole production of our own faculties, but in part originates from impressions received from realities, which exist beside our minds, even this assertion rests upon the evidence of our own minds alone. Consequently, the greatest of Kant's disciples, Fichte, deduced all objects from the laws and functions of our own faculties.

This theory of human knowledge, proposed by Kant, particularly in his great work, " The Critique of Pure Reason," must have proved very unfavorable to the establishment of moral and religious principles, if Kant had not assigned to reason another, a practical function, which, in his own judgment, far surpassed its theoretical use. This highest function of reason consists in laying down the laws of morality.

Kant, in the first place, asserts, that the principles of morality are not conveyed to us from without, by education or example, but are the indigenous growth of human reason. Though a virtuous action had never been performed, the principle itself would exist in our minds. "Even the holy One of the Gospel," he says, "must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection, before we acknowledge him as such." "Imitation has no place in morality, and examples serve only as encouragements."

All reasoning, in morality, must be directed to these three subjects, the nature of the will, the moral law, and the motive from which it is to be obeyed.

Kant answers these questions chiefly according to the principles of the Stoic philosophy.

First, with regard to the nature of the will. He asserts the freedom of the will, or rather, he considers the rational will as a power determined by its own laws, independent of all impulses from without. But as to the moral struggle which must ensue from the free will existing in intimate connexion with animal impulses, it is not perfectly clear, whether Kant believed that it was incumbent, at every moment, on the will, to conquer the appetites. In some instances he speaks of the free will as of a power which, when it appears in this life, is already predetermined, by a previous voluntary act of its own, for the course it must pursue, at least in the present state. This idea gives rise to a mystical self-imputation of sin committed in a previous state, of which the frailty of the body is considered as a just punishment.

This idea of an original sin committed by each human being, by which a number of pure intelligences have become inhabitants of time and space, here and there occurs in Kant; but generally his strong mind appears to be free from this mystical idea, so entirely opposed to all sound principles of accountableness.

In the second place, the only motive which Kant admits as just, is respect for the moral law, without any regard to the consequences of the action, whether productive of happiness or misery.

In the third place, the highest moral law, or, as he expresses it, the moral imperative, is founded upon practical reason. He states it in these words, "Thou shalt act in such a manner as is fit to be or become the rule of action for all rational beings." Happiness is the object of man's animal nature, but the moral law is a commandment, a restraint, and it would be absurd to enjoin it upon man as a bounden duty to act with a view to his own happiness.

Practical reason, therefore, recognises no motive as truly moral, except that of pure respect for such rules of action as are fit for all rational beings; while a regard to one's own happiness or adventitious good impairs the moral character of an action. Still reason demands, that, also with regard to adventitious good, men should be more or less happy as they are more or less worthy.

Now it is a fact, that this second demand of practical reason is not, and cannot be, realized in this life. This demand of reason, therefore, becomes a proph-

ecy of a future state, of a just retribution, to be brought about by that power which implanted in the mind of man this demand for a degree of happiness proportioned to his deserts. Thus, according to Kant, the belief in the immortality of the soul, a future retribution, and the existence of a moral governor of the universe, is founded on practical reason, or, to state it more closely, upon the practical interest of reason in the ultimate success of virtue and vice. All religion rests upon morality ; and every positive faith is to be judged of, and even interpreted, by this standard.

Many observations with regard to this system I must reserve for future lectures. I will mention here only some of the most important objections.

First, the observation of regularity in nature, the fact that things and events in the world exist and come to pass according to certain laws, has led Kant to the unnatural supposition, that these laws do not exist in nature, where we perceive them, but in our own faculties of perception. But if we follow up with simplicity the history of our belief in the existence of these laws, so far as our own memory, and that of our fellow men, and that of history extends, the observation of the various modes of existence and change in animate and inanimate nature, has in some respects always led to the same results ; wherefore we cannot help believing that they will stand the test of future observation, as they have stood that of all past experience, — particularly if the principles are such as can be examined at any time, such as the principles of mathematics, of logic, and of moral philosophy.

Our knowledge of the exercise of our own faculties, intellectual as well as moral, is founded on observation or moral experience. And through our own experience, from the testimony of our own consciousness, we know that there are general laws in nature, and that there are no innate ideas or forms of perception which make us see things without, which exist only in our own perception or imagination. We know from our own consciousness, (and we have no deeper criterion of truth,) that the objects reflected in the mirror of our minds are not productions of this mirror; that the mind is not predetermined to perceive things in a certain manner before it actually perceives them; that it prints not with stereotypes, but with movable letters.

Secondly, Kant does not consider man as one and the same being, endowed with powers and impulses which in part belong to every animal, though to no one in so high a degree as to man, but also enabled by his superior capacity, to rise beyond the bounds of animal life, and to strive after an ever-increasing sphere of existence and action; or, to use a more common form of expression, Kant does not consider man as, at the same time, an animal and spiritual being. Kant considers him sometimes, or in one view, as a pure self-determined intelligence, and in another, as an object of sense, a natural phenomenon, a creature of experience, subject to all the laws of time and space, and the material world of which he is a part, (*νοούμενον*, *φαινόμενον*). As a creature of sense or experience, man traces all his actions to that state of things and of his own being, which preceded each act, as its

necessary cause, so that his will appears predetermined from the first moment of his existence to the last, — so that there is no act which he can consider as the effect of his own free will or arbitrary decision, neither virtue nor sin. But man, when he considers himself as an object of reason, as a self-determined intelligence, imputes every one of his actions to himself, to his own free will. Even his present existence, which prevents him from always recognising and obeying the moral law, must be considered his own work. It is evident that this double aspect of man, each view excluding the other, is contrary to experience ; it destroys the unity of our own consciousness, by which every individual appears to himself as one and the same being, endowed with different animal and intellectual capacities and desires ; and particularly as a free moral agent, imputing to himself all those actions, and no others than those, which he thinks himself able to perform or omit.

This great mistake of Kant, that he considers man sometimes entirely as a rational and moral, and sometimes entirely as a sensual or phenomenal being, — pervades the whole system. For he considers every thing, in one view, exclusively as a pure object of reason, and in another, as an object of the senses. Thus he says, our experience (that is, knowledge derived through the senses,) is distinguished from mere matters of theory or imagination; by the circumstance that our experience is only in part a production of our own perceiving minds, while the other coefficient part, the impressions we receive from ex-

ternal objects, must be considered as produced by these objects acting upon our faculties of perception. But when we speak of external things, the book or the table that is before our eyes, as making an impression on our senses, we speak of these objects merely as objects of sense, in their phenomenal character, and not as objects of reason (*νοούμενα*). For we know only how the things appear to us; but how and what they are in themselves, we know not, or, as it is sometimes technically expressed, we have only a "subjective," but no "objective" knowledge of things.

Now it is evident, that if we know only so much as that there are real objects, such as have an existence not merely in our own minds, but in themselves, although we do not know what or how they are, — it is evident, I say, that such a knowledge of the truth is equal to no knowledge at all. For it amounts to nothing more than this, that we feel obliged by our own minds to suppose the reality of things, because our minds are so constituted as not to allow us to consider all our conceptions as mere productions of our own imaginations.

But whether there be any reality corresponding to this view of our own perceptions, which is forced upon us by the constitution of our own minds, this remains, according to Kant, an unanswerable question. It was natural, therefore, that this state of doubt, in which the master had left the subject of the reality of external things, induced his bolder disciple, Fichte, to assert that the existence of external things

was not only founded on the testimony of our intellectual nature, but that they were the regular productions of our own creative imagination. It is evident from this, how Kant's criticism of human knowledge, and the faculties of perception, led to an absolute idealism, which could easily be used as an instrument against itself, and thus again be converted into absolute skepticism, which Kant had set out to refute.

I shall endeavour to show, in my next lecture, that all our knowledge is derived from experience, from our senses, and our self-conscious mind, and that the degree of certainty of any one of our perceptions depends chiefly on its constancy, particularly when it is in our power to put it to the test of repeated investigation.

In the third place, the rule of action which Kant lays down as the moral law, or moral imperative, as he calls it, is too general and vague to serve as the supreme rule of conduct, or to enable us to deduce from it any practical duty. He says, "Act always in such a manner, that your mode of conduct might be or become the general law of all intelligent beings." Now in what does that mode of action consist, which is to be the great law of all rational beings? It is evident, that such a mode of conduct only can be considered as becoming an intelligent being, as is most consistent with his own nature. The formula of Kant, then, merely directs us to search the nature, particularly the rational and moral nature of man, in order to find the moral law, the substance and extent of his duties; while, from the general formula itself, not one of them can be deduced.

In the fourth place, Kant says, an action loses its moral character by being performed on account of the happiness which it is supposed to produce; though the only happiness in view should be that of a satisfied conscience, and such adventitious good as must be considered a just reward of conscientious effort, for example, the esteem of all good men. The view of reward, of happiness, demoralizes the action, destroys its merit, makes it undeserving of happiness, and yet it is the ultimate connexion between virtue and happiness, which reason itself demands, upon which Kant rests his whole belief in a future life and just retribution, and in the existence of the moral character of God; since without these principles of faith, the great demand of practical reason, that every one should be finally rewarded according to his deserts, could not be realized. What a strange disproportion between the grounds of faith and the demands of duty! Reason compels us to believe in a just retribution and a just God, because reason demands, that happiness and misery should, in the end, be proportioned to every degree of virtue or vice; and yet, if we abstain from wrong, or do what is right, in order to avoid the evil, or secure the good, which each of them is designed to produce, we do not deserve either to be freed from the evil, or to acquire the good. God has created us to be happy or miserable according to our deserts; and yet, if we make the design of the Creator our own, if we strive to obtain the just reward, we act contrary to the moral law, contrary, then, to the will of God! A righteous

act, performed for no other reward than that happiness which is necessarily connected with the mere consciousness of having done our duty, does not deserve the name of a moral action. The Christian martyr, who, according to the example of his Master, "endures the cross for the glory that is set before him," does not deserve the name of a moral man! As I shall soon have to speak more particularly of the nature of moral motives, the observations now made may be sufficient to direct the attention to this important subject.

In the fifth place, according to Kant, religion is founded wholly and exclusively on morality. The results of speculative reason afford no foundation for a belief in God and a future life, which rests entirely on the demand of practical reason, that virtue and vice should finally reap their just proportion of happiness or misery. Accordingly, Kant requires, that even the records of religion, which are considered as containing the true principles of faith and action, should be interpreted so as to suit the demands of practical reason. But I shall have occasion to show, that both religion and morality are founded upon essential principles in human nature; and, as for the records of religion, no Christian, that has a true regard for his Bible, will allow its words to be taken in any other sense than that which the words themselves convey to every unprejudiced reader, who is acquainted with the language of the people, and the times in which they were written.

A summary account of the theory of the categories,

which I reserve for my next lecture, will complete this sketch of the philosophy of Kant. As the product of unprecedented and untiring intellectual enterprise and labor, this system must always exert a powerful influence on those who engage in its study with a firm determination not to rest until they have measured its whole circumference, and searched its depths. No one will rise from the study of this system, (the result of a long life spent in arduous intellectual labor,) without feeling that he stands on higher ground than before, though his own investigations should lead him to different results. For although that which is pointed out to you as the most striking light, appear to you as the deepest shade, still, even thus, it serves to bring out the truth.

I have presented to you, from different ages and parts of the world, the theories of morals, which seemed to me best calculated to mark the principal stages in the progress of this science. The sketches I have given, imperfect as they are and must be, may be sufficient to invite the studious to more extensive researches. The history of man, and particularly that of the human mind, still presents many unexplored regions, which are hidden from the sight of men only by their own indolence or prejudice. "Search and you will find." The further you proceed on your voyages of discovery, new stars, new constellations, will appear above the horizon to bless the eager eye of the bold and persevering inquirer. And when we see the rays of truth bursting forth from every quarter, and know what oth-

ers have done for us to guide us onward in the pursuit of light, we are not so easily led into the temptation to advance, or blindly to extol, that which is presented as novel and original, particularly when it is brought forward by our own friends, or those whom we are accustomed to admire. We are not so likely to believe, that the light of a lamp, in the dark, is brighter than the rays of the sun, because it happens to burn in our own parlour, or in our neighbour's house. Nothing is better suited to break the spell of authority, and to teach us to think soberly and justly of our own country and our own age, than the study of the history of philosophy, the science of sciences, which claims the world for its country, and eternity for its age.

# LECTURE V.

We now leave the history of Moral Philosophy, to enter upon the study of the subject itself. In launching upon this vast expanse of inquiry, let me once more remind you that we separate ourselves entirely from the parental guidance of authority. History has served us as a pilot to lead us forth from the iron-bound coast of established opinion, which henceforth becomes dangerous to our progress, the whole success of which depends upon our own perseverance and skill in braving the winds of adverse doctrine, as well as in steering clear of the shoals in our own reasoning. I repeat it, reflection upon facts which every one is able to observe, is the only ground on which any question can be settled in Moral Philosophy, and the simple lesson which the child has caught from his mother Nature, may overthrow the testimony of an age of experience collected in the green-houses of artificial life, or from the dead lore of the world of books. All a person can do, whether in lecturing or conversing upon this or any other philosophical subject, is to communicate his own observations and reflections, with the persuasion that every one who hears him is a competent judge.

No sound system of Moral Philosophy should be founded upon any insulated principle, be it called the benevolent or the selfish principle, or that of utility, which in many modern systems seem to be made use of as running titles, for which the books are composed. The moral nature of man is the only legitimate foundation of Moral Philosophy. Our first inquiry, then, must be directed to the essential properties of our own nature, and particularly to the principal powers of the mind, their divers functions, and their coöperation for all the various purposes of life. "Know thyself," was the oracle inscribed on the fane of the god of light; and every inquirer after the way of wisdom, if he repair to the oracle within, will find the same divine lesson inscribed upon the temple-gates of his heart. In practical morality, in our dealings with men, the importance of this self-knowledge is recognised by all; we are in constant danger of mistaking the true motives of our actions, unless we know "of what spirit we are." But in order to decide this question, we must previously ascertain whether we are spirits or not, whether we have souls or minds distinct from our bodies, or not. This question is negatived by the modern teachers of atheism, and has been virtually denied by all those philosophers who have maintained that all our knowledge is founded upon the evidence of the five senses.

A few passing remarks on this supposition I have already made, in treating of the materialism of Leucippus and Democritus. I have said, that every one can at any moment convince himself of the truth of

this assertion, — that there are two sources of knowledge, — our senses and our own consciousness. When I say, "Know thyself," is there nothing in what I utter except what my ear perceives, — a peculiar noise, which the hearer, by a sort of anatomy of the human voice, can resolve into the simple elements of sound?

"Know thyself." — I am uttering, not merely an empty sound, for which I might substitute any other; — but one expressive of thought, — of something which has never entered the ear or the eye of any man, and yet is perfectly well known to all. For every one is conscious of thoughts and feelings, desires and intentions, of joy or sorrow, hope or fear, trust or distrust, love or hate, and innumerable facts within himself of which his five senses can tell him nothing. Now those things which we perceive by our senses we call material; those which we perceive not by our senses, those of which we are conscious, we call immaterial or spiritual. I know that the words "matter" and "material" have been differently defined. The characteristic of matter, it has been said, is resistance; so that the dark body upon which the light strikes should be called material, but not the light which offers no resistance.

But what is resistance? It is a perception we receive through one of our senses, the touch, — whilst light is a perception conveyed to us through another of our senses, the sight. These two perceptions, then, have this in common with each other, that they both come to us through the senses. It is this common foundation which constitutes an important dif-

ference between them, and those perceptions which we do not derive from the senses, but through our intellect, — our consciousness ; — such as thoughts, feelings, and desires. As we have no other words to express this essential difference, it seems better to use the words " matter " and " material " exclusively for all those objects which we perceive by either of our five senses ; while all those objects which we do not know by our senses, but simply by our own consciousness, all the operations of the mind, are immaterial or spiritual realities.

This insisting upon the meaning of certain abstract words, will seem strange only to those who are not acquainted with the actual poverty of our philosophical language, which necessarily enhances the value of every appropriate expression.

It is necessary to use fair terms, and to shun counterfeits, to insure credit in the philosophical, as well as in the commercial world.

I return to my position, in order to state it more strongly. Our reasons for believing in the spiritual realities which our consciousness reveals to us, are not merely equally as strong as the whole evidence of our senses for material objects, but even stronger. The senses themselves, by which we have knowledge of material objects, are immaterial endowments of our nature ; the organs of hearing and seeing, deaf and blind in themselves, become instruments of perception only when the eyes serve as glasses, and the ear as a hearing-trumpet, to the living soul.

Those, therefore, who deny all spiritual reality, and

found their theory upon sensation, which is an immaterial principle, in fact rest their doctrine upon what they set out with denying.

Among the moderns, Condillac is the founder of this sensualistic school of philosophers, as they are termed, which has until lately been prevalent in France. A modern writer on the history of philosophy, Cousin, considers Locke as its founder; but, I believe, without sufficient ground. For, although Locke is to be charged with not having paid sufficient attention to the immaterial functions of the mind, still he distinctly recognises the two most important of them, reflection and volition, as objects of consciousness. The infinite variety of facts and events, in that world which each human being bears within him, is very generally overlooked. The history of any passion in the soul, its rise and progress, its ever-changing complexion, may give some idea of the infinite diversity of spiritual nature.

Take, for example, the passion of fear. How different are the fear of the opinion of others, and that of personal danger; the fear of censure and the fear of doing wrong; the fear for ourselves and for others; the fear of the man and the fear of the woman; the fear that strikes a man dumb, and that of the blustering bravado; the same passion as the motive of the base deserter from the ranks of duty, and that of the foolhardy and the suicide! Yet these are only a few of the native varieties of one passion; how vast and incalculable would the diversity appear, should each act and state of the mind be subjected to that microscopic

investigation, for which the faculties may acquire a sufficient polish and temper from constant exercise.

By the same power by which we discover this infinite variety of immaterial realities within us, we know also that they all have the same source and centre. Whatever thoughts and desires, hopes or fears, I may be conscious of entertaining, I know that it is no one but I, the self-conscious individual, who am thinking, desiring, hoping, or fearing. I am conscious that my thoughts, desires, joys, and sorrows, though they be occasioned by outward circumstances, are virtually my own; and not, as the demonologist supposes, the doings of good or evil spirits, possessing me; or, as the pantheist believes, the direct acts of the Deity. This individual existence and agency which every one calls his own self, is not an object of his five senses, not a material thing. We know, as Cicero says, that "our bodies are not ourselves." That individual power in man which thinks and wills, hopes or fears, knows itself and reflects upon itself by its own intellectual light, without the instrumentality of the senses; it is a self-conscious, immaterial principle, a being distinct from the body, which we call the soul, or the spirit, or the mind. I shall use these three words promiscuously, except in cases in which a stricter phraseology is required, and the definition of each term in particular is to be given.

But the infinite variety of phenomena in the immaterial world, to which our own consciousness introduces us, can not only be traced to one common centre and source, the self-conscious mind; but,

like the numberless beings and occurrences in the material creation, they exhibit, to the observing historian of intellectual nature, more or less resemblance and affinity to each other, and may, accordingly, be classed into different species and families. Some of these affinities, upon which the classification of the phenomena of the mind is founded, can be discovered only by an acute and continued self-observation, while others are so obvious that they are recognised at first sight. For example, no one can help perceiving that the ideal productions of the poet, the painter, and the sculptor, bear a closer resemblance to one another, than to the works of the historian, the experimental philosopher, and the practical moralist. Every one perceives that the affinity or resemblance between the three last-mentioned works, consists in their common object, which is truth, — historical, experimental, and moral truth, — whilst the object of the first-mentioned productions is beauty, which constitutes the bond of union between them, and distinguishes them from other conceptions of the mind.

These resemblances and differences between the numberless creations of the mind, can be traced partly to the influence of circumstances, and partly to the native powers of the soul. If you compare the account which the natural historian gives you of the gradual unfolding of a plant or a tree, with the manner in which it grows, buds, and blossoms in the poet's mind, you readily perceive that these two productions of the mind are unlike one another, not only in their objects, truth and beauty, but in the different power

or faculty that seems necessary for giving rise to each; wherefore we consider one of them as the result of observation, and the other as the creature of the imagination.

Some philosophers have spoken of the different powers of the mind as if they were different souls; and, by their extravagance in separating the various functions of the mind, have induced others to reject every classification of this kind as a preposterous and fatal attempt at dissecting the very principle of life.

While the first-mentioned view destroys the unity, the latter prevents all accurate delineation, of the various capacities of the soul. When I speak of different powers or faculties of the soul, I mean nothing more than certain modes of operation, in which the mind finds itself engaged, when left to itself without any unnatural abstractions. It is evident, that the constituent principles of the soul cannot be ascertained by theories and definitions made up beforehand by our philosophizing imagination. The study alone of the history of our own minds, — accurate and assiduous self-observation, is the true prism by which we can succeed in separating, and thus ascertaining, the original colors which are blended in the ray of life.

In order to show the original powers of the soul, one example may serve instead of many. A person knows that he suffers pain from poverty, and that wealth can change that pain into pleasure. He consequently desires wealth. He sees before him two ways to gratify this desire, an arduous one by industry, and an easy one by fraud. This circumstance

divides his desire of wealth into two separate impulses, an animal and a moral desire, each of which prompts him to choose and determine which of them is to be gratified. We see in this internal process the three essential powers of the soul, the intellect, the feelings, and the will. That power which enables us to ascertain our wants, their causes, and the means of relief, I call the *Intellect;* the emotions of pleasure, pain, and desire, I call the *Feelings;* the power to choose and determine, I call the *Will.* A philosophical account, founded on experience, of the first of these faculties, the human intellect, is the special object of this lecture.

The intellect may be defined, in a general manner, as the power to form ideas, true or imaginary. The human intellect is capable, at the same time, of expanding indefinitely in the contemplation of the universe, and of concentrating all its light upon the most minute objects. Thus the bold conception of Copernicus has freed the science of astronomy from that selfish and contracted view, which supposed this earth to be the centre of the universe, and has divested geography of the childish contentions of antiquity about the true centre on the surface of the earth. On the other hand, the minute investigations of natural philosophers have taught us to see in the smallest particles of matter numberless habitations of life, — in each part of the created world a new, unthought-of creation.

Of the various functions of the Intellect, I shall mention those which seem to me most important. These are the powers of *perception*, *imagination*, and

*reason*. We have a perception of a thing, if the idea we form of it is accompanied with the irresistible belief that there is a real object corresponding to it. This belief rests upon the evidence of our own consciousness, which enables us to observe ourselves in the very act of forming our ideas.

An idea, then, deserves to be called a perception, if our consciousness bears us witness that in forming it, we have endeavoured to give ourselves up wholly to the impression which the thing itself should make upon our minds, excluding every thing that our own imagination or will could add to, or take from it. It is evident from this, that we really believe, only what we cannot help believing; and that any effort of our will to believe what we have not found true by an unprejudiced inquiry, is the first step toward bribing our own understanding, and thus lessening our prospect of ever attaining to a settled and fearless faith.

We are not capable of any higher degree of certainty with regard to any object of thought, than that which the testimony of our own conscience can give us, that the result we have come to, has been gained by the most faithful use of our understanding. The correctness of our impressions may be raised almost beyond all reasonable doubt, by putting the result we have arrived at, to the test of repeated observation. This repeated examination is impossible, with regard to all historical truth; but the subject of moral philosophy has this advantage in common with mathematics, that the results can at any moment be put to the test. For, as I have before observed, Moral Philos-

ophy admits no positions but such as are founded upon the observation of facts, which every one, at every time, is capable of making; particularly upon the great inheritance of all nations and generations, the common nature of man.

Perceptions, then, are those ideas which we are conscious of having formed from impressions made on our minds.

I have already observed that we possess a twofold power of perception. The senses for material objects, and our consciousness for spiritual realities. From these two sources, sensation and consciousness, we derive all the facts on which we can reason; all that can properly be called experience and knowledge rests upon this foundation, and all reasoning is, at best, mere conjecture, unless it be borne out by experience and facts.

Besides the faculty of perception, that enables us to receive impressions and obtain ideas of facts and realities, our intellect possesses the power to originate ideas, to conceive of mere possibilities, of things or images which exist nowhere, except in our own imagination which gave them birth. Our own will, whose influence is excluded from the perception of facts, has full sway in the realms of the imagination. Imagination takes its materials from experience, but it changes and models the facts into all conceivable shapes; as we see in that most daring and ingenious feat of the fancy, the creation of a whole world of gods, by personifying the powers of nature and of man. The productions of this magic power of the intellect,

are, of course, much more numerous and various than those of perception or observation; whence, also, the literature of fiction not only covers a larger surface, but is continually encroaching upon the literature of truth.

Both perception and imagination are capable of unlimited expansion; perception strives to encompass all reality, imagination to fill all the realms of possibility. But the ideas which we derive from perception, dependent as this must be on accidental impressions, as well as those which spring from the luxuriant soil of the imagination, would neither be distinct in themselves, nor in harmony with each other, if the intellect were not invested with a third essential power, which enables us to conceive of all things and images of things in their true and proper relations, to discriminate, compare, and arrange all our ideas with a regard to truth, goodness, or beauty. This and no other, is the high department of reason in the intellectual life of man. I speak here of reason, as the power of thinking, in its general sense, which implies both the faculty of discrimination, which we more strictly call the understanding, and that of judgment, which is more properly the office of reason. Reason enables the philosopher and the man of science to place the scattered parts of his knowledge in their true relation to one another, and to reduce them to a system, to a harmonious whole; it puts into the hands of the artist the seal of perfection; it enables him to embody in his work the greatest variety of forms which can be held together by the living bond of

beauty; it enables the statesman and the political economist to calculate the interests, and weigh the claims, of every individual portion of the whole, whose welfare is his care; it enables the physician to infer, from a comparative examination of all the symptoms, the real character of a disease, and from a calculation of the specific powers of various remedies, the one that may bring relief; it enables the father of a family wisely to provide for his household; it enables every one to know his true place in the world, and to fill it faithfully; and what is more than all, reason reveals to the individual mind the system of the universe, the divine reason that has assigned to each being his part in the great drama of creation, and enables him in the concert of worlds without number, to approach and enjoy the parent Mind who is hidden in the perfection of his works.

Do you ask in what manner human reason accomplishes these mighty works? Simply by attending to those facts which perception furnishes and imagination forms, and studying their relations to each other. There are two ways, in particular, in which reason draws important inferences from the materials furnished by perception and imagination. First, in cases in which our experience is too limited to account for the true relations between the facts it presents, their causal or reciprocal connexion, it is the office of reason to employ and to guide the imagination, that it may present a variety of possible explanations or conjectures, and then, from a comparison of the facts, so far as they are known, with the various possibilities

presented by the imagination, to find that which most satisfactorily accounts for what mere experience has left unexplained.

This is the internal history of all improvements and inventions in science and in the arts; they are first the random excursions of the imagination beyond the boundaries of experience into the untrodden regions of possibility; until, under the direction of reason, they become new accessions to the territory of truth. Thus that bark, full of fate, in which, three centuries ago, one hemisphere set sail in search of its other half in the unknown West, — that victorious bark, the Argo of modern times, first floated upon the boundless fancy of Columbus. And thus a descendant of Columbus, in spirit and in truth, when inquiring into the laws of electricity and the nature of lightning, would not rest satisfied with his own speculations and inferences, but resolutely sent his kite up to the clouds, and perseveringly repeated his daring inquiries, until it did indeed bring down the desired answer from heaven; and he who, had he not succeeded, would have been laughed at as a madman, was hailed as a second Prometheus.

Some of the most important truths are gained by reason uniting the facts which we obtain through consciousness, and those which the senses furnish. Our consciousness only acquaints us with the acts of our own minds, our thoughts, feelings, and intentions, and not with those of other men, of whom we have no immediate perception except through our senses. But finding that other men are like ourselves in their visible appear-

ance, and that they make use of their limbs and organs in the same manner as we do in order to accomplish our purposes, we suppose them actuated by the same motives, possessed of the same spiritual nature.

The mutual experience of relief from one another excites the desire of a constant and intimate intercourse among men; and a common language, the most finished production of reason, availing herself of the results of consciousness and the senses, is thus produced. Still more, as reason enables us to know the minds of other men by their external actions, interpreted by our own inward experience, so the whole creation, in its infinite variety and harmony, becomes a language to the reasoning mind. It is the study of this language of universal nature, which leads us to a nearer acquaintance with the designs of Creative reason, of that God of nature, whose being and character, the Christian, by the use of the same all-searching faculty, finds confirmed, and more fully and clearly revealed, in Scripture.

I have spoken so far of reason, in its general sense, as the power of judgment, which examines the subjects presented by experience or imagination, and, having compared them, draws its conclusions. But when we analyze this power of judgment, we discover, that it implies two distinct faculties or functions; first, the understanding, or the power to fix upon and examine any particular subject, real or imaginary, and to discriminate or distinguish it from others; and, secondly, the faculty of judging, or rea-

son, in its strictest sense, that is, the power to consider all things in their proper relations to each other. It is evident, that these two acts of the mind belong to a right judgment. The exercise of the understanding is a necessary preparation for that of reason or judgment; for, in order to consider all things in their proper relations, it is necessary to understand each by itself, and in comparison with others. We frequently find, on the one hand, persons remarkable for using their reason without their understanding, that is, for passing judgment on things or persons in general, without being sufficiently acquainted with each, or distinguishing one from the other. If there were need of examples, we might adduce many celebrated descriptions of foreign countries by travellers, passing judgment upon a whole nation from a very partial acquaintance with a few individuals and places. And, on the other hand, we find persons remarkable for their understanding, yet deficient in reason. An instructer may be perfectly acquainted with all the branches of knowledge to be taught in his school, and yet be a very indifferent teacher, because he is unable to judge of the comparative value of each, for the general improvement of his scholars. A mechanic, a merchant, or a literary man, may have a thorough and discriminative knowledge of the peculiar interests of manufactures, commerce, or literature, and yet be unfit for the function of a statesman, which is to consider them all in their proper relations and bearings upon the general interest. And thus I should say of the atheist, that he may be remarkable for his under-

standing, either as a natural philosopher, searching the laws of the material world, or as a physician, comprehending the human frame; but that he is deficient in reason, not considering all things in their proper relations to each other, which could not exist and endure as a various and harmonious whole, without one central and universal power.

In speaking of the understanding, as the faculty of knowing single things by themselves, and distinguishing them from one another, and of reason, as the power of considering all things in their proper relations, I believe I have used those words in their practical, as well as their true philosophical meaning. In some respects this distinction agrees with that made by Kant, and in others, not. I believe that the view I have given is consistent with all that is true and important in the doctrine of the categories, technically so called; and perhaps it may throw a clearer light upon it, than the representation of the author himself.

Let us see, then, what is the substance of this system of the categories. They are the most simple and general conditions and relations of things, which the intellect of man discovers in nature. It is in general easy to say, what conditions and relations are more or less simple and general than others. Take, for example, these three ideas, a community and its members, a town and its inhabitants, a whole and its parts. You easily perceive, that the idea of a whole and its parts is a more simple, and, of course, more general conception, than that of a community and its

members, which is again more simple and general, than that of a town and its inhabitants. For the idea of a community and its members belongs to many other associations besides that of a town ; and the idea of a whole and its parts belongs, not only to communities which consist of living beings, but to any particular collection of things, as well as the universe. Now the categories are proposed by their founder as a system of all the most simple and general conditions and relations of things ; and thus to point out the whole province of the understanding, or that faculty of the mind by which we ascertain the nature of each subject, and its relation to others. The practical difference between the functions of the understanding and of reason will enable me to give here a succinct and complete view of the categories of Kant, with such illustrations as I hope a child might be able to understand.

The categories, that is, the simplest, and, of course, most general conditions and relations in which things are known to exist, are contained under these four heads ; quantity, quality, modality, and relationship.

First, in point of quantity, the understanding distinguishes between one thing, several things, and all things ; whether these things be man, or plants, or any other objects whatever.

Second, in point of quality, our understanding points out, in the first place, any given quality ; it points out, also, opposite qualities ; and, in the third place, divers qualities. For example, we qualify an action as good ; we ascribe to another the opposite

quality, bad; and we distinguish between divers degrees of goodness or wickedness.

Third, in point of modality, (a name which I retain from Kant, because I know no better term,) we distinguish between that which is possible, actual, and necessary. Thus, life is to us an actual possession; the continuation of life is among the possible things; and death is a necessary event.

Fourth, in point of relationship, as Kant calls it, we have a distinct perception, first, of that which is essential and that which is accidental; secondly, of cause and effect; and, thirdly, of communion and mutual influence. Thus, for example, a republic is a communion of persons connected by mutual rights and duties; the will of the majority is the cause of its existence; the establishment of justice is its essence; prosperity and refinement are accidental objects.

Now I say, with Kant, that by our understanding we are able to discern any one of these categories, or fundamental relations, as well as any other less abstract and general connexion, such as the relationship that exists between several persons; the essential properties of a moral action, distinguishing them from accidental qualities; or any other relation of things, or mere thoughts and images, to one another. It is the proper department of the understanding to consider any one thing or subject in its abstract or practical relation to any other; while it is the province of reason to consider every thing in its relation to every other, to compare it, not only to this object or that object, but to the whole of our knowl-

edge, and to assign to it its true place and comparative worth. Accordingly, I have said before, that a person may be remarkable for his understanding, and yet be deficient in reason, or true wisdom; he may be acquainted with the individual interests of agriculture, or manufactures, or commerce, and yet be unable to comprehend the comparative value of each of these branches of industry to the common good of society. And thus we see, that the practical considerations, according to which we have before endeavoured to define and distinguish between understanding and reason, are also philosophically true. The peculiar province which Kant assigns to theoretical reason, to apply the three categories of relationship; that of essence and accidence to the thinking individual; that of cause and effect to all the phenomena in the world; and that of communion and mutual influence to the Deity, — this demarcation of the province of reason is altogether arbitrary, and, I am bold enough to say, unworthy of the founder of the critical philosophy.

I shall now speak of a view of reason, understanding, and the senses, advanced by the founder of the critical philosophy, which is entirely opposed to that which I have given. Kant does not consider the senses, the understanding, and the reason, merely as powers of observation and reflection, by which we gain knowledge of objects which exist without them, and are reflected in our own minds, as living mirrors of material and immaterial realities. On the contrary, Kant considers the things which we perceive by our

senses, the objects of outward and inward experience, merely as phenomena, or appearances, while the real things themselves cannot be perceived by man. How it comes that we have any notion of the things themselves, which Kant says we cannot know, neither he nor any one of his disciples has ever explained. But Kant considers our faculty of perception, not merely as a recipient and judge of truth, but as the source and substance of truth. The perceptions of space and time, cause and effect, a whole and its parts, are not ideas derived from real facts and events, but innate ideas, laws, which our understanding, instead of learning or inferring from nature, imposes upon it.

This view of our faculties of perception as the source and substance of truth, I think radically wrong. Our faculties are evidently fitted for the perception of all the various objects around and within us; through them we discover single objects, their resemblance and difference, and their relations; qualities and laws which belong to all things, or only to some, or to one in particular; and those rules which have been found true whenever they have been put to the test, we have a good right to believe will stand the test of all future investigations. Thus the science of optics, that is, the laws of vision, which have been abstracted from a great number of observations, and have been constantly confirmed by later investigations, apply only to objects of vision; but here, we believe, they will always be found applicable, because nature is true to itself. Thus, the observation, that, in na-

ture, each event is predetermined by another which precedes it, and that thus all the future is necessarily predetermined by the past, by the chain of cause and effect; this rule applies, and will always apply to inanimate things, to plants, and to animals, but it does not apply to man as a moral agent, simply because this rule was and is derived only from observations on material and animal, but not on moral nature. In the same manner, mathematics have proved true, and will always prove so, because the mind, having formed the idea of quantity from experience, retains it in its abstract purity, and observes the laws which regulate the increase and decrease, and the proportions of different quantities; and those laws of quantity must be applicable to the whole material world, because all things, as we observe them, exist in time and space, and time and space can be measured or determined by the laws of quantity. In the same manner, by observing the phenomena of moral nature, the conscience and the will, we discover laws which will always prove true, but only with regard to all moral agents, because all our observation, and all history, lead us to believe, that moral nature will remain the same for ever. Thus, when we discover a rule or law, which is constantly found to apply to all things, or to all things of a certain class, we have no reason to infer, with Kant, that our faculty of perception is so constituted, that it cannot form any other ideas than these, and therefore must find them true in all cases; but the fact, that some laws are found confirmed by all experience, can be accounted for on the

supposition, that these laws actually exist in nature. And as we cannot judge of the truth of things differently from the manner in which they appear to our own faculty of perception, faithfully exercised, we have no reason to disbelieve the simple account of our observing minds, that the general laws, as well as the peculiarities, actually exist as they are perceived. And this is a sufficient reason for rejecting the theory of Kant, which, contrary to our own consciousness, supposes that what we believe real and true in itself only exists in our own thoughts; that we indeed, constituted as we are, cannot help entertaining these thoughts, though by the aid of critical philosophy we may convince ourselves that they are nothing but delusion. My objections to the view of reason maintained by Kant, as the source of all general principles, and the laws of experience and nature, extend also to the manner in which the terms "law of reason" and "religion of reason" are frequently used.

If you understand by the "law of reason" those rules of social conduct which reason derives from an investigation of human nature, as the true source and substance of private and social conduct, I readily acknowledge the existence of such a law, as an important branch of Moral Philosophy, and as the moral foundation of all the actual laws of society. But, if by that term you mean a law which has its foundation in your own faculty of reasoning, I deny the existence of such a law; and cannot help fearing that the scheme which is thus appealed to as the law of reason, in opposition to the established laws of society,

is like the "Town of Man-Soul," an essay of the imagination acting the part of reason, to which it would be very unsafe to intrust ourselves and all our earthly interests; and if ever this so-called law of reason should be appealed to as the highest authority in our courts of justice, the guardians of society would at once become its despots.

Much the same is to be said about the expression, "Religion of reason." If you mean a faith which is founded upon the inquiries of reason into the constitution and government of the universe, and into the external and internal evidences, and the contents of the records of immediate divine revelation, I confess that I consider this religion of reason as the only orthodox faith. But if you mean by that term a religion which is founded upon reason as its source and substance, I deny the existence of such a faith, except in your own imagination. The profession of such a religion of reason is nothing less than an avowal of atheism.

I have given in this lecture a general view of the constituent principles of the human mind, — the intellect, the feelings, and the desires; I have then given a brief analysis of our intellectual powers; and shall proceed in my next lectures to give a similar account of the original feelings and desires, — particularly of the moral powers, the conscience, and the free will of man.

# LECTURE VI.

In my last lecture I have given a description of the intellectual capacities of man. I shall now treat of the two other essential faculties or functions of the soul, the feelings, and the will.

With regard to these two capacities, which are less open to observation, and consequently cannot be so easily defined and set forth in words, it is particularly important to remember that all our definitions of simple acts or functions of the soul, such as thoughts, feelings, and intentions, can never be made so accurate and complete, that from our description alone the subject may be fully understood by any one not already acquainted with it by his own experience. Thoughts, feelings, and intentions are facts as much as stones and trees; they are not results of reasoning, but objects of perception. The most successful efforts of the philosophy of the mind are sketches of that scenery which lies open before the inward eye; of which every one, though possessed of no other philosophy than the optics of nature, is a competent judge; while the most faithful copy cannot be justly estimated by any one, unless he find the original in his own soul.

In order to prevent any mistake in regard to the words I am using, I observe that by feelings I mean the emotions of pleasure, pain, and desire. Desire, pain, and pleasure, the simple elements of feeling, are capable of an infinite variety of modifications and degrees, from the slightest uneasiness to the agony of despair; from the most trifling agreeable sensation to transports of triumphant joy; from a slight inclination bordering on indifference, to the most ardent passion. They are frequently mixed up with other phenomena of animal and intellectual life, but they cannot be resolved into any other acts or states of the soul. In every instance in which different powers of the mind coöperate to a certain result, you can, by a philosophical analysis, distinguish between the influence of the feelings and that of the intellect and the will. Thus our calculations of the good or ill success of an undertaking are an exercise of the understanding; but only the feeling of pleasure which attends the expectation of success, and that of pain which is called forth by anticipated disappointment, transforms these calculations into hope or fear. Thus we may think of the wants of others, and do what is in our power to relieve them; yet, without the true desire to help them, our thoughts and our deeds cannot be called charity; while that desire of itself, bereft of all the means to show it, is true and perfect charity. Being conscious of ourselves, we know whether we are pleased or grieved; inclined or averse to a thing; but we are conscious also that this knowledge is something different from the pain or pleasure

or desire we feel. Still more striking is the difference between our feelings and our imagination or our will If we say of a person that he imagines or chooses to be pleased or displeased, to love or dislike a thing, we mean that he imagines or chooses to do or to be what he in reality is not or does not. He imagines, he wills ; but he does not feel pleasure, or pain, or desire.

Before I treat of the nature of the will, of conscience, and those laws by which the process of the moral life of man is regulated, I shall speak first of the feelings in general, those which belong to his animal as well his spiritual nature. The emotions of pleasure, pain, and desire belong to the inferior animal as well as to man ; and the nature of those which are peculiar to him can be best explained by the former, which are in themselves a more simple and easy object of investigation, as they belong to the general economy of animal life, in which every thing is as distinctly and necessarily determined as in the inanimate world.

The emotions of pleasure and of pain are immediate expressions of the satisfactory or unsatisfactory state or condition of the animal. If he is sick or wounded, starving or confined, man, as well as every other animal, feels pain ; if he is sound and healthy, well-supported, and free to follow his inclinations, he feels pleasure. Any occurrence which impairs the actual condition of the animal, causes pain ; any change which improves it, causes pleasure.

The imagination, as well as experience or percep-

tion, is able to call forth pleasure or pain. If I imaginea better state than that in which I am, this imagination is attended with a pleasant emotion, while the feeling which arises from my actual state, if it were pleasant before, becomes painful; and if it were painful, it becomes still more so when contrasted with the better state pointed out by the imagination. Of course the opposite effect is produced on our feelings when the condition pointed out by the imagination is inferior to that in which we actually are. Thus the poor man who possesses a competency through the profitable exercise of his own faculties, enjoys his condition, for mere existence gives pleasure; this satisfaction with his actual condition is increased by comparing it with that of helpless indigence; and it is turned, at least partly, into dissatisfaction, if he compare it with a state of economical independence in which he may exercise his faculties freely, without a regard to emolument. Every pain, whether real or imaginary, gives rise to desire, or the feeling of want; a tendency to change the unsatisfactory condition in which we are, or imagine ourselves to be. The pain caused by want of food, gives rise to hunger and thirst, the painful feeling of ignorance gives rise to curiosity, or desire of knowledge. The first immediate object of desire, therefore, is cessation of pain. But experience shows that the cessation of pain itself is the cause of pleasure, because the mere consciousness of existence which is left, is attended with pleasure. Consequently we can say, that the object of all desire as soon as it is defined by experience, is pleasure. The attainment of pleasure puts an end to the want

and the desire. Whatever be the cause of that pain which gives rise to desire, its object is the same; hunger, cold, ignorance, or unskilfulness, are causes of pain, and this gives rise to desire, the real object of which is cessation of that pain, by means of stilling the hunger, guarding against the cold, acquiring knowledge and skill. The circumstances which give rise to pain and dissatisfaction, must not be confounded with the real cause of the desire, which is pain itself; and the means by which the desire accomplishes its object, should not be mistaken for the object itself, which is pleasure, or satisfaction. Desire, in order to accomplish its object, sets the faculties of man, or any other sentient being, at work. His intellectual faculties, in order to find or contrive the means to satisfy his wants, and his active powers, in order to carry his thoughts into effect. Thus desire becomes the motive of action; it moves, as it were, the powers of the body and the soul to its own and only object, the attainment of pleasure or happiness. Hence the difference between those functions of animal nature, which, like the growth of the plant, proceed without any motive, desire, or will on the part of the animal, — such as respiration and digestion, — and those which may properly be called actions. Actions I call such phenomena or changes as are produced by a living being from some motive or other, that is, with a view to attain something of which it feels the want, that is, which it has a desire to accomplish or possess. Those desires which are accompanied with the persuasion that their accomplishment is beyond the power of the individual, or that the means to attain them are

more to be shunned than the end is to be desired, are mere wishes, and not motives, because they do not operate upon his own active or executive powers; such as the desire to visit the stars, or never to die. The motives or practical desires are qualified by the nature of the pleasure which is their immediate object. Thus almsgiving may be actuated either by charity or ostentation, as the giver finds his happiness either in benefiting others, or in being considered as their benefactor.

By observing the causes of pleasure or pain and the objects of desire, we can ascertain the nature and original tendencies of a living being. For, in general, those things which are conformable to the natural constitution produce pleasure, and those which are contrary to it, pain; and the object of desire is to seek or do the former, and avert or avoid the latter.

In animals, and in man, so far as his animal nature is in question, the objects of desire are all limited, and such as can be attained in this life, unless prevented by accident. Among these animal desires there are two paramount to all others; the desire of the individual to preserve itself, and the desire to provide for its offspring. Thus the ingenious net of the spider, and the curious nest of the tailor-bird, are not manufactured for an exhibition of specimens of the arts of weaving and sewing; but the former to serve as an instrument of self-preservation by prey, and the latter to accommodate the unfledged brood.

When we examine the various desires of man, we find that some of them are in their nature finite, as the animal desires of food, motion, and rest, while others

are in themselves infinite, as the love of perfection. There are others, in the third place, which are finite in some respects and infinite in others. This I conceive to be the character of the *passions*, — desires which are peculiar to man. The desire of food, the healthy appetite as we find it in the animal, as well as in the man who from principle follows the simple dictates of nature, cannot be called a passion ; and the same is to be said of every other desire which is absolutely limited. On the other hand, the love of perfection, of the most harmonious and various exercise of all our powers, that deepest and brightest principle in man, which constitutes his resemblance to the Deity, — cannot be properly termed a passion.

But the nature of the passions will be evident from the following examples of lower and of higher passions. The drunkard and the glutton change hunger and thirst into passions, by indulging and exaggerating the demands of nature without end. On the other hand, the desire of knowledge is infinite in its nature, but every branch of it may become a passion, such as botany, history, or philosophy, if it is pursued in preference to every other. Even the desire of universal knowledge, and religion itself, may become passions, if either be indulged in to the neglect of other pursuits and duties. Accordingly we understand by passion, a desire which being either in itself finite, is indulged in beyond its natural bounds, like the appetite of the gourmand ; or a desire which, being in itself unlimited, is pursued in a limited manner ; such as the partial devotedness to knowledge of the antiquary or the

mineralogist. The passions are more or less generous, as they are more contracted within the narrow sphere of our animal self, or expand more into that love of perfection in which the highest happiness of man consists.

If this brief account of the feelings in general, and of those of man and of the mere animal, be accurate, it leads to some important disclosures of human nature and destiny. Let us first attend to the three elements of feeling, pleasure, pain, and desire, and ascertain their relation to one another. Then let us attend to the difference between animal and human nature, which I have just now pointed out, with regard to the sources of pleasure and pain, and the objects of desire. Spinoza, I believe, was the first who pointed out the true import of each of the constituent feelings. Pain is the feeling of imperfection, pleasure the feeling of perfection, while desire implies a transition from imperfection to perfection, or from dissatisfaction to satisfaction. Sickness, poverty, ignorance, guilt, all kinds or states of imperfection, are causes of pain; health, comfort, knowledge, virtue, and every other kind of perfection, give rise to or are indicated by pleasure; and all kinds of desire are evidently strivings of the soul to rise from imperfection to perfection, and thus from pain to pleasure. The perfection itself, which is thus sought for, may be real or imaginary. He who strives to make himself independent by industry, and he who strives to effect the same by deception, both certainly proceed on the plan of endeavouring to better their circumstances, to perfect their condition. The regular succession of pain, desire, and pleasure, is found in the animal as well as in man; yet with one remark-

able difference, which the clear sight of Spinoza, confined by the horizon of his own peculiar system, did not discover. It is with man as with every other animal, that, for example, the confinement of our limbs in the same position, long continued bodily rest, causes pain ; this excites the desire of motion, which gives pleasure, but long continued motion again produces pain, and the desire of rest ; and so on through life ; the objects of desire, the causes of pleasure and pain, remaining essentially the same, but changing parts in continual succession.

But in man the degree of knowledge and of virtue, which once was the cause of the highest joy, because it was the highest summit of perfection he was then capable of reaching, becomes a source of dissatisfaction, of a desire after higher states of excellence. The highest degree of perfection, of which we are at any time susceptible, being actually attained, neither the same, nor any inferior state, can ever again satisfy us ; the thoughts, which we have once entertained as familiar guests, depart from us as the messengers and prophets of unknown and unfathomable sources of truth ; the highest principle, which held together and illumined, like a fixed and self-radiant sun, our whole system of philosophy, seems, as we advance in knowledge, to shine with reflected light, and to move like a planet around an unknown centre. Such is the nature of the human soul, manifested in its ever-growing desires. Infinite power, bound up in a finite existence in time and space, strives at gaining an adequate sphere of action ; this infinite tendency in man makes him seek satisfaction in the animal appetites,

stretched beyond their natural bounds, or the lower passions, such as the gratification of the palate, wealth, and low ambition; but not satisfied with the prospect, or the actual attainment, of these imperfect gratifications, his mind presses onward to higher pursuits, the objects of the generous passions, such as the love of country, of freedom, of glory, of knowledge, of the fine arts ; until the mind recognises the fulness of all its tendencies, in striving after the most various and harmonious exercise of all its powers, human perfection, the likeness of God in man.

Thus we learn, from the evergrowing desires of man, that it is his nature, his destiny, to strive after perfection, as the sole foundation of happiness. Human perfection consists in the most various and harmonious exercise of all our faculties of body and mind, and an adequate sphere of action or condition in the world. I mean such a state of health, such advantages and comforts, such a state of society, such a relation to the Supreme Being, as is most appropriate to the full exercise of all his faculties. To express it more briefly and strictly, human perfection, the life-spring of happiness, consists in the greatest possible efficiency, and an appropriate condition. The truth and sufficiency of this principle, upon which the whole system of morality is founded, will appear more fully, after the account of the principal faculties of man is completed.

As the striving of man after perfection is in itself infinite, it is evident, that, at no time, his efficiency and his situation can fully satisfy his desire. Still

that infinite tendency impels him to accomplish, in every stage of his being, as much as possible of his endless destiny. Hence arises a contest of desires in man. While he is enjoying the use of his powers in any particular situation, the divine impulse in his soul leads him to discover a more enlarged sphere of action, and urges him to sacrifice the present for future, greater enjoyment. Pleasure being the object of all desire, he feels tempted to retain what he actually has, and to satisfy, or get rid of any longings beyond, in the shortest and easiest manner. Thus, a person in easy circumstances feels the strong desire to improve his mind by knowledge. But the acquisition of knowledge requires a sacrifice of ease, and tempts him who thought himself already safe beyond the necessity of exertion, to come to a compromise with the demands of his own mind, by possessing himself of some of the ornaments of information, such as may be gathered in the antechambers of learning, to grace the drawing-rooms of life. In such and similar innumerable cases, springing up at each step in every walk of life, there arises in the soul a struggle between opposing desires. This collision of desires calls in, for its decision, the moral powers of man, the conscience, and the will. As these faculties are peculiar to man, their office may best be understood, after considering the manner in which nature settles any collision of desires in other animals. If, in any case, the various animal desires come in collision with each other, nature has ordained, by an inward necessity, which of them shall prevail. We

see the animal leave its play to obtain its food, and neglect its food to secure its life, and sacrifice its life to protect its young. But this simple principle of order does not prevail in the infinite variety of desires that spring up in the soul of man, each of them pretending to the sole dominion over the whole. Whenever one of his desires or passions clashes with another, nature has not decided, by an absolute law of his being, which of them shall predominate. The human parent can abandon his child to save his own life; he can neglect the care of his life to gratify his appetite; he can hazard his means of living, his life, his child, for the love of gambling.

It is evident, from the boundless variety of human desires, each of them striving to absorb the others, that cases of collision must be much more frequent in man than in other animals. Still there is, as I have observed, in the human soul, no sovereign instinct which decides with absolute necessity which of the conflicting tendencies shall prevail. Hence the possibility of a case which is actually found in individuals, when the whole soul is disturbed in its depths by the tumultuous anarchy of the passions. But though nature has not saved man from such a ruinous state, by the established supremacy of instinct, she has done more for him, having placed the means of salvation in his own power. She has endowed him with conscience and a free will, the constituents of his moral being.

The character of each of the faculties or functions of the soul, which enter into the complicated process of the moral life of man, may be distinctly seen from examples.

Jerome of Prague was put into prison by the ecclesiastical council assembled at Constance, because he advocated the religious opinions of his teacher and friend John Huss, who suffered martyrdom for his Protestant faith. Jerome resisted all the threats of the Inquisition, and the sufferings inflicted upon him to make him recant his faith. At last, however, broken down by the miseries of his dungeon, he was induced to make a public recantation. But soon afterward, being again brought from his prison before the council, to make a still more complete confession of his errors, he, to the astonishment of his judges, publicly declared, that his teacher, Huss, was perfectly right, and that, of all his own sins, not one grieved him so deeply, as to have renounced the truth for fear of the flames, which now seemed no longer dreadful to him. Neither the threats of his enemies, nor the entreaties of friendship could induce him to take back this fatal assertion; and as he stood upon the pile, he ordered, contrary to custom, that it should be kindled not behind but before him, and died praising the God of truth. Now though we should have to bear the blame which the botanist incurs, when he pulls a beautiful flower to pieces, in order to find the number of stamens which marks the class, let us analyze this remarkable conduct of Jerome, the true characteristics of which we can find in many, though less striking events of our own lives; let us trace it to its roots in the soul.

It is easy to assign to each power of the soul its part as an actor in this short scene, taken from the

great drama of life. Let us see, first, what was the part the intellect had in this recantation and the then following act of noble inconsistency. By his understanding, he perceived that his recantation and acquittal on the one hand, and his perseverence and destruction on the other, must follow each other as cause and effect. His reason enabled him to judge of the comparative worth of a life bought by falsehood, and death in the cause of truth. The judge within him perceived on one side immediate cessation of temporary pain, and acquisition of pleasure by release from imprisonment, counteracted by the expectation of lasting self-reproach for having sacrificed the prospect of a higher degree and a wider sphere of action, which, on the other side, offered a reward of a greater and more lasting happiness to come for present and transitory suffering. His reason therefore pronounced the sentence of voluntary death, as conducive to higher perfection and happiness than a life of successful falsehood. His reason told him, — to express it in heavenly language, — that by losing his life he should find it.

Among the feelings of Jerome we notice first the pain he experienced from imprisonment and the anticipation of a cruel death; the pleasure which attended the thoughts of release; and the result of these two feelings, the desire to save his life and personal freedom, which was strengthened by the knowledge that it was in his own power to obtain its object by a few words contrary to his conviction of which his persecutors had no right to ask a confession. On

the other hand, there was the pain attending the thoughts of forfeiting so high a degree, and so great a sphere, of efficiency, as that of promoting the cause of truth by the testimony of his death; there was the pleasure connected with this thought, and the desire, arising from it, to attain to the glory of martyrdom for eternal truth. Each of these two desires, that of saving his life, and that of sacrificing it, were both natural aspirations of his soul; neither of them can by itself be called either moral or immoral. For it is evident that both the saving, and the sacrifice, of our own life may be in one case moral and in another immoral, according to the object for which we either make or refuse the sacrifice. We suppose that neither of these two opposite desires in Jerome was strong enough to overcome the other, and to determine him irresistibly to one or the other course; their demands were appeals to his own free and sovereign will; and in this capacity they assume a moral character.

On the one hand he feels pain at the thought, that having the power to suppress the fear of death which prevents him from attaining the highest object of his mind, he should not use it; this pain gives rise to the desire to exert his will for this purpose; and as he really makes or neglects to make all the exertion within his power, he feels satisfied or dissatisfied, pleased or displeased with himself. These feelings of desire, pleasure, and pain, which depend on the free exercise of the will, are the manifestations of conscience. Accordingly, conscience consists partly

in the impulse or desire to suppress, by efforts of the will, those longings after immediate pleasure which are opposed to the attainment of greater happiness in the end, and partly in those pleasures or pains which are the result, the rewards or punishments, of efforts made or neglected. In the history of Jerome we find the power of conscience manifested in his eagerness to abide by the truth even in death; in his pain on account of his previous recantation, and in the holy joy with which he suffered martyrdom. In opposition to this moral feeling, or the power of conscience, the natural desire to save his life became a temptation to sacrifice his highest good for his nearest.

The two essential qualities or powers of the will, also, are evident in the conduct of Jerome; the power to choose between the objects of temptation and conscience, is clear, from his first refusing a recantation, then submitting to it, and then again revoking it. The power to resist temptation, the conscientious consistency of the will, which we call virtue, was set in full view by the flames lighted in front of the pile, which could only try and purify his will but not consume it.

The third constituent power of the soul, in connexion with the intellect and the feelings, is the will. By this expression I mean what is more emphatically called the free will of man, or the power of free agency. It is the power of man to determine by his own choice upon either of several modes of conduct which his intellect points out to him as possible. It is in-

different in what these modes of conduct consist, upon which he is at liberty to decide; whether the object be to raise his hand or not, to open his eyes or shut them, to give his mind to a subject or divert it from it, to follow the dictates of conscience or the allurements of the senses. The most important province of the will consists in moral agency, that is, in deciding the conflict between conscience and temptation.

# LECTURE VII.

MANY questions with regard to the moral powers of man, the conscience, the will, and the motives of actions, which I have only glanced at, require a more particular investigation. Some of the most important of these questions will form the subject of this lecture.

All discussions on morals can be reduced to these three questions. First, what is the origin and the foundation of duty, or that mode of conduct which we call moral? In the second place, what is the true and legitimate motive of moral actions? Third, what is the nature of the will, or that power whose office it is to execute the moral law from moral motives? I shall now treat of some topics relating to the first question, concerning the origin and the foundation of the moral law.

With regard to the origin of the moral law of conscience, and our moral ideas in general, some think they are not founded upon the nature and constitution of man. The promptings of conscience, in particular, are considered by some as the immediate operations of the divine spirit; while others suppose all our moral ideas to be arbitrary, though highly useful con-

trivances of the understanding, the result of circumstances, of education, and the institutions of society.

In opposition to these two opinions, many believe in a moral legislation in our own minds, which they ascribe either to conscience, or reason, or a moral sense.

The assertion that the ideas of duty, of right and wrong, do not rest on any immutable law of our being, but on changeable circumstances, and institutions, this assertion, maintained by Locke and others, is founded chiefly on the fact that the moral ideas of men and nations differ from each other, oftentimes on the most important subjects. The Christian widow, who takes the most conscientious care of her life and health, in order to be both father and mother to her orphan children, — would she not consider such a conscientious care of herself as selfish and faithless cowardice, and conscientiously throw herself upon the flaming pile of her husband, if she had happened to be educated under the burning sky of idolatrous India, instead of the mild light of the Gospel? It is a fact that the conscientious Hindoo derives, from his sacred books, moral obligations which neither the Christian finds in his Bible, nor the Mahommedan in the law of his prophet.

Discordant views of duty are found not only among men of different nations, in a savage and in a civilized state, but among enlightened men of the same nation, professors of the same faith, members of the same household. How can these differences, of which many striking examples might be mentioned, be ac-

counted for, on the supposition of something in human nature that deserves the name of a principle or a law ?

It is true that men may conscientiously perform actions of an opposite character, because they may conscientiously embrace opposite views. When I say, that a person is conscientiously a Christian, I do not call him conscientious because the doctrine he embraces is true, but because his conscience bears him witness, that his belief in the truth of the Gospel is the result of the most strenuous exercise of his intellect of which he thinks himself capable, intent solely upon the discovery of truth.

A person may err in judging of the truth of a doctrine, or the goodness of an action, and of his own power to comprehend or perform it. But he cannot err with regard to the question whether he believes the doctrine true, the action good, and his own strength sufficient to comprehend or perform it. Whether I do or do not believe, is a fact of consciousness, of immediate self-perception, not the result of reasoning, and is, therefore, exempt from all possible mistakes in reasoning.

I am either conscious or not of a belief in a certain doctrine ; if I am conscious of it, the doctrine itself may be called in question ; but the simple fact that I am conscious of having such a belief, is something that neither needs nor admits of any proof, but is self-evident.

Now the operations of conscience are founded upon this simple fact of consciousness. I feel a self-condemning pain, if I am conscious of a belief that I have

not used all the means within my reach to acquire a full knowledge of my duties as a citizen ; and I feel a self-approving pleasure, if I am conscious of a belief in my having done all I could in order to know and perform my civil obligations ; and I feel prompted to act in conformity to this consciousness.

This self-condemning, self-approving, and self-impelling power in man, which we call his conscience, is, so far as we know, the same in all men, a law of our common nature. As soon as the powers of the individual are sufficiently developed to perceive the two different ways of life, the one which leads to easy and transient, and the other which leads to hard-earned and lasting pleasure, — the impulses, pains, and pleasures of conscience awake together with the freedom of the will. It is true, that children, when very young, show no indications of the moral principle ; and that men in a savage and brutal state possess only few and imperfect moral ideas, which are frequently confounded with the love of power, expediency, or passion. But this circumstance does not prove that the moral nature is in man only a habit, that has become a second nature. On the contrary, the mere fact that the moral principle can be developed in man, is a sufficient proof that it is a principle of his nature, though, like all his other qualities, it needs to be unfolded in order to become active. Accordingly it admits and requires the influence of circumstances and society for its first developement and continued growth. But this necessity of culture does not prove that the moral sentiment is not a native of the soul. On the contrary, in this con-

sists the great difference between man and the brute, that the true nature of the latter can be seen only in its wild state, before its instincts are modified by taming and training; while the nature of man is revealed only by the developement of all his faculties, by education, civilization, and religion.

However great the influence of circumstances, of parents, and society may be upon the formation of the character of an individual, it is easy to show that the promptings of conscience are not merely the continued vibrations of early or late impressions upon our minds. Though the individual is prompted by conscience, to obey the dictates of parents and the laws of society in general, yet when these external injunctions are contrary to the real or supposed laws of moral nature, he feels called upon by the same power to disobey and overthrow those immoral behests; — still more, the conscientious man obeys the laws of society, not because others prescribe them, but because obedience to them is required of him by the law of laws in his own mind.

Accordingly conscience, or the moral principle in man, cannot be considered as the creature of circumstances, of education, and social institutions.

In the second place, the opinion of those who regard the injunctions of conscience as the immediate promptings of the divine spirit, does not seem to be borne out by an unprejudiced self-examination.

God, in endowing the soul with this inward voice, which calls us to moral action, has indeed most clearly manifested his own design in the creation of man; and every prompting of conscience is an evidence of this

original revelation of creative wisdom. But, though conscience itself is the gift of God, and consequently an act of the Giver, yet, as he has made it a constant principle of our nature, the actual promptings of conscience can no longer be considered as immediate actions of the creative mind. When we observe ourselves in the act of conquering any wrong tendency to indolence, pride, or revenge, we cannot help perceiving, that the monitions of conscience against these temptations, as well as the power of our own free will, which enables us to overcome them, are alike the attributes of our individual moral nature. The moral injunctions, the pleasures and pains of conscience, our virtues and our sins, are all equally the effects of the same constant and individual power, which we call the human mind.

It is the legislative power of his own mind by which man prescribes for himself a certain mode of action, as right; it is the judicial power of his mind which makes him approve or condemn his own conduct; and it is the executive power of his mind by which he is enabled to obey his own commands.

These legislative, judicial, and executive capacities, are, as I have observed, only different branches of the same sovereign power in man; and not the immediate operations of Him who has implanted this principle within him, as the moral foundation of his being.

But though, in general, the demands of conscience cannot be considered either as the results of education and circumstances, or as direct operations of the

Deity, but as the natural effects of an independent principle in man; yet the natural operations of this innate principle may be so obstructed by habitual misconduct, that nothing but a call from without or from above, can resuscitate the principle of moral life within him. But these influences, calculated to excite man to repentance and moral action, are not to be confounded with conscience itself; they are restoratives and incentives, which must become needless as soon as the moral principle in man has recovered its natural self-sufficient power.

These observations may be sufficient to show, that conscience and morality are not adventitious possessions of man, but inherent principles of his nature. Still the fact, that the origin of morals is not to be sought without, but within, does not yet decide the question, whether the moral law, with its operations, is to be considered as a peculiar principle in the soul, or as the result of one of its essential faculties.

It has been a subject of much controversy, whether conscience, that principle to which men commonly appeal as the moral guide within, is a matter of feeling or of the intellect.

Among those who consider conscience as an intellectual principle, some hold it to be only one of the various modes in which man exercises his judgment, his reason, or his understanding; while others believe in the existence of a power of immediate or intuitive perception of right and wrong, called the moral sense. Right and wrong, according to Hutcheson and others, are simple qualities of actions, which

we perceive just as we do colors and sounds by the outward senses, intuitively, without a previous process of reasoning to ascertain the tendency of an action to produce more or less good or evil, without calculating their consequences. Hence the appropriateness of the name Moral Sense, indicating a power of immediate perception, which, like the external senses and our own consciousness, does not reason, but furnishes facts, the materials of reasoning.

But is it true, that right and wrong are simple qualities of actions, that is, such as can be perceived, like sounds and colors, without a previous process of reasoning? The sight or the mere idea of cruelty, say the defenders of that opinion, calls forth immediately our moral disapprobation. But what is cruelty? Is it any severe evil inflicted upon a person? I see a person deprived of his personal freedom, and forced to painful labor; does not my moral sense condemn him who inflicts such evil at first sight? No, I say, certainly not without hearing. Suppose that person to be deprived of his freedom, and forced to hard labor, because he has used his freedom to nourish a criminal indolence, by robbing or defrauding others. Does your moral sense now condemn the law, and the judge, and the jailor? No, you approve of the act, because you have learned to view that, which at first sight seemed cruelty, as a just punishment?

How then can we discriminate between just punishment and cruelty? By intuition, as you perceive and discriminate sounds and colors, without a previous process of reasoning?

In order to understand the boundaries between just punishment and cruelty, you have to perform one of the most difficult tasks of practical reasoning. You have to ascertain what kind and what degree of evil is suited to the nature of the offence, and most likely and sufficient to reform, or at least deter the convict. All evil beyond this just aim of punishment, is crime, is cruelty. It is evident then, that this intuitive quickness and certainty with which you condemn a certain act, can be considered only as the last act of the judge, after having ascertained the merits of the case and the bearings of the law; — the last and easiest act of reason, passing sentence upon the case in question.

Notwithstanding many ingenious attempts to show that the moral ideas are immediate perceptions of simple qualities in actions, and not the results of reason, which determines the character of an action according to its tendency to produce more or less good or evil, the advocates of that doctrine have not been able to define these original qualities of actions in such a manner, that every one, without reasoning, should intuitively perceive them, like objects of sense. Dugald Stewart, in his work on the active and moral powers, has left the moral character of actions wholly undefined. Butler mentions three qualities of actions as essential moral attributes, veracity, justice, and regard to the common good. But it is evident that a regard to common good cannot be considered as a simple quality of an action; for if we say that an action is conducive to common good, we judge from its

consequences, and not from its intrinsic quality. A regard to the common good, then, is a regard to the consequences of an action, and cannot be the object of an intuitive faculty, a moral sense, but of reason.

Veracity and justice, too, are moral qualities, which are results of reasoning, not objects of immediate perception. Justice is a practical regard to the rights of all; but only a faithful study of human nature and the social relations, can lead to a true perception of right and wrong. Even veracity, simple as it is, cannot be called an absolute moral quality, the perception of which is as independent of reasoning as that of sound or color. If I have promised to perform an act, which I am afterwards convinced would be a crime, veracity, if it consist in performing my promise, would make the commission of a crime my duty.

Thus we find that those qualities, which have been pointed out as objects of the moral sense, do not justify the supposition of such a peculiar faculty of intuitive perception, since they are not like perceptions of the senses, independent of reasoning, but results of it. Shall we, then, give up the attempt to define the moral character of actions, scientifically, and believe, that, in each particular case, the right and the wrong will be pointed out by an innate and undefinable moral sense or taste? The examples of perverse moral judgments, which Locke and others have quoted, forbid such a supposition. Or shall we, with Reid, confine this immediate moral perception to men after they have come to

years of understanding, or, as a recent excellent reasoner has expressed it, to "a perfectly well-informed man"? It is evident, that this is not the way to decide the great question with regard to the moral character of actions, but rather indefinitely to postpone it. These endeavours to trace our ideas of morality to simple qualities of the actions themselves, were evidently designed to save morality from that precarious condition, which seems to result from a calculation of consequences. Kant had the same end in view; but he sought the immutableness of the moral character, not in the quality of the actions, but in the constitution of practical reason, as the source of the moral law. According to him, the moral form or character of an action does not consist in its tendency to good, but merely in its conformity to the supreme rule of practical reason, or the moral imperative. It is this; "act in such a manner that it might become the law of all moral agents." But this rule, though true, is insufficient to determine what is right or wrong. It only advises us to act, not with reference to any particular case, but to the moral nature of man. But the practical precepts, enjoined by conscience, can evidently not be deduced from the moral imperative, but from the observation of our nature.

It is evident, then, that conscience consists, neither in this abstract form of practical reason, nor in a moral sense, as described by Hutcheson and the Scottish philosophers.

Is it true, then, that conscience and reason are

essentially the same power, or that conscience is nothing but reason exercised upon moral subjects? To this result we must come, if we find no other point of difference, than that conscience is the faculty of perceiving what is right or wrong, while reason ascertains what is true or false. In general, that is right in our actions, which is true, or conformable to our nature, and our relations to God and man; and whatever is false, or contrary to them, is wrong. We see, then, that by the same faculty we ascertain right and wrong, by which we discover truth and falsehood.

But it may be shown, that neither are reason and conscience synonymous expressions of the same faculty, nor is conscience a part of reason, nor reason a part of conscience. For it can be shown, that there are some operations of reason which cannot be ascribed to conscience, and some manifestations of conscience which cannot be attributed to reason. Who would ascribe to conscience the speculations of the mathematician, or any other kind of reasoning on topics which cannot be considered moral subjects, or matters of conscience? I know, that conscience bids us use our reason in every way; but there can be no doubt but that reason may also be exercised from motives which are foreign or contrary to conscience. Reason or judgment, then, cannot be considered as a part of conscience.

On the other hand, the pleasures of a good, and the pains of an evil conscience, all those emotions and impulses, by which the perception of right and

wrong becomes a motive to action, cannot be considered as perceptions or reflections. They are feelings, which may indeed be called forth by reasoning as well as acting, but are always distinct from the exercise of reason itself.

Reason and conscience, therefore, are not one and the same faculty, nor parts of one another.

But are not those feelings of self-approbation and self-condemnation which we ascribe to conscience, though not a part, yet perhaps a necessary effect or result, of reason? I answer, even the feelings which are the proper consequence of the use of reason, of our discoveries of moral or any other truth, are entirely distinct from the moral emotions or promptings of conscience. If I discover, that a principle, which I have hitherto conscientiously acted upon, is wrong, I experience at the same time pain from the thought of my previous error, and pleasure from the consciousness of having acted according to what, at that time, I could not help considering as true and right. The pain alone, which arises from the consciousness of error, and that pleasure alone, which results from the discovery of truth, can be called feelings produced by reason. But the pleasing or painful certainty of having acted according to, or against, what we conscientiously thought right, remains independent of those intellectual pleasures or pains, as genuine moral emotions, authentic manifestations of conscience.

But although reason cannot be considered as the cause of moral feeling, it is certainly a necessary means

or preparation for it; that is, though these emotions are not always experienced in conformity to the right or wrong use of reason, yet conscience cannot be active without a previous exercise of judgment. The dependence of conscience on reason is like that of the will. Although we are free in choosing between the various modes of conduct, yet if we could not perceive these various ways, our power of choice would be useless. In the same manner, if we were not endowed with reason to distinguish between right and wrong, the promptings of conscience, which stimulate us to the one, and repel us from the other, which reward or punish us according to our having obeyed or disobeyed its injunctions, could not exist.

Having thus established a distinction between conscience on the one hand, and the exercise of reason and of the will on the other, we observe two ways in which conscience manifests itself. It operates, first, as an impulse to act in a certain manner; and, secondly, by feelings of pleasure or pain, in consequence of that impulse being complied with or disregarded. What, then, is the object of that impulse?

I have shown already, that man, like other animals, is impelled by his own innate power, which strives after an adequate mode or sphere of action. The power of the mere animal is finite, and therefore the mode of existence and action it strives to obtain is likewise finite, restricted to the satisfaction of certain natural wants. The power of man is infinite, and, consequently, impels him to strive after an infinite range of action. His impulse, therefore, differs from

that of the animal, first through its infinity; it bids him strive after endless perfection.

In the second place, the instinct of the animal directs all its faculties, by an irresistible power, to the end of its existence, without requiring, on the part of the animal, any additional effort to obey the controlling tendency of its nature. But the inborn tendency, by which man is impelled to accomplish his boundless destiny, is not an irresistible instinct, but in a great measure only an incentive of his own free will, which still leaves it in his power to obey or resist the call of his nature. He feels impelled to strive after endless perfection, that is, after the most various and harmonious exercise of all his powers, of his body and his mind, his reason, his affections, and his active powers. A part of this great destiny is fulfilled, by his own natural inclinations and talents, together with the influence of circumstances, of climate, country, condition in life, parents, society, and the course of events. But the most important part of his destiny is made to depend on his own free exertion.

Thus one of the constituent tendencies of human nature, is that innate curiosity or desire of knowledge, which in man is not, as in the animal, merely an impulse to seek out the means of supplying his earthly wants, but an exhaustless striving after ever-increasing intellectual riches. Whenever the desired knowledge is brought within his easy reach, every man seeks after this gratification of his curiosity. But so far as the pursuit of knowledge depends on laborious research and hard study, that natural curiosity which is common to all, is not of itself sufficient to lead man

onward to intellectual perfection, but calls in aid an additional power, which the individual alone can create, by faithful self-application, by overcoming, through his own exertions, the meaner tendencies of his nature to ease and indolence. So far, then, as the natural tendency of man to perfection is insufficient, without his own additional effort, that impulse becomes an appeal to his own free will, and is then called moral impulse or conscience, while the exertion of the will in obeying this call of his nature, is called moral effort or virtue.

The moral impulse, however, is only one manifestation of conscience. By the same power which impels him to exert himself, he is also judged, by pleasures arising from obedience, and by pains resulting from disobedience, to that moral impulse. These self-approving or self-condemning emotions in man are, like the moral impulse itself, manifestations of conscience. These feelings of pleasure and pain, by which conscience rewards or punishes obedience or disobedience to its injunctions, become additional moral impulses. The joy a man has felt in performing his duty, encourages and incites him to greater moral exertions; while the compunctions resulting from the neglect of duty, stimulate him to reform.

Conscience, then, cannot be defined as the power of moral perception, but as moral emotion which consists in impulses and feelings, which have for their object, to incite man to the most powerful exertion of his will, in overcoming all obstacles to endless improvement.

From this view of conscience, founded on self-

observation, it is easy to answer the question whether the promptings and decisions of conscience are infallible or not. If, by these promptings, is meant the moral impulse, the question is virtually this, whether that is really the destiny of man, to which the moral impulse leads him, namely, to strive, to the utmost of his power, after infinite perfection, that is after the most various and harmonious exercise of all his faculties. The question thus stated answers itself in the affirmative. But if, by the promptings and decisions of conscience, (the infallibility of which is in question,) that moral retribution be meant, which consists in the pleasure of a good, and the pains of an evil conscience, the question is likewise decided by the above observations. Conscience awards pleasure or pain in exact proportion to the exertion we make in doing what we, according to the best of our knowledge, cannot help considering as the amount of our duty, and of our ability to perform it. Whether our view of duty and the calculation of our own strength, were in themselves right or wrong, this is not a matter of conscience, but of judgment, which is capable of continued improvement, and therefore fallible. But suppose the question to be this, whether the same pain which we commonly feel in consequence of what we consider a bad action, will never be the result of a good action; or whether the pleasures of a good, will ever be the recompense of an evil, conscience? We answer confidently, that such an unjust retribution is a moral and natural impossibility. Accordingly, the decisions of conscience, within the true limits of its jurisdiction, must be considered as infallible.

# LECTURE VIII.

To ascertain the origin of the moral principle, was the object of my last lecture. We have found that human nature, and particularly the promptings of conscience, which are not to be confounded with the speculations of reason, are the foundation of morality. Reason enables us, by the study of human nature, to deduce from our own experience, and that of others, the moral characters of actions, or the law of duty. To make this deduction, to ascertain the moral law, is, of course, the individual concern and calling of each human being, which no one can perform for him. Others can only communicate to him their ideas of duty, and thus awaken his attention and direct his search. But every one has passions and temptations, a conscience, and a reason of his own, and so it must be laid down, as the first principle of morality, that the duty of each individual is that which he conscientiously thinks to be his duty; and that the virtue of each individual consists in acting according to what he considers his duty. Whether his ideas of the moral law are right or wrong, his conscience impels him to act according to this and no other; and judges, re-

wards, or punishes him according to no other, though he should find out afterward that the idea of duty which he acted upon, or neglected, was erroneous. Whether he did or did not believe that a certain mode of action was his duty, this is, as I have before observed, a fact of consciousness ; not the result of reasoning, but an object of perception. His conscience prompts, rewards, or punishes him for his conduct, only so far as he is conscious of having considered it as his duty at the time. This is the moral foundation of personal accountability. The praise and censure of other men is true and just, only so far as they are able to enter into the mind of the individual, and to judge him as he judges himself. Hence the important practical rule, that in our judgment of others, which can be founded only upon actions as indications of motives, we should never forget that our interpretation may be a mistaken one ; though in our intercourse with others we are obliged to rely upon these imperfect evidences of their minds, and to act as we understand them.

Still, though we acknowledge it as the first duty of every one to act according to his own conception of duty, — we cannot help supposing, that by a sound and thorough study of their own nature, and by assisting one another in this study, all would arrive at the same results. For we have reason to believe from our own experience, as well as from history, that human, and particularly moral nature, is essentially the same in all men. Knowing, therefore, that our conception of what is conformable or opposed to moral

nature, may be more or less correct, we perceive that an action may be moral according to our ideas of right, and nevertheless immoral in itself. Thus when we speak of morality as the system of moral truths, we do not mean an aggregate of all the opinions of men on this subject, but we mean principles founded upon our moral nature. In judging, therefore, of the moral character of actions, we have a different standard for determining their relative worth, that is, their conformity to our actual conceptions of duty, and their absolute value, or accordance with correct principles of morality resting upon the foundation of duty in human nature. If the conduct of a man agrees with his own views of duty, we call it conscientious, and if these views are correct, we call it moral, strictly speaking. True, what we call correct principles are, after all, nothing more than our own; which, in reality, may be either true or false. Still, as every individual feels bound in conscience to act according to his own idea of duty at the time, it is of incalculable importance to all men to be able to distinguish between their actual conception of duty, and the truth itself. This distinction between the true view and our own, lies at the foundation of individual and social improvement. Though all may disagree in their notions of duty, and be continually changing their views and their conduct accordingly, still the conviction that each may be in error, and that all can come to the truth, and that in their mode of thinking and acting, they will be less inconsistent with themselves and with one another the nearer they come to the truth;

this conviction secures to the individual, and to society, both freedom and consistency; it teaches, at the same time, humility and confidence, mutual respect, forbearance, and assistance, and a faith in individual and social improvement, which inspires the power to attain it. This principle, that each may at any time be in error, and that all may come to the truth, shows us that we violate duty not only by acting contrary to our actual conception of it, but likewise by aiming at a narrow-minded consistency with those views which we ourselves have at any time formed, or which others may have formed for us; — our family, country, and party prejudices, creeds, and statutes.

The tree, as it grows, puts on a hard covering, strong enough to steady itself, if it should not increase any more; but, at the same time, elastic enough to admit of continual enlargement. But if you put on artificial ligatures to confine it to its present size, you will either kill the tree, or it will burst both its natural and factitious bonds. Either of these two effects must attend every attempt at confining the free judgment of individuals, and forcing society to continue to wear the clothes of its infancy.

The fact that every one is and must be his own moral legislator and judge, should induce us, in judging another by his conduct, never to forget that we may be mistaken, and that though his view of duty be wrong, he himself may be right, that is, conscientious in holding it. But this acknowledgment should not prevent us from securing our own rights against the effects of his errors. No one can be al-

lowed with freedom or impunity to exceed his own rights and encroach upon those of others, on the plea of his private judgment, conscience, or religion, though he rest his pretensions upon an immediate command from heaven.

The universal belief in the existence of one law of duty for all men, founded on the identity of their moral nature, while it forms the basis of public confidence and of all our social institutions, justifies also our attempts at exhibiting the contents of that law in a system, or systems, of morality. It lies at the foundation of morality as a science, which must prove the most effectual means of reconciling the different views of duty among men, if its principles be not the results of theorizing fancy, but of a faithful observation of our moral nature. This science of duty is indeed by no means a substitute for the conscience of each individual. Each one still remains the authentic interpreter of the law of his own nature, and is entitled and obliged to be governed by his own morality. But the opinions of others, the counsels of moral philosophy, may help him to understand himself, which is the first indispensable requisite for self-government.

We have seen that every one, by the use of his reason in observing human nature, is the competent judge of his duty. In answer, then, to the first of the three questions stated in my last lecture, — what is the origin of duty? we say, human nature is the foundation; the senses and our own consciousness are employed in ascertaining the facts; and reason is the

judge of the moral truth they teach. I now proceed to the second preliminary question.

Suppose the moral law, the rule of conduct, to be ascertained, what is the motive that should prompt us to its performance? I have observed already, that motive is identical with practical desire, or interest, that prompts or moves the soul to action. Thus ambition is the desire of excelling others; avarice the inordinate desire of wealth; curiosity the desire of knowledge; justice the desire of vindicating the rights of all; charity the desire of ministering to their wants; — this practical desire is the mainspring of animal life, converting ideas into actions. Thus the tree, supposing it possessed of the power of thought, so as to have an idea of each direction in which it grows, could yet not be classed among animals, if still wanting a desire to satisfy its wants, a regard to its own happiness. I have shown before, that the cessation of pain, its conversion into satisfaction or pleasure, is the ultimate object of all desire, and consequently of all human actions. This is generally supposed to be the case, except with regard to virtue or moral action. Of this many have asserted that an action could not be truly virtuous or moral, unless it were performed without any regard to the agent's own happiness. Virtue should be practised solely for virtue's sake, or, as Kant says, out of regard for the moral law. This observation is worthy of the most serious consideration. For it evidently flows from a deep sense of the essential difference between moral and adventitious good, between that which is good for

something else, and that which is good in itself. This principle, that virtue has no end in view but virtue, not the advantages derived from good conduct in the world, not even the pleasure that accompanies a virtuous action, — this has proved a most salutary check against the Epicurean doctrine, which knows no difference between virtue and a clear-sighted, selfish prudence; which would induce men, as Hutcheson says, "to have the same affections toward a fruitful field, or commodious habitation, as toward a generous friend, or any noble character; because both may be advantageous to us." The oldest solemn acknowledgment of this important moral discrimination, I find in the ordinances of Menu, in the chapter on Education. "Self-love," it is there said, "is no laudable motive; yet an exemption from self-love is not to be found in this world. On self-love is grounded the study of Scripture; and the practice of actions recommended in it. Eager desire to act has its root in the expectation of some advantage; and with such expectation are sacrifices performed. The rules of religious austerity and abstinence from sin, are all known to arise from hope of remuneration. Not a single act here below appears ever to be done by a man free from self-love. Whatever he performs, it is wrought from his desire of reward. He indeed who should persist in discharging these duties without any view to their fruit, would attain hereafter the state of the immortals; and even in this life would enjoy all the virtuous gratifications that his fancy could suggest."

There is truth in both these views, discordant as they seem, — that virtue should be practised solely for virtue's sake ; and that it, nevertheless, not only is, but even should be, practised for the happiness growing out of it. That happiness, or the greatest amount of pleasure, is and must be the ultimate object of moral action, appears beyond doubt from a series of considerations founded upon facts and forming a chain of logical reasoning. No one can doubt, I say, that happiness is the ultimate object of virtue, when he considers that every moral action, and indeed every action, properly speaking, must be performed from some motive ; that motives are nothing else than desires ; that the object of every desire is satisfaction, and that no one is truly satisfied until he feels satisfied or happy. Ask yourselves whether you can consider a man virtuous who is indifferent with regard to the practice of virtue, who does not take a deep and earnest interest in it ; who has not an ardent desire to be good. And do you not think him the most virtuous man who finds his happiness in goodness ? As true as you believe that the virtuous man acts from some motive, your acknowledgment implies the belief that he is interested in virtue, that he is prompted or actuated by a desire or regard to his happiness being dependent on his good conduct. Happiness, then, is most surely the object of all moral, indeed of all human, action. But that happiness which springs from virtue is as different from every other, as its cause is from every other source of pleasure. The pleasure which is found in the path of duty is different, in the first

place, from that which is derived from external objects. The fruits which honesty, as the best policy, reaps in society, are different from those fairer joys which never fade in the silent consciousness of the honest mind. The winter winds of adversity may seal up every fountain of joy abroad, but they do not reach the eternal springs in the blessed regions of the heart. The pleasures of virtue are different also from those which arise from the exercise of our intellectual powers and the kind affections. The joy which always is the prize of successful talent in disclosing new treasures of knowledge, is different from that which is earned by the night lamp of faithful application. The joy which is derived from ministering to the wants of others from our abundance, is different from that joy which is reserved for poverty casting her precious mite into the sacred treasury of elevated human love. Thus all the pleasures which spring from circumstances, as well as from the exercise of the intellect and the affections, are different from those which flow from no other source than virtue or conscientious exertion. It is a happiness created by the free will of man, his own and only merit, which consists in sacrificing the tempting prospect of present and easy gratification for the hope of a more entire satisfaction. It is a satisfaction that is earned only in the service of conscience, which opens a life of joy to those alone who are ready to cut off the right hand and pluck out the right eye at its bidding. It demands the greatest exercise of power of which man is capable, as the foundation of moral happiness, which

is, for this very reason, the greatest blessing which human nature is capable of enjoying. Moral happiness is a substitute, more than equivalent, for every other joy ; in the same manner as moral misery, the fruit of vice, is greater than any other distress, and poisons every pleasure.

Virtue is most decidedly distinguished from every other source of pleasure, by the fact that whenever we follow conscience, resisting a desire which we think wrong, all the pain that attends our self-denial is converted into joy, making our satisfaction complete. On the contrary, if we yield to the temptation, and gratify the wrong desire, the painful reproaches of conscience can never be turned into joy, not even by the knowledge afterward obtained, that the mode of action which we conscientiously thought wrong, was in itself right. Nothing but a deep and full repentance, more painful than the severest self-denial, can reconcile us to the offended majesty of our own moral nature. The truth, then, which is implied in the principle, that virtue should be practised solely for virtue's sake, is simply this, that we should obey the law of duty from no other motive than a desire after that happiness which results from the performance of duty ; that the prospect of this satisfaction being more complete than any that is found in adventitious goods, should suffice us and enable us to set aside, and, if necessary, to sacrifice all other interests and advantages for that one, which, as the Stoics well remarked, can neither be equalled by any other enjoyment, nor diminished by any distress.

The cause of the superiority of virtue over all the other means of enjoyment, and of moral happiness above every other good of life, is clear from what I have already observed with regard to the peculiar destiny of man. That continued advancement in excellence, that rising from glory to glory, which characterizes the destiny of man, depends not so much on circumstances, and the various faculties he is endowed with, as on his own free exertion. Kindness, for example, though it be aided by the possession of means to supply the wants of others, and still more by a nice perception of their necessities and the best mode of realizing them, cannot be said to be more or less perfect because the means of exercising it are within our reach or not. But kindness is more or less perfect, it exists in a higher or lower degree, as we are more or less determined to benefit others by smaller or greater sacrifices, devoting time, property, health, or life, to the good of others. It is this free effort of the will of man in overcoming the lower propensities and sacrificing the meaner interests which obstruct his endless progress, from which his desire of moral happiness derives its exalted character. When we say, therefore, of a man, that he is disinterested, that he does not act from self-love or selfish motives, we do not mean that he is not interested in his highest good, that he does not regard his moral happiness, or love his own perfection. On the contrary, we mean that he loves himself and his true interest too well to confine the far-reaching energies of his soul, like the miser, and the coward, to his own animal self, instead

of seeking the satisfaction of his infinite nature, like the martyr and the true philanthropist, in boundless, beneficent action. It is, as I have shown, the object and essence of conscience, to impel the will to bring the appetites and the passions into subjection to the love of perfection, and to free the sacred lamp that burns in the inner temple of human nature from every impurity which dims its clear and joyful light. Our success in all other pursuits, — after wealth, honor, knowledge, or friendship, — depends but in part on ourselves; but the happiness of a good, that is, a satisfied conscience, depends wholly and solely upon ourselves; and therefore, if we seek it anywhere else, in the success of our undertakings, the favor of man, or of fortune, we seek in vain. True, the impulse of conscience is not, like the love of life or of knowledge, an immediate motive of action; it makes itself felt only in the contest between higher and lower desires, so that we have no occasion for obeying or disobeying our conscience, except when we are engaged in other pursuits, when, for example, we are tempted by party feeling to defame the character of our antagonists. It is then, that the still small voice from within makes itself heard through the storm of passion, and we are obeying or disobeying our conscience, according as our actions tend directly to gratify either our low or our generous passions. But the joy or mortification we experience from the good or ill success of our undertaking, is altogether different from the recompense of a satisfied or dissatisfied conscience, which remains engrafted in the soul after

the splendor of fortune and the shadow of sorrow have passed away.

Thus, the bright essence of virtue, though sometimes obscured by the more obvious objects of life, shines forth at last with its own unchangeable glory, like the sun after an eclipse, when the dark body has passed away from its radiant orb. He, who depends on outward success, must be aware, that the happiness he seeks is not that of an approving conscience, which needs nothing, and is satisfied with nothing, but conscientious exertion in the performance of what we think to be our duty. Although, therefore, moral actions may have another, immediate, and external object, the only true motive of virtue is moral happiness. This happiness is not merely the final result and reward of a good action, it accompanies the mere thought of it, and remains connected with its recollection.

The same remarks, which I have made here with regard to the opinion, that virtue is the only object of virtue, apply also to other objects which different moralists have considered as the true motives to virtue. Some say, the will of God is the highest moral motive ; as according to Kant, it consists in our supreme respect for the law of practical reason or morality. But with regard to all such theories, it is evident, that the mere idea of the will of God, or of duty, is not a motive to action. In order to become practical, that idea must become a motive, a desire ; our happiness must be concerned in it. Thus we find, in every case, that it is the expectation of happiness, by which a thought, be it the

idea of the divine will, or the moral law, becomes a motive to action.

Some philosophers refer moral action to two principal motives, rational self-love, and a sense of duty, or love of virtue. Of each of these I have already spoken ; and will merely observe here, that, in settling the question about the true origin of moral action, the recognition of more than one chief motive is as fatal to morality, as the belief in more than one God is to theology. Others, who consider happiness as the ultimate object of all human action, do not make a distinction between adventitious and moral happiness, the latter of which is the true object of all virtue, or conscientious self-exertion. This want of a clear discernment of the moral character of actions, is found in what is called the utilitarian system. The word utility, or usefulness, seems ill adapted to express the highest moral principle. It seems to relate rather to a prudent choice of means to any given end, than to a definite determination upon the ultimate ends of life. It is, as I have shown, in the case of a collision of various desires or motives, that conscience impels the will so to constrain the passions, as to ascertain, by the exercise of reason, what mode of action is most conducive to real happiness, and then to direct the active powers accordingly.

Having treated of the origin of the moral law, and the motive from which it is to be obeyed, I now proceed to an examination of the will, or that power in man which enables him to execute the law of his moral nature.

The first and most important question to be answered here, is this. Is man a free agent, or is his will determined by any other influence than his own choice? There is no question in moral philosophy of greater practical importance, and none in which a decisive result has been rendered more difficult by metaphysical subtilty, perverting the simple facts from which alone a satisfactory answer can be deduced. It is a fact, acknowledged by necessarians as well as their opponents, that there are cases in which every one thinks himself free to act or not to act, or to determine, according to his own independent choice, which of two modes of action that his understanding points out as within his reach, he shall adopt. Freedom of will, of course, cannot exist without intelligence; for how can we choose without being able to perceive the various grounds of choice between which we are to decide? But whenever we perceive two ways before us, upon either of which we think ourselves able to enter, we are conscious that it depends altogether on our own determination which of the two we shall endeavour to pursue. Each of these may be an object of desire; for example, when a young man is deliberating and consulting his inclinations for different professions, in order to decide upon one. But these various desires or motives, which operate on the mind in different ways, each impelling it to action, are entirely distinct from the power of the will, by which the mind is enabled to decide which of them shall prevail and actually be carried into effect.

These facts suggest the true definition of the will. Locke, who has the merit of having first successfully insisted upon that distinction between the will and the desires, says, "The idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred." This definition of the free will, true in its design, is vague in its expression. For, according to this, the power to do or forbear, in which free agency is said to consist, is considered as dependent on the determination of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred. But it is evident, that free agency, consists in this very power of determining, or giving preference to either of the various modes of conduct before us. The definition of Read, adopted by Stewart, is this. "By liberty of a moral agent, I understand a power over the determination of his own will." The defects in this definition are obvious. In the first place, to speak of the liberty of a moral agent, borders on tautology. For it is this very liberty, or free agency, which makes a person a moral agent. Besides, if the will is something distinct from desire, as Reid and Stewart allow, it consists in this liberty or free agency. And, if this be so, then it is an error to define liberty as a power over the determination of our own will, as if these determinations were already formed, and as if man had a power to control his own free will, which is a contradiction. It is evident, that a definition of a simple function of the mind, as that of volition, can only be an account of

its characteristic mode of operation. Accordingly, I should say, the will, or what is to me the same, the free will, is the power of the mind to determine, according to its own choice, upon performing or not performing something which it thinks itself capable of doing or leaving undone ; or, in fewer words, the power of self-determination according to choice.

Whether the object of volition, the mode of conduct on which a person is to decide, consist in doing or forbearing, in an act of commission or omission, is immaterial. He may exercise his will as much in keeping his seat, as in rising, in silence, as well as in speech. It is likewise indifferent, whether he is right or not in thinking himself capable of doing what he may choose to do. He may determine upon going a journey, though sickness should keep him at home ; he may resolve upon accepting or refusing an office, though, no offer being made to him, he may not have a chance of doing either. The existence of this power of self-determination, according to choice, in man, rests upon the clearest and surest evidence of which the human mind is capable, the evidence of our consciousness, which, at any moment of our life, may be put to the test. Make the experiment, whether, in any case in which you think yourself capable of forming a resolution, you actually possess this power or not ; make and repeat this experiment ever so frequently, and you cannot doubt that you possess this power of forming or not forming a resolution according to your own choice. But still more ; as the possession of a free will is the foundation of

all personal responsibility, Providence has so constituted our being, that it should be impossible for us to deceive ourselves with regard to this all-important fact. Whenever we feel tempted to do what we think wrong, we feel impelled by our conscience to suppress this temptation, by an act of our will which depends wholly upon ourselves; and if we have either yielded to the temptation, or done what we thought right in spite of it, our conscience rewards or condemns us, thus irresistibly forcing upon us the conviction, that it was in our own power, that it depended on our own sovereign choice, to resolve upon right or wrong. Thus, our consciousness furnishes both a direct, and an indirect proof, of our free agency. Our consciousness proves our free agency directly, whenever we make the experiment, whether, in any case, we actually possess the power to form or not to form a resolution; and it furnishes an indirect proof of the same fact, by bearing testimony to the retributive justice exercised by our own conscience, the independent judge of the will. This twofold evidence of our consciousness, though of itself sufficient to establish the freedom of the will with greater certainty than any other object of human knowledge, is moreover supported by the analogy of nature. When we consider the various capacities with which creative wisdom has endowed the various classes of beings; when we consult the scale of perfection, which assigns its proper place to the mineral, the plant, and the animal, we find, that moral free agency is a necessary part of the system of creation, that it

is the last degree of that progressive scale of being, by which the dust that cleaves to our feet is related to the highest mind. This fact, that it can be shown from the analogy of nature, that free agency is a phenomenon which naturally and necessarily belongs to the whole, is particularly important, because all reasoning against it is chiefly prompted by the apparent improbability that man should possess a power, of which all other creatures, being determined by absolute necessity, are deprived. When I speak here of a proof of man's free agency, founded upon the analogy of nature, I mean nothing more than a high degree of probability, resulting from a consideration of the various orders of creatures. He, who has caught a glimpse of the meaning of all this visible variety of things, reads in stones, and plants, and animals, a prophecy of human freedom.

# LECTURE IX.

I HAVE shown, in my last lecture, that the common belief in the moral free agency of man is founded upon the unexceptionable evidence of our own consciousness. This internal testimony seems placed beyond all reasonable doubt, by the fact, that, in general, it is in the power of every individual to put it to the test whenever he pleases. Whenever he believes, that it is in his power to move or remain at rest, to speak or to be silent, to tell the truth or deny it, to yield to the tempting influence of indolence, avarice, pride, envy, suspicion, revenge, or to the moral charms of honesty, industry, humility, generosity, — in every case, I say, in which he thinks it is in his power to do or to forbear, he is certain, also, that he is free to determine, or resolve, which of the various objects within his reach he will actually pursue. Nay, more, whenever he thinks himself capable of doing a thing, or of forbearing, he is conscious, not only that he can choose, but that he must choose between the two. As soon as you know that it depends on your own will to contradict a false report, or to confirm it by your silence, you can

no longer remain entirely neutral, your not speaking is as much an act of your will, as speaking. The mere knowledge, or belief, therefore, that it depends on him to do or forbear, places a man in a responsible condition; it forces upon him the conviction, that he is a free agent. He cannot, by any act of his own, free himself from this responsible situation. Such a moral suicide is impracticable. For the will cannot, by any volition or effort, by any act of its own, destroy itself; we know not, and cannot conceive of, any thing having the power to convert itself into nothing.

Thus we see, that man is conscious, not only of the power, but of the necessity, of choosing and determining, in every case in which he believes it to be in his power to act or not to act. This belief, though it may prove wrong itself, does not depend on his will; for, as I have before shown, in examining the intellectual powers of man, we really believe only what we cannot but believe. Thus, if I really believe, that, by professing certain religious or political sentiments, I shall render myself unpopular, this belief is not an arbitrary conception of my fancy, but the natural result of my reason, reflecting upon my knowledge of the state of things; although experience may afterwards prove, that I was under a mistake. Now if I have the belief, that I can express my sentiments, and that they will render me unpopular, I feel obliged to consider the concealment, equally with the profession of my sentiments, as an act of my own will; and to believe myself, not only possessed of the

power of choice, but under the necessity of exercising it. I am free to determine whether I shall act or forbear to act; but I cannot get rid of this alternative; I must choose and determine upon one or the other.

I have already observed, that this direct evidence of our free agency, which we derive from the fact, that we are conscious of it whenever our decision is called for, is confirmed by an indirect testimony of consciousness in cases in which we have to decide between right and wrong, between temptation and conscience. For as soon as we have decided, we are conscious of the involuntary operations of a retributive power implanted in our nature, by which we judge, reward, or punish ourselves, as free moral agents. We are, in every case of this kind, conscious of various desires or motives, by which we are impelled to act in different ways; but we are conscious also, that, in case of a moral contest in our soul, neither conscience on one side, nor temptation on the other, is of itself strong enough to decide the struggle, without the casting vote of our own free will. It is a poor evasion of this clear evidence of our own consciousness, and a specimen of reasoning in a circle, when some of those, who believe that in every case we are determined, not by choice, but by the strongest motives, declare that to be the strongest motive from which we finally determine to act.

All the opposing theories of philosophers have never been able to prevail against this simple fact,

that every conscious being feels obliged at all times to say to himself, "as sure as I am, I am a free moral agent."

Not only the retributive judgment of our own conscience, but the estimation in which men hold one another, the just approbation or censure of society, and the administration of justice between man and man, are founded on the supposition, that they are free agents; and this legal and moral presumption can be invalidated only by proof being brought that the person, at the time of the act that otherwise must be imputed to him, had not the use of his reason, and was, therefore, not able to discriminate, and, consequently, unable to choose, between right and wrong.

All distinction between good and ill desert, virtue and vice, all that we esteem most highly in ourselves and others, is founded on this self-evident fact, that man is a free moral agent.

Among those who have denied the existence of this freedom in man, there are some who, like Spinoza and Priestley, were led to it by their independent speculations on nature; others evidently came to this inquiry, with prejudices of a very different character. Some seem to labor under an ill-directed philanthropic enthusiasm to free man from that source of unhappiness which arises from dissatisfaction with himself, for not having acted according to his conscience, in cases in which he thought himself free to act or forbear. These modern enthusiasts think it an important part of their great scheme of liberating mankind from bondage, to free them from the load of moral

responsibility and remorse, which arises from the belief that, in any case, they might have acted otherwise than they have done.

Other men have come to this philosophical inquiry with preconceptions of an altogether different character. Some, who thought they had found the doctrine of moral necessity taught in Scripture, were predisposed to find the same principle taught by nature. This evidently impairs the philosophical character and value of the speculations of Edwards, on the free will, whose energetic acuteness and plainness would otherwise have greatly advanced moral science, whether he had enlisted on the side of moral freedom or necessity.

The main argument in these various systems is taken from the observation or supposition, that every event in the world can be traced to some antecedent fact as its cause; and that the determination of the will in one way, rather than another, is not accounted for on the supposition of a power of arbitrary decision.

Now I would ask, in the first place, in what way will you account for other facts in nature, for example, the growth of plants, or the shape which liquid bodies, passing into a solid state, assume by crystallization? Neither the seed nor the nourishment of the plant accounts for its peculiar growth, and the chemical properties of crystallized liquids do not account for their regular, specific form. I do not mention these examples as analogous cases, but only in order to show, that the mere fact that we cannot account for the peculiar determination of the will from any known

antecedent, is no reason for supposing that our consciousness of choice must be a mistake, and that we, in fact, are always determined by the relative strength of our motives.

Some think, with Edwards, that it is impossible for us to suppose a change produced without a previous event to account for it. But unless we believe in cause and effect as innate ideas of our minds, (which I have endeavoured to show to be an erroneous supposition,) it is evident, that we have no right to extend our belief in the necessity of an antecedent for any event in the world, further than to those objects which, according to all our observations, are determined by an uninterrupted chain of cause and effect. I mean that we must confine this supposition, that every event is necessarily determined by some cause or other, though unknown to us, to inanimate matter, plants, and animals. But the fact that this supposition, that every event must be the necessary result of a predetermining cause, agrees with all our observations of inferior creatures, does not justify our taking it for granted, that it cannot be otherwise with the human will, whose acts, according to the evidence of consciousness, are not the results of any predetermination, but of choice.

Still, the circumstance that free agency is not found in any other creature we know of, though it does not disprove its existence in man, is apt to make this supposition more plausible, which would otherwise, perhaps, never have been advanced in direct opposition to our own consciousness. The reasoning is

this, — since free agency is found in no other creature, it is very improbable that it should exist in man. I have glanced at this opinion already, in my last lecture, and I now proceed to show, that our observation of the inferior creation, instead of raising suspicions against the evidence of our consciousness, on the contrary, makes it highly probable, that moral freedom, which is denied to the inferior creatures, should exist in man.

The argument against human free agency from the common necessarianism in nature, resembles that which Hume used against the miracles, as being contrary to the known laws of nature which operate in all other cases. A thorough refutation of this argument with regard to the miracles, is much more difficult than with regard to human free agency. For of the occurrence of miracles, at least according to the belief of most Protestant Christians, we have no knowledge through our own consciousness, or from our own experience. Nevertheless, it can be made evident, I believe, from the history of the world, that miracles, or events contrary to the common law of nature, are, under certain circumstances, events as natural and probable as the existence of these laws. For suppose men should be in such a state that they believe in nothing but what their five senses can teach them ; and suppose the wonderful designs which appear in the constitution of things, and the course of events, pass by them without their learning from them the most important lessons of life, the existence of God and their own immortal destiny ; — suppose men

to have been brought to such a state as actually existed at the time of Jesus, is it not highly probable that Providence, if there be such a power overruling all human affairs, should teach men, in the only way in which they can be impressed, by visible effects contrary to the common laws of nature, what from the course of events they do not perceive, that there is a power from whom alone both those general laws, as well as these miraculous exceptions to them, proceed.

Thus viewed, the miracles related in the Gospel must appear as the most natural, because the only effectual means, of carrying on that system of divine education, by which man is to be fitted for higher states of being.

But I return to the main question, whether a fair and thorough investigation of the nature of beings inferior to man, renders it probable or improbable that he is a free moral agent.

It needs but one glance at the various classes of creatures on our earth, to discover a gradual advancement toward that freedom, the fulness of which characterizes the human being. Only look and compare the crystal, the plant, the animal, and man, — how clearly they mark the different stages of the progressive principle of freedom in nature. We know that liquids, on becoming solid bodies, assume a distinct and peculiar shape, which is able to resist those continual changes of form to which each particle of a liquid mass is subjected. Thus we see, in the formation of crystals, the first attempt of nature toward individual existence. A plant is but a living crystal. Almost

every child has seen the formation of a metallic tree, and has gazed at the beautiful variety of shrubs and flowers, with which crystallized moisture paints our windows in winter, and has read in it the indication of coming spring, throwing open its bright galleries of living pictures. The eye of science, as well as that of childhood, sees in the plant a more perfect crystal, more perfect, because when the plant itself is decayed, it does not disappear entirely, like the metallic tree when melted; but perpetuates its individual existence in the seed, and, by its independent growth, enlarges, though it cannot break, the bonds which confine the mineral to the mass. The growth of the plant is the first imperfect attempt at spontaneous motion which we see completed in the animal. But the animal is a more independent being than the plant, not merely because its body is disconnected from the earth, but still more because it has, within its own body, the principle of separate, incorporeal existence. It is a living being, endowed with powers of perception and understanding, and susceptible of pleasure, pain, and desire. Still the progressive principle of freedom in nature, though clearly indicated in the difference between minerals, plants, and animals, is not completed in them. The mineral is bound up with the mass of the earth by the law of gravity, which the plant but imperfectly strives to throw off. But the plant, as well as the animal, is determined, each by the law of the species to which it belongs. This constant law of nature assigns to each kind of animal, by its peculiar organization, its definite

existence either on, or over, or in the earth, or in the water, with the same necessity with which it causes some seeds to spring up as lilies or palms, or creep along the rocks as lowly mosses.

Still we see already, in animals of a higher order, that the primitive law of their being, which we call the instinct, may be in some degree changed, perverted, or ennobled, by the skill and powers of man. The dog may be so trained, that he will do for his master that, which, according to his native tendency, he would do only for himself, or his young. Similar artificial modifications of the wild instincts may be seen in all our domesticated animals. Thus, by modifying the natural propensities of other animals, man discovers the characteristic principle of his own nature.

The animal, though a more independent being than the mineral and the plant, is bound down by its own instinct, whether in its wild state, or modified by man. Freedom from instinct, free agency, then, was the principle, which alone could complete that tendency of creative nature toward independent individual existence and action. But the principle of freedom, which nature has implanted in man, is not only sufficient to make him the freest of created beings ;— free agency is in man an everlasting and ever-growing principle. As there is in his soul a continual struggle between spiritual desires after infinite perfection, and animal propensities to present gratification, the free will of the individual, by which alone that struggle

can be decided, finds an endless field laid out for its ever-increasing efforts.

If this view of the origin and progress of freedom or individuality in nature, be correct, it is evident, that the moral free agency of man must be considered as the last natural result of the same regulative principle, which assigns to all the inferior creatures their relative rank in the system of creation.

The principle of freedom, the beginning of which we have traced in the crystal, the plant, and the animal, attains in man, as a moral agent, its full developement, and a settled assurance of endless progress.

While these inferences from the analogy of nature fully support the decisive evidence of our own consciousness, they refute, on the other hand, the reasoning of those, who controvert the testimony of their own minds, because they have ascertained, that stones, and trees, and animals, are not free agents. In the same manner, the animals, if they could philosophize, might deny the principle of life within them, and think themselves no better than stones or trees.

It is the full exercise of this native principle of freedom in the soul, it is virtue or moral effort, by which the striving of man after happiness may be cleared from every alloy of selfishness. Convinced of his own immortal existence, and capable of finding supreme happiness only in perfection, or the most complete use of all his powers, he finds, that whenever he endeavours to promote his own advantage at the expense of his fellow-men, he is abridging, instead of advancing, his own happiness. If he, for example,

confine his efforts after wealth and knowledge to himself, and leave others to the evils of poverty and ignorance, he robs himself of the best joys which can flow from the possession of wealth and knowledge. While the inferior animal finds satisfaction only in the care for itself and its offspring, man's happiness is commensurate with the use of his powers; so that he alone can be said to know and pursue his true interest, who considers the whole human family as his own, and their happiness as the foundation of his own. The immortal principle of freedom in his soul, of which he is conscious, makes him the master of all he possesses, even of his own life; he has no selfish interests to secure, and if he seeks the increase of his native riches, he must, as the Bible says, put his talent to the usurers, and be satisfied with nothing less than the very highest interest, even the perfection and happiness of all.

The remarks I have made in this, and the last two lectures, seem to me sufficient to answer the three great preliminary questions, — What is the origin of the moral law? what is the true motive from which it should be obeyed? and what is the nature of the will, or the power of moral obedience? We have found, that human nature, and particularly the moral capacities of man, are the foundation, and that reason is the competent expounder, of the moral law. I have shown, then, that the desire of moral happiness is the true motive of virtue; and that the will of man is free. A full exposition of the moral law itself, of which I have given only some general outlines, must be the next subject of inquiry.

We have seen, that it devolves upon every individual, by the use of his own reason, to seek a satisfactory answer to the question, What is my duty? The ways, in which men endeavour to satisfy their minds with regard to this great question, are various. Some, it is said, are guided in their decision by feeling, others by principle. What is the true meaning of these words? And if there be, indeed, two ways to judge of our duty, is it desirable, in a moral point of view, that man should be guided solely or chiefly by principle or by feeling? It is this question which demands our immediate attention, since it is evidently the first duty of every one to ascertain in what his duty consists.

The words, principle and feeling, are not used, in this instance, in their common and philosophical meaning; and a want of accuracy in the use of words has occasioned, in this instance as in so many others, much unnecessary and unprofitable dispute. The real meaning of these words, used in this connexion, may be learned from examples.

A person, seeing another in distress, is moved with compassion, and, knowing that the means of relief are in his hands, he at once concludes, that it is his duty to use them for this purpose. This man, we should say, acts from feeling. Suppose, on the other hand, that the experience of many cases of the same description, leads a person to reflect, whether it would be well for him to act in the same manner in all similar cases. He reflects on the number of instances, and the degrees, and the causes of suffering; and, at the same time, upon the extent of his

own means of relief. He thus comes to the conclusion, that he would be counteracting his own purpose of doing as much good as possible, by doing, in a particular case, as much as his feelings prompt him to do. He therefore thinks it his duty to restrain his benevolent desire, in a particular case, so as to gratify it most fully, on the whole, by limiting, in each case, his charitable efforts. Such a man would be considered as acting from principle.

If, in these instances, the word feeling were used in its general philosophical meaning, we should say, that the man, who determines to meet the whole demands of the case before him, and the man, who withholds his means on one occasion in order to be capable of greater charity in general, are both actuated by a feeling, that is, by a desire or motive of compassion and of duty. But when feeling is used in opposition to principle, we mean, by feeling, a judgment founded upon the impression which a particular case, real or imaginary, makes upon our minds ; and by principle, we understand a judgment that is founded upon a consideration of the nature of a case in general. Hence the judgment of the man of principle is calculated to apply to all cases of the same description ; while that of the man of feeling, being the result of the impressions of the moment, applies only to the individual case before him.

It is necessary to conceive the two definitions in these general terms, since this difference between principle and feeling affects, not only our actions and practical views, but our mode of judging in general.

We may judge of a work or act, either according to feelings, that is, by impressions produced by the sight of it, or according to principles, or general views of all the qualities required in a work of this kind. At present, I shall confine my remarks to the influence of this difference upon our actions.

It is evident, that our immediate impressions, and our maturest reflections, may lead to the same judgment; but they may also yield a different result.

"Lord, I am ready to go with thee both into prison and to death," were the generous words of Peter, when Jesus foretold to his disciples that his sufferings were at hand, and that, in that night, they would all forsake him. Though that highminded declaration of Peter may have been dictated by the feelings of the moment, still the most deliberate exercise of his reason, if he had used it, must have borne him out in the belief, that this determination alone was conducive to perfect happiness; that imprisonment and death with Jesus were freedom and life. But in the house of the high priest, in that dark and cold hall, where, amongst the officers and servants, around the fire they had kindled, he sought warmth and light, which he could not find in his own bosom, the interrogatory of a timid girl could induce him to forsake what his reason, as well as his best feelings, pointed out to him as his highest good.

As the two modes of judging which we are considering, may lead to a different result, it becomes a question of great practical importance, whether principle or feeling is most likely to bring us to a correct view of duty. Now it seems to me, that the man,

who determines upon his conduct beforehand by general rules, has great advantages over him who trusts to the impressions of the moment of action.

In the first place, the man of principle forms his views at a time when he is free from momentary excitement, and is likely to be guided in his judgment only by the real merits of the case ; whereas the man who trusts to his feelings, delays his decision to a time, when he is likely to be not so much a judge as a party, and is apt to be induced by secondary considerations to overlook essentials.

In the second place, in forming our rules of conduct beforehand, we have the power of choosing our own time, our calmest and clearest moments for reflecting upon our mode of acting ; we have sufficient leisure to consider it in all its bearings and results, as applied to all cases that may occur ; and we may correct our views, if necessary, before the time of action. But if we depend on such views as may seem to us most satisfactory at the moment of action, this moment may surprise us in a state of weakness, or may not leave us sufficient time to reflect, and to correct the views we form from the first impression.

The man of principle possesses a third advantage, in his unwillingness to act unless he is conscious of sufficient reasons, and in his being able to assign a reason for his conduct in each particular case, since it is founded on considering the general nature of all cases of the same description. The man of feeling, on the contrary, is frequently at a loss to give to himself, or others, a satisfactory account of his conduct ; that is, to find and show the reasons of his being impressed by

certain persons or events in some particular manner, and thereby condemned to trust or distrust, to absolve or condemn. The three advantages of the man of principle in regard to calmness, time, and ability to account for his conduct, might be illustrated by many examples. Thus, in education, we see many instructers fail from want of principle ; for example, in applying rewards and punishments. They are apt to delay their decision to a time when they are excited by a recent offence, without taking time to reflect upon all the consequences of the kind of punishment they inflict, — trusting to a temporary expedient, suggested by the moment, rather than to a more troublesome maxim, applicable to all cases of the same description, and enabling them to give to themselves and others an account of their conduct.

But, on the other hand, the man of feeling, too, possesses advantages over the adherent to principle, in regard to the correctness of his mode of action.

In the first place, the man who delays forming his opinion of the manner in which he ought to act, until he is called upon by the occasion, may form a more perfect view as he grows in experience, and particularly if he employs the time previous to his decision in improving his mind. Opinions formed at an earlier period, with less experience and ability of judging, ought not to be followed at a later and more mature period of life.

In the second place, the man who judges from the impression which the case before him makes on his mind, is not prejudiced by a previous opinion of his own ; while decisions previously formed are apt to

become parts of our character and nature, and easily induce us to abide by them rather than to form new opinions and resolutions. The tendency to abide by opinions already formed, springs partly from indolence and partly from vanity, which tempts us to be guided rather by notions of our own, and by a blind desire of self-consistency, than by the real circumstances of the case that calls for action.

In the third place, in order to form a correct principle of action beforehand, it is necessary that we should have time to reflect upon all its probable consequences, and that we should imagine all the circumstances of the case exactly as they afterwards come to pass. But some cases occur which require to be acted upon without leaving us time for reflection, such as instances of immediate danger, in which the man who follows the decision of his feelings will hasten to rescue the person who might otherwise be the victim of his previous calm reflection. But even where such reflection is in its place, the correctness of our principles would, as I have observed, require a fore-knowledge of all the circumstances of future events. In this respect, the man who refrains from forming a judgment, except on the real, and on all, the circumstances of the case before him, has a decided advantage over him who arrives at his conclusion from preconceived notions of a case that may require his decision. For though our principles of action be originally founded on experience, and reflection on the nature of real cases, yet as the decisions themselves are meant not merely for those that have happened, but for all similar cases that may happen, it is evident that

our principles, in so far as they regard the future, are decisions of imaginary cases. Hence it frequently happens, that we think cases which occur afterward to be exactly like those to which our preconceived rules apply, while they are like them only in secondary qualities, and unlike in the most important requisites. In such cases, the man of principle is liable to persist in the application of general rules, which are true, indeed, in most cases, but not in all, and thus to misjudge in those cases which must be considered as exceptions, or rather which are to be decided by other principles. Thus, in the example of a man who knows that his means enable him only to support himself and his family, and has therefore formed the principle to avoid any expense beyond this purpose; if he be a strict adherent to principle, he is likely to deny his charitable aid to others, in cases of present and extreme distress, in which his feelings prompt him rather to starve himself for some time, than to let another perish.

Thus we see that whether a person be actuated by principle or by feeling, there are moral advantages and disadvantages in each of these motives, in regard to the correcting of the views by which our conduct is to be regulated.

How, then, shall we answer the question, whether it be morally more desirable to be governed solely, or chiefly, by principle, or by feeling? It is evident that there are only two ways of deciding this question.

We ought, if possible, to combine the advantages,

and avoid the disadvantages, connected with each of these practical guides. Only, if that should be impracticable, we must measure the good and the evil in each, and choose according to the result of our estimate.

I will briefly survey the relative advantages peculiar to principle and feeling. The advantages of the man of principle with regard to correctness of moral views, consist in his freedom from the excitement of the moment; in the time he has at command to form and reform his views previous to the moment of action; and in his being conscious of the reasons of his conduct.

The man of feeling, on the other hand, with regard to the correctness of his moral views, possesses the following advantages. As he does not judge of a case before it happens, he may bring to itam a turer mind than by forming his opinions at an earlier period. He, moreover, is not prejudiced by any previous opinions of his own; and, finally, he is more likely to see the case as it really is, independent of his previous suppositions; and he is able to act in cases which require decision without affording sufficient time for reflection.

Although it may be impossible for us perfectly to combine in our conduct the peculiar advantages of acting from principle and from feeling, yet an approach to this mode of acting certainly is in our power. To this end we ought to employ our calmest and brightest moments to form such general practical principles as we think best calculated for all the cases that have come to our knowledge, or may be sup-

posed by us beforehand. To these rules, we should be resolved to adjust our conduct in general, for this simple reason, that those principles which are the results of all our experience and reflection, since we have found them satisfactory in all previous instances, are likely to prove satisfactory also in cases to come, at least in the next case that may occur, before we have altered our opinion. But, though we should firmly keep to our principles, as long as we are not convinced that they are false, yet we should never consider them infallible. The consideration of their fallibility enjoins on us the duty constantly to strive to improve our views; and, particularly, when a case occurs in which the rule we have hitherto followed seems unjust, should make us ready to correct our principle even at the very time of action. And if the case should require a decision without allowing a sufficient time to form a principle on general grounds, we must act according to what seems to us the most satisfactory view at the time, that is, according to our feelings.

It is evident that in this practical combination of principle and feeling, our determination to act according to principle in general, enables us to establish our conduct upon calm reflection, and to overcome beforehand many of the temptations which might lead us astray at the time of action; while, on the other hand, the conviction of the fallibility of our principles, and of the necessity of acting upon our first views, in a case where further consideration is impracticable,—this conviction will preserve in us that freshness and

elasticity of mind, which the man of feeling brings to the case before him ; and we thus are enabled to take advantage of the impulse of the moment, without having our judgment led astray by its excitement.

It must be acknowledged, that this decision of the above question, concerning the practical advantages in acting from principle or from feeling, still leaves much to the peculiar judgment of the individual. It is, indeed, true, that passions excited by the moment may induce a man to believe that a case in which he ought to be faithful to his principles, requires a different decision, agreeably to passion in the disguise of reason. But in order to decide the question, whether we are at any moment impelled by the voice of truth or of passion, by a moral or an immoral motive, God has established in our breasts an unerring tribunal. Our conscience does not tell us whether a view we take of a case is right or wrong, but it tells whether we have exerted our intellect to the utmost for the purpose of finding the true view.

Our conscience, then, does not tell us in what cases we ought to act from principle or from feeling ; but it tells us, infallibly, whether in forming our principles and our feelings, as well as in acting according to them, or deviating from them, we have exerted all our powers for the sole purpose of finding out the truth, and acting in conformity to it.

## LECTURE X.

Our previous reflections have led to the result, that it is the right and the duty of every individual, to ascertain and judge, by the use of his reason, in what his own duty, and the moral law in general, consist. So far as it is in our power, we should be guided by principles or rules of action, founded upon mature reflection on the nature of each case that may require our decision. But when an immediate determination is called for, for which we find no sufficient rule in previous deliberations, we should act from feeling or acts of judgment, founded on the immediate impression of the case before us upon our minds. I have shown also, that, although every one must answer for himself the question, What is duty? yet he knows that his judgment, however conscientious, is not infallible; that he, therefore, should be continually striving to improve his ideas of right and wrong, and to form such conceptions of duty, as all men, if properly informed, would recognise as true. For this purpose, the attempt is made to reduce morality to a science, or systematic reasoning from the observation of facts. All my previous remarks were intended to

review and mark out the ground of this science ; and we now must put to ourselves the question, What appears to us to be the sum and substance of duty, or moral conduct ?

The following remarks are intended to point out the essential properties of moral action.

In the first place, it is one of the most obvious characteristics of good, as well as bad actions, that the moral quality belongs not to the outward part, but to the act of the will, the purpose or intention, whether this have been expressed in word or deed, or not. The physician, who mistakes the disease of his patient, and, notwithstanding his best endeavours to cure him, administers poison instead of medicine, is innocent ; while he who mixes harmless drugs, believing them poisonous, or who is prevented by circumstances from executing his criminal design, is guilty.

Second. An action, in order to be considered moral or immoral, must proceed from the choice or free-will of the agent. It would be absurd to consider an animal, the elephant for example, moral or virtuous on account of his not using his strength for the destruction of other animals, or to call the tiger sinful or immoral. They both act from an inward law, which controls their conduct with the same irresistible necessity as that with which the wheels of an engine are propelled by water or steam. For the same reason, a person who injures another in a fit of insanity, is not guilty.

Third. An action, in order to be moral, must proceed from the right motive, that is, from a desire

of that happines which arises from what the individual considers as his duty, be his view right or wrong. An action performed from a wrong view of duty we call, when we speak more strictly, a conscientious, rather than a moral action. A thorough study of human nature will teach us, I believe, to consider that mode of conduct as moral or conformable to duty, which, considering the whole of existence, is calculated to produce the greatest amount of happiness. Of this general requisite in a moral action I shall speak presently.

Fourth. An action, in order to be not only moral, but virtuous, in the strictest sense of the word, must proceed, not only from choice, but from an effort or exertion of the will. That effort, or voluntary exertion, is one of the essentials of virtue, may be easily seen, from examples. A child, that has been brought up among thieves and acquired their practices, has to undergo a hard struggle, and to make great efforts to overcome his propensities, after he has become acquainted with their wickedness. In such a child it is a virtue if he refrains from stealing, whereas, the same good quality cannot be considered a virtue in one who has been brought up so as never to be tempted by a chance of unlawful gain, because it requires in him no moral effort to be honest.

For the same reason, every action, though it may at first have been the result of moral effort, and therefore virtuous, ceases to be so, as soon as it becomes a habit. But these observations are by no means intended to slight the advantages of good education and

habits. For as soon as any action, for example, daily temperance in our meals, has become a habit, so as no longer to need a moral effort, our mind is set free from this care, and therefore capable of higher efforts. — Accordingly, there is no virtue without moral effort; and the degree of virtue is always proportionate to our exertions, or rather, virtue consists essentially in an effort of the will.

The distinction I have made here between morality and virtue, which are frequently used as synonymes, seems evident in itself, and at least, not contrary to the common and classical use of those words. Thus for example, God is called a moral being and we speak of his moral character; though it seems hardly proper to say that God is virtuous. We call him a moral being, because we think him acting always for the best and happiest ends or purposes; — but we do not call him virtuous, or speak of his self-denial, or self-sacrifice, because that which forms the distinctive excellence of man, his conquest and government over his passions, cannot be considered as a constituent of divine perfection.

The difference between that which is moral or immoral, and that which is virtuous or vicious, may be easily illustrated by examples. It is moral to tell the truth, to be just and kind towards others, while falsehood, injustice, and unkindness, are traits of an immoral conduct, and character.

I say veracity, justice, and kindness, are moral perfections, though the case in which we are called upon to exercise these duties, should be one in which

our meaner interests, our desire of wealth and worldly honor, should lead to the same conduct, and consequently no moral effort, no self-denial or self-conquest be required on our part. But whenever our obedience to the moral law demands of us the sacrifice of lower interests, a conquest over our passions, — the moral perfections then, which consist in the practice of such arduous duties, deserve the name of virtues, whose sole object is, as I have shown, the attainment of moral happiness, or that pleasure which springs from conscientious effort.

In the following remarks I shall treat, not of virtue alone, but of duty or the moral law in general, claiming dominion over the life of man in all its various branches.

I have designated that mode of action as moral, which is calculated to produce the greatest amount of pleasure or happiness, if the whole existence of man be taken into consideration.

When I speak of the whole of man's existence, I mean, of course, not only his present life, but his immortal being. It is true, that in most cases a consideration of the whole of the present life, is sufficient to show us whether an action be good or evil. Unkindness, faithlessness, injustice, lying, and impurity, are easily recognised as vices, though we should not take into account the influence of our conduct in this life, upon the future state of our being. Still our views of duty must be contracted, if our views of man's existence are limited to the present life. So that in cases which demand the exercise of the very highest duties,

he who does not believe in the immortality of the soul, must renounce his reason in order to obey his conscience. When conscience bids you lay down your life in the performance of your duty, be it in rightful defence of your country, or in striving to save another life more precious to you than your own, your reason, if you believe in the immortality of the soul, tells you, that the consciousness of having sacrificed your highest earthly good in the cause of duty must be a source of greater satisfaction, than this life can afford. This inference you might draw from your own experience; even if the positive declarations of Scripture on this subject, having been obscured by polemic theology, should be misunderstood. For you know, that the pleasure you derive from the performance of each of your duties, increases in proportion to the greatness of the sacrifice which they require. The joy, which parents find in taking care of their children, increases in proportion to the sacrifices which they either make, or feel ready to make, for their precious charge. And, on this account, he who believes that his personal identity will not be destroyed by death, but that he will continue to be the same self-conscious being for ever, is obliged to suppose, that the remembrance of having lost his life for conscience' sake will yield to him, in the future state, at least as much satisfaction as the recollection of having risked it affords him in the present. Accordingly, when we say that it is the duty of man to act in such a manner as is most likely to yield the greatest amount of happiness, considering the whole

of his existence, it is evident, that this principle of morality opens to the believer in the immortality of the soul, a more abundant source of obligation, and, consequently, of moral happiness, than to the unbeliever, who, in cases in which his duty demands the sacrifice of his life, must break either with his conscience or his reason.

The assertion, that morality consists in that mode of conduct which is calculated to produce the greatest amount of pleasure, if the whole of man's existence be taken into consideration, — this principle, which has been advanced, though not in the same terms, by several moralists, has been objected to, by others, on several grounds. Some have stigmatized it as a selfish principle, confounding it with that system which has been maintained by many, particularly by the French philosophers of the school of Condillac, under the name of clear-sighted self-interest ("*intérêt bien entendu*"). The difference between this system and that which I maintain, will appear more fully hereafter. At present I will only remind you of our previous investigations; investigations from which it appeared, that, in fact, every system of morality rests upon the desire of happiness as its chief foundation. For it has been shown, that no moral action can be performed without some motive or other, and that motive is nothing else than practical desire, and the object of all desire is happiness. Whatever objections, therefore, may be raised against the attainment of happiness as the motive to moral action, it is nevertheless true, that every system is founded upon

this principle, unless it should be maintained, which it never yet has been, that actions, in order to be moral, should be performed from no motive whatever. It is evident, then, that the real difference between various systems consists in the mode of conduct which is supposed to lead man to the greatest happiness. And if the basis of human happiness be considered as the characteristic of each system, the difference between that which I maintain, and that of the French encyclopædists, will clearly appear from the account I shall give, as soon as I have answered some other objections to the first principle, that morality consists in acting with a view to the attainment of the greatest possible happiness. It has been said, that this is no definition of morality at all, since it embraces bad as well as good actions. For every one is prompted to good and bad actions by a view of the greatest happiness, or amount of pleasure. But I have already shown, that in this consists the chief difference between man and the other animals, that he is tempted on one side by the prospect of easy gratification near at hand, to give up the pursuit of laborious and distant good, which promises a greater amount of pleasure upon the whole. This temptation necessarily prevails, unless it be resisted by an effort of the will. When we say, therefore, that it is the duty of man to pursue his highest happiness, or that mode of conduct which promises the greatest amount of pleasure, we are not guilty of the absurdity, which Kant and others impute to us, that we prescribe that as the duty or moral obligation of man,

which he is naturally inclined to pursue, namely, his greatest happiness. He thinks, that to make the greatest happiness the principle of duty, is nothing more than telling a man that he shall do what he actually does, and always will do. The pursuit of the greatest happiness is a duty, because, though it be the object of our spiritual nature, or generous passions, it is or may be contrary to the desire after immediate and easy pleasure, which would prevail over the spiritual motive, unless it were restrained by an effort of the will. When I say, therefore, that it is the duty of man to do that which promises the greatest amount of pleasure, I refer to cases in which he may be tempted to forsake it ; and the real meaning is, that his duty consists in restraining his propensities to immediate, though in the end unsatisfactory enjoyment, and thus strengthening, by his own free will, the natural tendency to spiritual desires, or generous passions, after the greatest happiness of which he is capable.

Others object, that by designating that mode of action as moral, which is calculated to yield the greatest amount of pleasure, we make morality and virtue a matter of mere calculation. But would it deserve the name of morality, I would ask, if it did not admit of the test of the severest calculation ? It is true, that it is not always in our power, nor is it always necessary, to calculate the amount of happiness that is likely to result from different modes of conduct, and to be guided by this result. I have shown that, in many cases, we are obliged to act from

feeling, that is, our practical judgment must be founded upon our impressions at the moment of action. But in the first place, we should not allow this moment to come upon us without being prepared for the situation in which we may be placed, by previous and continual reflection upon the vicissitudes of life, and the probable results of human actions. Besides, there are some simple characteristics by which those actions which are conducive to true satisfaction, may be easily distinguished from others, so that by their aid we can, at least in most cases, ascertain at once whether the counsellor in our heart be reason itself, or appetite assuming the garb of reason. I will mention some of these practical guides which it is safe to follow, in cases, in which it is not in our power to satisfy ourselves entirely as to the moral character of an action, by a thorough calculation of the amount of good or evil it is likely to produce.

First, if we feel ourselves impelled by different desires to act, either in one way, which promises a gratification of our senses, or in another, which implies abstinence from such pleasures, the latter is more likely to be the moral way than the former. If you feel prompted to get up early in the morning, and, on the other hand, find a number of weighty reasons for lying in bed, — you may trust that the first mode of action will yield the greater satisfaction in the end, and is therefore the right way. The same is to be said when you are engaged in assisting your neighbour, whose house is on fire; if you are prompted on the one hand to exert and expose yourself, and on the

other to spare and save yourself; or when you feel prompted to fulfil a troublesome promise, which you are inclined to break, trusting that he to whom you owe it will excuse you; — in all such cases the advantage which results from consulting your ease, strength, health, and life, is more obvious than the more remote, though more perfect, and therefore, more truly satisfactory pleasure from the exercise of self-denying virtue; and on this very account, those desires which tend to indulgence are less to be trusted than those which require a painful effort. Still this presumption may be wrong. A morose and whimsical austerity, be it the result of temperament or fanaticism, may condemn the most innocent amusements as immoral, and foolhardiness may disown altogether the duty of saving health and life.

A second practical guide, safe in most cases, though not in all, is this. If you see before you two modes of conduct, one for the benefit of another, and the other for your own, the former is most likely to be the right way. The animal desires of man, which are first awake, impel him to consider his own self, his life, health, comfort, wealth, and honor, as the chief good. But the infinite principle in his nature makes him seek, and leads him to find happiness, also in that of others, when promoted by him. But this rule, too, to consult the interest of others rather than our own, is in many cases wrong. A person may, from pusillanimity and a slavish disposition, disregard his individual rights and his true honor, and thus violate the dignity of human nature in his own person.

A third practical rule has been stated by Paley. One of the various ways in which our conduct may become the source of happiness, consists in the exercise of our faculties, either of body or mind, in the pursuit of some engaging end. "Engagement," he says, "is every thing; the more significant, however, our engagements are, the better; such as the planning of laws, institutions, manufactures, charities, improvements, public works, and the endeavouring, by our interest, address, solicitation, and activity, to carry them into effect; or, upon a smaller scale, the procuring of a maintenance and fortune for our families, by a course of industry and application to our callings, which forms and gives motion to the common occupations of life; training up a child, prosecuting a scheme for his future establishment, making ourselves masters of a language or a science, improving or managing an estate; and, lastly, any engagement which is innocent, is better than none, as the writing of a book, the building of a house, the laying out of a garden, the digging of a fish-pond; even the raising of a cucumber or of a tulip." The principle, that happiness consists in the exercise of our faculties in the pursuit of some engaging end; and that the more significant the engagement is, the better; — this principle, as it is here stated, requires of course, modifications and explanations; for it is evident that one who should be engaged in a deep and extensive scheme of intrigue and deceit, would come within the terms of Paley's description of a happy and moral man. But the terms of his proposition were evidently used in

their obvious meaning, as relating only to the innocent pursuits of life. But setting aside the imperfect statement of the principle, it expresses a great and most important truth, which, if its author had viewed it with a philosophic ken equal to his practical tact, would have been fit and worthy to be put at the head of the moral system, and to be made the corner-stone of the edifice of human life. This will appear from the following remarks.

I have laid it down as the first principle of morality, that the conduct of man is moral, if it is intentionally calculated to bring about the greatest happiness of the agent, considering the whole of his existence. I now add, in consequence of my previous delineation of human nature, that the greatness of the happiness of man is commensurate with his advancement toward perfection. Human perfection consists in the most various and harmonious exercise of our faculties, and an appropriate condition or sphere of action in the world. To express it in fewer words, the perfection of man consists in the greatest possible efficiency, with an appropriate condition.

The relation which the principle of morality, that characterizes the system I have to propose to you, bears to the forementioned remark of Paley, is obvious. According to this, the happiness of man is proportioned to the significance of the pursuit in which he is engaged; and the principle I have stated specifies the highest object of human pursuit;—I mean human perfection, or the greatest possible efficiency, and

an appropriate condition. The foundation of this principle in the nature of man has been already shown. We have seen that all that can properly be called human action is founded upon some motive, that is, a desire or striving after satisfaction. Thus human desire, in its gradual unfolding, appears under three forms, first, the appetite, which man has in common with the other animals; then, the lower and higher passions, showing the gradual rising of man from the limited sphere of animal existence to infinite mental action; until, at last, human desire appears in its most perfect form, as love, (heavenly love, as Plato calls it,) which consists in the vital interest of the soul in perfection. Love, then, or the desire of perfection as the foundation of human happiness, is the true and only motive to moral action.

The desire of perfection moves or impels the soul to put forth every capacity, and to assign to each its proper place among the objects of life, and thus to convert the practice, as well as the knowledge, of morality, into one various and harmonious whole. I have said, human perfection consists in the greatest possible efficiency, with an appropriate condition or sphere of existence and action. This last part of the definition distinguishes this system from that of the Stoics, who, in their morality, thought man's activity, or efficiency, was every thing, while the condition or circumstances in which the wise or moral man is placed, they counted nothing. Health, competency, the esteem of men, a well-regulated family, and a free country, were indeed reckoned among the desirable

things, and the rational objects of life. But they did not allow them to be real good, or objects of moral action. But this is evidently an exaggeration of the true principle, that action, the full use of his powers, is the main object of man, and that his desire after adventitious good, a place and condition in the world, should be limited to a mode of existence graduated by his deserts and suited to the use of all his powers. As the display of the fulness of his nature is a moral object, the striving after a condition appropriate to this end, must be likewise moral. It is consequently a moral object to strive after an independent condition in society, and intercourse with our fellow-men in its most interesting and improving forms, in domestic and public life; and to seek the approbation and love of God.

I now proceed to show the influence which the principle of morality I have laid down, must exercise upon the whole of human life; reserving it for my next lecture to carry it out into the most important particulars.

The principle, that it is the duty of man to strive after the greatest possible efficiency and an appropriate sphere of action, must exercise an influence, first, on his own faculties and powers of body and mind, and then on his relation to the world without him.

When we gaze upon the mighty achievements of the human intellect, in learning, in works of fiction, and philosophy; when we listen to the simple story of the affections, embracing God and the world in their infinite expanse; when we consider the free power of

the will, with its heroic tale of passions subdued and the love of life conquered ; when we look at the human frame, with its various organs and multiform powers ; when we contemplate all these manifold and wonderful capacities and works of the inner and the outer man, a desire rises within us, without our bidding or control, a desire to exercise all our faculties with entire freedom, and to the utmost of their strength.

The fact, that you cannot contemplate a work of poetry or philosophy, an act of stern principle or sacrificing love, without desiring to be yourself the philosopher and the poet, the hero and the martyr, this fact shows that all those various capacities exist in each human being ; and that it is the design of our common nature, that the individual should seek, in the actual use and unfolding of his powers, the substance of that enjoyment, of which his passive admiration is only the shadow. It is the calling of the minister of education to enter into this design of nature, to nurse the infant powers of man, to irrigate, with provident care, the tender roots of the character striking into the depths of his being, and to give light to the germs of the intellectual life which are aspiring upward.

But man is not satisfied with making his own little self the axis around which all these mighty powers revolve.

Man desires to extend his agency and influence beyond himself as far as possible. The exercise of power is the life-spring of happiness ; the degree of our happiness is commensurate with the amount of

power in action. The truth of this principle is exemplified in the conqueror and enslaver of millions, as well as in him who lays down his life as a ransom for all his brethren of the human family. But the enslaver of others mistakes the true object of his own desire, while the Saviour of his fellow-men sees it in its perfection. He who has looked into the perfect law of liberty, knows that one who exercises his powers for the destruction of those things, which, by his fostering care, might have ripened to perfection, counteracts his own purpose. He who desires a real, lasting, and unlimited influence in the world, must enter into the spirit of its laws; he must endeavour to find out from the constitution, and lasting design of things, in what manner he can exercise upon them a power such as his own nature makes him desire. How different, even in the freest country in the world, would be the state of society, if the simple truth, that he who takes intelligent care of a plant exercises greater power than he who wantonly destroys it, were applied to man; if it were understood, that the greatest influence in society consists in seeking, calling forth, and cherishing every latent germ of excellence, the smallest seeds of truth, goodness, and beauty; if it were deeply felt, that power is obtained and extended, not by suppressing, but by warming into life and unfolding it in others. Of these great prospects of moral philosophy, which must appear as dreams so long, and only so long, as men have not the moral courage to make them truths, I shall say more in future. Here I will only add, that the efficiency of man beyond himself

extends to nature or the inferior creation, to his fellow-men, and to the Deity. Of the particular duties arising from these three relations I shall treat in my next lecture.

From what I have said now, there cannot remain any doubt with regard to the essential difference between this system, which, for want of another distinguishing name, we will call the "system of human perfection," and that maintained by the French Encyclopædists, according to which morality consists in a clear-sighted self-interest. The practical difference between the two principles, may be seen most easily from an example. Justice and kindness toward our fellow-men are considered as duties in both these systems. But the system of self-interest requires of you to be just and kind, because your own conduct is the only reasonable ground for hoping that others will be just and kind to you in return. The system of human perfection enjoins justice and kindness upon you as duties, because they extend your own efficiency, since, in performing these duties, you exercise the highest power that is granted to man, to be, by his actions, an instrument of perfection and happiness to a moral agent, a being whose nature seems to place him beyond the control of every other being. According to the principle of perfection, then, kindness and justice are duties, though they should be performed without any view to receive a kind and just treatment in return. Every one owes the duties of justice and kindness to his own nature as necessary parts of its perfection; whilst, according to the system of self-

interest, there is no rational obligation to exercise them, except so far as they are the only terms on which we can expect justice and kindness in return. Whenever, then, we are perfectly convinced that our want of respect and kindness to others cannot come to light, there is nothing to restrain us from unkindness and injustice; and, on the other hand, whenever we are convinced that our good deeds will remain entirely unknown, there is no moral inducement to perform them; and if a person by violence or deception should succeed in making himself the arbiter of the lives and the sentiments of others, so as to feel entirely independent of their love or hatred, there is no duty, according to that system, to oblige him to justice and humanity, or to restrain him from tyranny.

But he who, by his own will, has made himself what his nature has enabled and intended him to be, would cut off the richest sources of happiness, by confining it to himself. His striving after the greatest possible efficiency, makes him consider himself only as one of all his fellow-beings, whose perfection and happiness is his aim. All his duties towards himself are included in those which he owes to mankind. As a little child, before he has learned to say, "I am," and "I will," speaks of himself in the third person by the name which others give him, thus the man who has risen to the height of personal independence by virtue, again considers himself and acts as one of the great family of man.

In my next lecture I shall speak of the most important of the special duties of man.

# LECTURE XI.

THE investigations in moral philosophy, to which I have had the pleasure to direct your attention, have led us to perceive the principle which lies at the foundation, and some of the proportions which form the system, of morality. We have seen, that it is the first duty of man to pursue the greatest happiness of which he is capable, sacrificing all inferior interests and pleasures, so far as they are opposed to the pursuit of the highest good. I have shown, that man's happiness is founded on perfection, that is, the greatest possible efficiency, and an appropriate condition. To judge from our feelings, it is as if all our powers, powers of incalculable strength, were pent up in a narrow enclosure; all our pains are manifestations of discontent; our desires, the motives to action, are strivings of the soul after emancipation; every joy, arising from the exercise and enlargement of power, is a feeling of triumph; it is the infinite principle in our nature, glorying in its progress toward freedom. Our happiness, therefore, increases with our active strength; and the strength of man, although sown in weakness, may be raised in glory, and grow without

end, by his own virtue, or conscientious effort. For virtue is the greatest display of human power ; while all vice, whether it consist in sensual gratification, or in pride, envy, avarice, cruelty, or tyranny, cramps the power of man, in confining it to his own narrow self ; whereas self-denial, self-government, justice, liberality, and philanthropy, enlarge the sphere of his efficiency.

We learn the infinite tendencies and capacities infolded in our own nature, as soon as we call them forth, and in proportion as we put them to the test by actual exertion ; and thus each one may create for himself an experience of himself, which will make him conscious of his infinite nature. This consciousness of himself, as a free and immortal being, enables and impels him to throw off all selfish reserve and regards ; his love of knowledge and skill is no longer confined to seeking support for himself and his family, but may become a generous desire and study of all wisdom and excellence ; his love for himself and his family may grow into godlike, self-sacrificing philanthropy.

The happiness, the duty of man, then, consists in the greatest possible efficiency. It is his duty to fill every situation in which he may be placed, and continually to enlarge it. The peculiar situations or conditions of man, being innumerable and incalculable, it would be vain to attempt a complete enumeration of all his social duties. We can state and consider only the most important relations of life, in which all men are, or may be placed, and point out

the course of duty in each of them. I have mentioned already, that the efficiency of man extends to three objects ; to nature, or the inferior creation, to man, and to the Deity. A superficial view of these three relations seems sufficient to show, that man is called by his moral and infinite nature to reign over inferior creatures, to enter into relations of mutual benefit with his fellow-men, and to rise to a contemplation and enjoyment of the Supreme Spirit. He, who should do justice to himself in the three great relations of life, must be considered as a perfect man. But we have already seen, that human perfection is not, and can never become, a permanent possession ; but that it is an object of continual aspiration ; and, consequently, when we call a person perfect, we mean only, that, during a certain period of his existence, he is doing all that is in his power to fill the whole sphere of his duty.

With regard to the three great branches of duty, or principal directions of moral action, I mention beforehand, that I shall not treat of the duties which he owes to himself, as an individual, as separate and distinct from all the rest, but as a part of the duties which the individual owes to human nature, and, consequently, to the whole race of which he is a member. Of these duties of man to mankind I shall speak, after I have considered his relations to other creatures and to the Deity. For these two relations, which exist for each individual without any reference to his fellow-men, form, at the same time, two important objects of human intercourse. The right of

property is founded upon the relation between man and the material and animal creation; and to regulate the acquisition and possession of property is one of the essential objects of the state or the civil community. On the other hand, the connexion in which each individual stands to the Deity is the foundation of religious societies. For these reasons I intend, first, to treat of those duties which arise from the relation between man and inferior things, and then of those which spring from his connexion with the Supreme Mind; so that, in the course of my investigations of the nature and object of church and state, I may be able to refer to those two fundamental relations.

Nature furnishes employment for all the various faculties of man, separately and combined. His intellect finds in nature the means for his own comfortable support, and an immense field of inquiry, bright with traces of perfection. His feelings discover objects of interest, sympathy, and affection; his conscience is awaked by a struggle in his soul between desires after a lawless exercise of his strength, and a wanton use of all inferior creatures, on the one hand, and, on the other, a tender regard for every trace of perfection in nature. This conscientious regard has for its chief object the life and happiness of animals, which seem to have been thrown by nature upon his generosity and mercy. His will finds an ample sphere of action, partly in restraining his own lawless passions from wanton cruelty and destruction, and partly in using the powers of his

body, his senses and his organs, to make himself master of the lower orders of beings. Thus, by the joint use of all his faculties of mind and body, man is enabled to realize the birthright of his race to "subdue the earth."

If it is true then, that the duty of man consists in the greatest possible efficiency, or the most harmonious and various exercise of his powers, it is evident that with regard to nature his duty is twofold.

It is his duty, in the first place, to establish his dominion over all created things except man, and to use, and even destroy them, if it be necessary for the support and improvement of man. Thus the use of animals for making painful experiments, is in some instances necessary for the promotion of natural and medical science; while in other cases it is as immoral as it is unnatural.

Man is bound, in the second place, to abstain from all cruelty towards, or wanton destruction of any thing in nature; for, by a disregard of this principle, he deprives himself of objects of knowledge, use, or interest; — whereas by a tender regard for every trace of perfection in nature, he acts as a fellow-laborer of the God of nature, though not in creating, yet in preventing the destruction of that which He has created, perfect in its kind. This conscientious regard for what may not improperly be called the rights of nature, and of animals particularly, we find recognised by men in a state of nature, as well as in that advanced stage of civilization, when the highest refinement has led them back to simplicity. Beautiful traces

of the acknowledgment of these rights, you may find in the ancient laws of the East, particularly those of the Hindoos. Among the ancient Greeks, also, though they used all sorts of animals for food, as we do, it is recorded that the Areopagus condemned a boy to death for having put out the eyes of a bird. Among modern nations also, we find some of the domesticated animals included in the protection of the law, though by no means so extensively and effectually as Christian and humane feelings would dictate. Nay, more, though we no longer consecrate trees and groves to religious rites, is there a heart that would not condemn, as a profanation, every attempt wantonly to destroy or disfigure a majestic elm or oak, or intentionally to tread under foot a beautiful flower, or dash to pieces a beautiful crystal? Who would not condemn him as a barbarian, who should wantonly mar the wild and lovely magnificence of a water-fall; or who, in countries adorned with the remains of ancient glory, with the ruins of castles and temples, should carelessly destroy what Göthe so expressly calls "the masterpieces of nature's masterpiece"? Let me not be charged with an extravagant sensibility, cherished at the expense of the real interest of man in the use of the things of this earth. I value the life and happiness of one human being more highly than all the things of this earth, the works of nature and of art. But it is for this very reason, for the purpose of multiplying and refining the sources of human enjoyment, that I urge it as a matter of conscience upon all, and particularly upon parents and teachers, to cultivate that love of nature which

is anxious to keep its commandments; and to listen to its silent protests against the wanton use or destruction of the means of life, wisdom, and happiness.

Enough has been said on the duties arising from the relation between man and the lower orders of creation. I proceed to give an account of those obligations which grow out of the connexion of man with the Supreme Being.

I cannot enter here upon an extensive inquiry into religion, examining the proofs of the existence of God, and the ideas we can form of his being and character. I shall speak chiefly of the essential bearing of religion and morality upon each other, and the practical consequences, the duties resulting from religious principle.

For this purpose, it is necessary, in the first place, that we should perfectly understand each other, as to what we mean by the words *religion* and *morality*. The definition of these terms cannot be settled by etymology, which, with regard to the word religion, is somewhat doubtful. But it is important that we should fix our attention upon the sense in which these words are generally used. There seems to be a general feeling that would insist upon a difference between the two, but opinions do not agree as to what it consists in. It is generally believed that a man can be moral without being religious, even though he be an atheist; while most persons at least, seem satisfied that a man cannot be religious without being moral. Some say, that religion is the spirit of morality, and morality the form or manifestation of religion. But though there is evidently some truth touched upon

in these expressions, they are themselves indistinct. For how can we conceive of any principle of action, physical or spiritual, without any form, that is, manifestation of itself in actions? And what becomes of morality, considered apart from the spirit of morality? We speak of moral principles, sentiments, and intentions, — of a moral spirit; and we condemn as immoral, that which is only moral in appearance. To take the mere appearance of morality for morality itself, is not less a mistake than to confound the mere form of religion with its substance. Much more arbitrary is the distinction which comprehends under religion the whole of man's duties, while it confines the idea of morality to the social obligations of man towards man; — as if purity, moral courage, and self-improvement, were not enjoined by the law of morality, even without reference to the social state! Others would have us understand by morality the obligations man owes to others and to himself, — while religion is said to denote exclusively his duties toward God. But there are moral obligations toward God as well as toward man; and God is worshipped in the performance of all our duties.

Others maintain a difference in the motives by which the religious, and by which the moral man, is actuated. The religious man is said to act from more elevated motives, he does every thing exclusively or chiefly with reference to God and his will; — while the mere moral man may be actuated by other motives, such as honor and a rational self-love. But this view implies a mistake, first, with regard to the character of the moral man. A man cannot be called

truly moral, unless his conduct consist in a perfect obedience to the dictates of his conscience. Neither self-love, nor honor, nor any other motive, can impress on any action or intention the character of morality; because every motive requires, itself, the sanction of conscience, in order to become a moral principle of action. Moreover, our religion itself, to be perfect, requires the assent of our conscience. Our religion is not what it ought to be, unless our conscience bears testimony, that the religious views we hold are the result of faithful inquiry, and that our feelings and actions are conformable to what we conscientiously hold to be true. Accordingly, we claim it as our highest privilege and duty, to worship God according to the dictates of our consciences. Our worship, our religion, whether it be founded upon fear or upon love, lacks its highest sanction if it is not founded upon our conscience, if it is not a truly moral religion.

However differently men may think on many subjects connected with morals and religion, yet in substance they understand each other; so that individuals of any nation find, in the language of every other, means of communicating their ideas on these subjects of universal and constant importance. He, therefore, whose intellect is sufficiently enlarged, not to lose sight of the principle in whatever form it may appear, can recognise and respect the spirit of religion in the fanatic and the idolater, and the foundations of morality in the atheist, as well as in the enlightened and pious Christian. All those

to whom these words are expressions of something real, understand by morality a principle that should govern the whole conduct of man in public, domestic, and private life; while religion enables them to trace the legitimacy of the government of this principle to the very foundation of his being, and the source of all existence.

If we look upon the effects of the religious principle in the world, it appears, in its purest and in its most degenerate form, as the mightiest agent in human affairs. Enlightened self-love teaches man to respect the rights of others and repay kindness with kindness; but religion teaches him to sacrifice his own rights for the rights of others, to love his enemies, and to die for those who would not permit him to devote his life to their service. Self-interest will lead men to enrich themselves at the expense of others; to conquer and enslave others to their own power. Religion gathers nations under the sign of the crescent, or the cross, to extend over all this world a kingdom that is professedly not of this world. It is religion that drives man from the society of men to make solitude his friend, and to seek in the wilderness himself in himself; and which, on the other hand, enables him to find in the bustle of society, in its troubles, pleasures, and cares, a peace which the deepest solitude cannot give.

In every instance in which religion acts as a principle distinct from every other, it impels and enables man to do and to suffer what no other principle of his nature could effect or explain.

Of the various illustrations of this truth with which

the history of religion abounds, I will give here only one. The societies of those religious enthusiasts who, in the history of the church, are known by the name of self-flagellators, which made their appearance in the thirteenth century, in Italy, are thus described by a contemporary witness. "During those centuries in which many vices and crimes disgraced Italy, suddenly a penitential state of feeling seized first the inhabitants of Perugia, then the Romans, at last almost all parts of Italy. The fear of Christ came upon them so powerfully, that noble and ignoble, old and young, even children of five years, nearly naked, walked through the streets, two and two, in solemn procession. Each of them held in his hand a scourge made of thongs, with which, uttering sighs and lamentations, he violently struck his own shoulders, until the blood followed. Their eyes overflowing with tears as if they were actually beholding the suffering of the Saviour, they cried in a lamentable manner after the mercy of God, the God of mercy, and the aid of the mother of God. Not only in the daytime, but even at night, and in the severest winter, they walked, hundreds, and even ten thousand of them, with burning torches, led by the priests with crucifixes and banners, through the cities and to the churches, and humbly prostrated themselves before the altars. They did the same in villages and market towns; so that fields and mountains seemed to reëcho with the voices of those crying to God. All musical instruments and amorous songs were silent; only the mourning hymn of the penitent was heard everywhere in

cities and in the country ; hearts of stone were moved by its lamentable sounds, and the eyes of the hardened were filled with tears. The women, too, took a part in this pious exercise ; and, in their chambers, not only those of the common people, but even noble dames and tender maidens inflicted upon themselves the same penance. At that time all who had been enemies were reconciled to each other ; usurers and robbers hastened to restore their unlawful gain, and whoever else was given to vice, humbly confessed his sins, and renounced his vanity. The prisons were opened, the prisoners were set free, and exiles were allowed to return."

In its healthiest and loftiest growth, as well as in its wildest excrescences, religion shows itself as the germ of infinity in the soul of man. Now if we follow up the various streams of human effort which, under the name of religion, have alternately blessed or desolated the world, and trace them to their hidden springs in human nature, what is it, for which the fanatic abandons all sources of natural enjoyment and submits to arbitrary, self-imposed torments ; and for which the true Christian turns away from the brightest and surest prospects of ambition ? It is a longing after happiness, which outlives all the sufferings he may have to endure, and outgrows all the success he may meet with. Disappointment only deepens, instead of quenching, this innate desire ; while it grows in proportion to his successful attempts to gratify it. This innate desire of man after the greatest happiness of which he is capable, is the element of all religion.

The desire of happiness, however, upon which religion is grounded, does not enable us to distinguish it from morality; but, on the contrary, shows that both rest on the same foundation. For the desire of happiness we know to be the motive of all human action, the main spring of animal, moral, and intellectual life. But the attainment of man's happiness depends in part on himself, on his faculties, talents, and especially his moral efforts,—and in part on circumstances, or his condition, and on the good or ill success of his undertakings. Every moment of his existence convinces him, that the use of his own faculties would not be sufficient to the attainment of happiness, unless nature, or the things around him over which he has no control, were so organized and directed as to be adapted to his wants. He, indeed, commits the seed to the ground; but he knows that it will not yield the desired harvest, unless it be favored by rain and sunshine from above, and the storm and the hail be averted, by a power not his own. The same may be said of every other pursuit of man; his life, his family, his industry, the culture of his mind, and formation of his character, every thing he has, wants, or hopes for, depends in a great part not on himself, but on another, a greater power, which has assigned him a place in the universe, in which he cannot exist unless supported by the same Almighty hand. Now this desire, that all things should be so organized and directed as to be conformed to the wants of man, is the foundation of all religion. Whether a person believe that this providential direction of human affairs is vested in

a host of gods, or in the eternal law of nature, or in God, whose guardian care controls the course of events in such a manner as to enable man, as a free agent, to form his own character, and, consequently, be the author of his own happiness or misery, — or whether he believe that this providential agency is independent of all he can do, or that it can be secured by a virtuous life, or by prayers, or sacrifices, or by the charms of his priests ; — all these various beliefs are only different forms of the same principle.

It is easy, from these considerations, to perceive the difference, as well as the intimate connexion, between religion and morality. They both denote a direction of the mind toward a certain object, a good to be attained, a happiness to be secured. Morality we know to be a direction of the mind toward that happiness which results from the consciousness of the most various and harmonious exercise of all our powers. Religion consists in the direction of the mind toward that happiness which results from the belief, that all things in the world are constituted and directed so as to admit of the most various and harmonious exercise of all his faculties. Now as we cannot exercise any one of our faculties, nor draw a breath, nor move a hand, nor feel, nor think, nor form a resolution, unless the world in which we live be so constituted or governed, as to admit and secure our existence and action, it is evident that the moral life of man, which consists in the full exercise of his faculties, is without a foundation, unless the main supposition on which religion rests, be true. But though morality has no se-

curity for its continuation, but in religion, and naturally leads to religion, it is clear, on the other hand, that it can exist without it. For as long as man actually possesses the faculties, in the exercise of which morality consists, he feels bound to acknowledge the moral law, though these faculties should cease the next moment. Thus we find many among the Stoics, as well as among the Sadducees, insisting upon the strictest morality, though not believing in the immortality of the soul, but supposing death to be the extinction of moral as well as animal life. But, on the other hand, although true morality can exist without religion, true religion cannot exist without morality. For all true religion rests upon the belief in a supreme direction of the course of events, which secures to man his moral existence, a state of happiness dependent on his conduct.

But false religion, that is, a principle having some of the characteristics of religion, may be made the instrument of folly or immorality. When we hear of the Indian, in Brazil, believing himself divinely inspired, when the priest, in order to strengthen him for a dangerous enterprise, blows some tobacco smoke into his nose, we see, through the guise of folly, a reliance on Providence for the success of his undertaking. And when we see the fanatic, honestly relying on divine aid in a war of extermination against heretics; or boldly attempting every crime, because all sins are forgiven beforehand to a champion of the Most High; we still recognise the religious principle, though in its most corrupted form. But, as I have before observed,

true religion is founded on a reliance on Providence for a continuation of our moral existence, and for that happiness alone, which flows from the most harmonious exercise of all our faculties.

The religious principle, or reliance on Providence, is not confined to the exercise of any one faculty, or any particular pursuit of man. The husbandman relies upon it for his harvest, the merchant for his commercial undertakings, the soldier for victory, the clergyman for guidance and strength in his ministry, the philosopher for intellectual light, the poet for inspiration. Every one desires to live and to act according to the known tendencies of his nature, so that his religious ideas must, of course, depend on his knowledge of himself, and the relative importance of the various objects of his desires, as conducive to real satisfaction. A clear illustration of this truth you will find in comparing the religious doctrines of the Old and the New Testament. In both records, success and happiness are promised to man; in both, divine aid is made to depend on his moral conduct. But the happiness, promised in the Old Testament, such as long life, prosperity, and numerous descendants, is evidently calculated for men not yet awakened to a consciousness of the infinite tendencies of their nature; while the declarations of the Gospel hold out an inspiring encouragement to every good effort, a faithful warning against every tendency to evil, a full compensation for every good of life lost without guilt, a crown of glory for every sacrifice; — it shows to every penitent child the

opening arms of a forgiving Father ; it points out to all the wanderers on earth the way to their eternal home.

The adaptation of religion to the actual condition of men, is as evident in the Old as in the New Testament. The former was adapted to a people who could find God only in the events of this world, and the influence of human conduct upon the present life ; the Gospel was calculated for mankind, in all ages, to satisfy both the finite and the infinite wants of human nature.

This account of religion contains, I believe, all that is essential, and excludes all that is extraneous, in the views which are generally entertained with regard to this subject. Somewhat too vague for a scientific exposition, though reaching the very heart of religion, are the words of Benjamin Constant, in his work on religion, which no one, truly interested in this subject, should leave unread. He says, " We experience a confused desire of something better than that which we know ; the religious sentiment presents to us something better. We feel oppressed by the bonds which confine and chill our souls ; the religious sentiment announces to us a period when we shall break these bonds. We are weary with the commotions of life, which, without ever subsiding, are so monotonous, that they render both satiety inevitable, and repose impossible ; the religious sentiment gives us the idea of a repose inexpressible, and ever exempt from satiety. In one word, the religious sentiment is the answer to the cry of the soul

that nothing can silence; to that springing forward of the soul towards the unknown, the infinite, that no one can entirely control, with whatever distracting objects he may surround himself, with whatever ingenuity he may deafen or degrade himself."

The common view of religion is too narrow, that it consists in a belief or faith. The mere desire to find a security for our best possessions, and our highest hopes, the joy at having found it, the pain of being without it, belong likewise to the religious sentiment, as well as the practice of every virtue from religious motives.

Too confined, also, though setting forth the essential object of religion, is the voice of Kant. According, to him, religion consists in the rational belief, that virtue, though it should be practised without any view to present or future reward, will finally meet with that happiness which it deserves; and, consequently, the belief in a future life, and in God, the just Rewarder of good and evil. It is evident, that the hope of a future life, and a just retribution, is only one, though a most important part, of that reliance on Providence in which religion consists.

Of the duties arising from religion I shall now say only thus much, that religion is an innate tendency of human nature. It is essentially the same principle which makes the child seek protection from his parents, the friend from the friend, the individual from society.

Every human being seeks after a security for all that is dear to him. Accordingly, religion demands

of no one to do violence to his feelings, to force upon himself a state of devotion, or to strain his intellect to an object remote from the natural desire of knowledge ; on the contrary, religion merely demands of all to restrain the lower desires and selfish passions, which would prevent the natural growth of religion in the soul.

If you do not confine your intellect to seeking after means of ease and luxury, it will of itself go in search after those high and simple truths, which can alone secure our true and eternal interests. If you do not encumber your feelings with low interests and unholy affections, they will of themselves rise in devotion to the Father of spirits ; and if you only disenthrall the will from selfish motives, it will gladly worship God in the performance of every duty.

Of those duties which man owes to man, on account of their common religious nature, of those means and aids of religion, in particular, which are derived from association, I shall speak hereafter.

# LECTURE XII.

BEFORE I enter upon the inquiry into those duties which every human being owes to himself and his fellow-men, I wish to call to your minds the obvious truth, that the extent of duty cannot be the same for all men, but must be commensurate with the powers and opportunities of each individual. For the duty of man, as we have seen, consists in the most various and harmonious exercise of his powers. The moral law, our own conscience, requires of each one of us all he can do, neither more nor less. No one would require the same degree of refinement in the savage and the civilized man, or task the boy with all the duties of the man. We know, moreover, that in a sound state, the powers of man are continually growing by constant exercise; those of the body for some time, those of the mind without end. It is a necessary consequence of this gradual unfolding of our faculties, that the circle of duties belonging to each particular stage in the progress of our being, is a preparation for the next. We know, that in order to rise to eminence in any profession or occupation of life, we must faithfully serve our apprenticeship, and that

he is most likely to discharge his duties as a man, who has most fully performed those of the boy.

I wish that these remarks with regard to the gradual enlargement of the whole sphere of our duties, and of each in particular, may be borne in mind, in the following investigation of the special obligations of man, as it will not be in my power to speak of each successive stage in the practice of every virtue. The personal and the social duties, or those which every human being owes to himself and to his fellow-men, may be comprehended under the general name of duties to mankind, or duties to human nature. Whatever obligations the individual acknowledges, he feels bound in the first place to perform them to himself, and then to excite others to their performance. In order to perform our whole duty as regards the virtues of temperance, fortitude, veracity, justice, and kindness, we must not only be ourselves temperate, intrepid, true, just, and kind, but must also induce others to the practice of the same virtues. Accordingly all the duties of man toward himself and others are obligations, which he directly or indirectly owes to human nature. Our duties towards others consist in enabling and inducing them to perform, what we consider the law of duty for all men.

When I speak of duties which a person owes to himself, I mean those which from their nature could be performed if he should live entirely separated from society; although in many, and perhaps most cases, these personal virtues are to be practised by men in society. Thus for example, patience may be prac-

tised by each individual, in sickness and distress, without any reference to other men ; while, in many cases, this virtue is to be exercised in relation to other men.

Our duties toward ourselves are of a preparatory nature, so far as their performance alone, enables us to discharge those toward others. It is the duty of each individual to enlighten and improve others ; but this duty he cannot discharge, unless he has first learned and mastered the lesson he wishes to teach ; unless he is continually endeavouring to enlighten and improve himself. The reason is clearly this. We have seen that the duty of man consists in the greatest possible efficiency ; and in order to produce any salutary effect upon others, we must learn to use, and continually cultivate, our own powers ; now this unfolding of our own powers, this self-culture, is the very object of all the duties we owe to ourselves ; by the performance of which duties, accordingly, we qualify ourselves for discharging those toward other beings. He, only, who is thus faithful to himself, is fit to reign over the lower creation ; to enter into relations of mutual benefit with his fellow-men, and to rise to a contemplation and enjoyment of the Supreme Mind.

In pointing out the detail of the duties of man toward himself, as well as other beings, it is important to bear in mind that to mark out the duty of a man, is to calculate the sphere of his power and freedom. Duties in themselves are rights or privileges, assuming the form of commands or prohibitions, only so far as their claims are urged against the enthralling influences

of the appetites and lower passions. Thus the duty of self-education, which each individual owes to himself, and each generation to their posterity, while it is a sacred obligation, is, at the same time, the highest privilege intrusted to man.

To speak of duties as checks upon power and freedom, is the language of slaves; which can be accounted for only by the fact, that moralists and theologians have attended rather to the lower propensities in human nature, which are to be checked, than to the divine principle that is to be set free by the law of duty. Instead of setting out, then, with the view of devising the most complete system of checks and drawbacks upon human power, our mode of ascertaining the duties of each individual consists in taking into view the faculties with which nature has endowed him, and the most extensive and efficient way to use them. After these preliminaries I proceed to speak, first of the personal duties, or those which each individual owes to himself; and then of the social obligations, or those which all men owe to one another.

The extent of man's individual freedom or personal duty, can be ascertained only by a satisfactory answer to these questions. What are the native powers of man; how are they to be preserved; and how improved? I have already given a general view of the various powers of man, particularly of those of the mind, in order to show the foundation of morality in human nature. At present, as it is my object to show how those faculties are to be preserved and improved, I shall refer only to the results of that scien-

tific exposition, in order to carry it out into its practical consequences.

The law of duty assigns to every one, as the object of his preserving and improving care, the faculties of his body and his soul, not only those which he has in common with others, but those also, by which he is distinguished as an individual.

That there is a decided differenoe in some of the various capacities of men is as true, as that, with regard to their essential properties and qualities, all men are alike.

To judge from experience, this diversity of human capacities and talents, is in a great measure not the result of circumstances, or the self-formed character of the individual, but innate. This seems to be the case with mental, as well as bodily capacities. In one child, the sense and taste for music is developed apparently without any thing to call it forth, or in spite of all disadvantages ; while in another child, all the exertions of parental vanity, and the united skill of all the music-masters employed, are not able to make up for the absence of the artist within, or breathe the spirit of sweet sound into the tuneless, tormented soul. You can no more give him an ear for music, than you can make his fingers grow long enough to grasp the strings or keys of the instrument.

The same may be said of all those accomplishments, such as poetry, and the genius of invention in science and art, which are, in part, at least, the free gift of nature, and not the results of a meritorious effort. But still more, not only is there a native differ-

ence between individuals with regard to those peculiar gifts, those artist powers, by which men are distinguished from one another as truly as birds by their note and their plumage, but it seems, also, that the essential powers, which belong to all men as such, are distributed by nature, in a greater or less degree, even among the children of the same parents. The powers of observation and abstraction, the memory, the vividness and creative energy of the imagination, the keenness, and the depth of feeling, seem, in some degree, the gift of nature.

The question, whether these original differences in the capacities and dispositions of men are properties of the mind itself, or merely the natural result of the formation of those corporeal organs, which the mind needs for the exercise of its faculties, — this question does not properly lie within the horizon of moral philosophy, the province of which is to determine what influence these peculiarities of human nature should have upon our conduct. But if you permit me to glance at that interesting question, without attempting a full investigation of it, I would urge upon every one the importance of being guided wholly by the facts which experience furnishes on this subject, and to distrust every mere theory. Now experience shows, that the peculiar organization of the body, particularly the head, is of great importance for the exercise of the general, as well as the peculiar faculties of the mind. There are so many facts to establish this assertion, that it is hardly worth while to mention any. Haller relates, that an idiot, being wounded in

the head, showed a sound intellect and good sense, so long as the wound was kept open, but fell back into his idiocy as soon as it was healed. Most of my hearers, perhaps, know what is related of Mabillon, an ecclesiastic of the order of St. Benedict, who distinguished himself by his learning and excellent judgment in examining the authenticity of historical records, and, by the principles he established, became the founder of this branch of historical criticism. This man, in his youth, seemed destitute, not only of talent, but of common sense, until being wounded by a tile falling from the roof of a house upon his head, he soon after displayed those brilliant powers which raised him to eminence among his contemporaries. Now every one knows, through his own consciousness, (which is the foundation of all evidence,) that his mind, of the operations of which he is conscious, is something wholly distinct from his body, which is an object of his senses. But he knows, also, that the mind, in order to exist and act on earth, needs a body and corporeal organs. In order to execute the resolutions of his own will by words or actions, he needs the organs of speech, and hands, or feet ; and from this and other observations, we infer, that the mind, also, for its other functions of thought and feelings, has and requires corporeal organs ; as such we are led to consider particularly the nerves and the brain.

How far the believers in phrenology have actually succeeded in discovering the peculiar inequalities in the skull, which correspond to those of individual

minds, I do not feel competent to determine. So much, however, seems certain, that no peculiarities in the formation of the head have been found, which justify a belief in any necessary determinations and irresistible propensities of the soul; this is not denied by the intelligent advocates of phrenology. Again, the peculiarities of the mind and dispositions of men are brought to light, not merely by wounds in the head, or similar accidents, but still more by great events, mighty changes in society, such as wars, political struggles, and revolutions, which afford a sphere of action to those capacities which were kept down by the obscurity of common life, and the uniform round of its occupations. It is then, that eminent talent leaves the obscurity of the farm-house and the work-shop, to take its place in the council-chamber, or at the head of the army. It is unreasonable to suppose, that striking and favorable events create the powers which seize upon them as the catch-words, in order to take and act their part in the drama of life. If this were the case, we should be indebted for the reformation of the church, not so much to Luther as to Tetzel, the itinerant preacher and retailer of absolution from past and future sins. And we should have to trace the great discovery of the law of gravitation, not to the head of Newton, but to the apple that fell upon it. It is equally unreasonable to consider a wound on the head, or any change in the form of the skull, as the cause of sense and reason. But all these, and many other similar facts, make it at least very probable, that the human

mind, as it exists in every individual, contains all the various capacities which are found in any one human being; that every one, by nature, is a philosopher, a poet, a statesman, an artist; but that the exercise, or actual display, of these innate capacities, depends partly on the formation of those organs, which the mind needs for its various functions, and partly on the influence of external circumstances, such as education and the state of society, and especially on the free moral efforts of each individual.

Now with regard to these differences in the capacities of individuals, the law of duty is simply this. The defects in the general powers of man, in the use of the senses and organs of motion and speech, as well as in perception, imagination, judgment, and feeling, should be supplied, as much as possible, by education and self-culture. But the attainment of any one of those powers, which may be considered as natural accomplishments or instincts, should never be made the object of exertion, which must lead, in the end, to disappointment, or, which is worse, to self-deception. Thus, for example, it is as practical as it is important, for every one to acquire skill enough in drawing to copy correctly from nature, or works of art. For a practical knowledge of the rudiments of drawing is desirable, partly on account of its direct usefulness in enabling you to give to others a definite idea of any thing you have seen, or may wish to procure, be it the leaf of a tree, or an article of furniture or clothing, and still more on account of its general influence on the faculties of observation,

and memory. But it would be absurd, and an immoral waste of power, if every one, in attempting to draw, were to set out with a view of becoming a Raphael or a Hemling. But if you examine your own mind with true humility, and a deep sense of responsibility for every talent and power that nature may have intrusted to your care, and you discover that within you which is designed to improve and bless many, you have to consider yourself as holding a sacred trust under Providence. It is your duty, in the first place, to suppress every feeling of personal pride or vanity, and, unconcerned about the world's flattery or envy, strive to purify, and to form and employ, the precious materials, as a faithful steward of the riches which God has laid up in your nature. Never forget that to be thus distinguished by nature, is not a merit of your own ; do not expect, nay, do not allow, others to ascribe to you the honor and praise which belong to the giver, and not to the possessor, of heavenly gifts. Whatever be the talent you possess, whether it be calculated, by discoveries in the arts and sciences, to improve the private, domestic, religious, or political condition of man, always think that the light you possess was given to you for no other purpose than to be a lamp to the feet of those who tread that walk of life for which these means of improvement are designed. Use your talent like a dark lantern, enjoying, at the same time, the light it throws before you, and the shade it casts upon yourself.

With regard to all the faculties of body and mind

which man possesses, he has the following duties toward himself. According to the general principle, that it is the duty of man to preserve and to increase his powers, — we should say, that it is his duty with respect to his body and animal existence, to preserve and take care of his life, his health, his comfort, and every part of his body, and to cultivate all his bodily powers, particularly the organs of sense and of motion. It is his duty thus to preserve and improve his material and animal being, partly for its own sake, simply because it is better, that is, a more perfect mode of action, to take care of and cultivate than to neglect and destroy, and partly and chiefly, in order to fit the body for the purposes of the mind.

With regard to some of the duties belonging to the care of the body, I shall add a few remarks in connexion with the subject of education. The state of health must depend chiefly on alternate exercise and rest, suited to the constitution of the individual and the circumstances in which he is placed. As much engaging exercise as possible, — and no other rest than that which is the natural consequence of labor, and invigorates us for new exertion, — this is the golden rule, which leads to health and happiness.

In connexion with health, the duty of cleanliness is to be mentioned, and only mentioned, as it recommends itself most effectually, as a matter of taste, even to those who will not obey it from conscience. It is a duty, as well as a luxury and charm, not the less to be prized because it is within the reach

of the poor as well as the rich. Is not impurity, even when external, a degradation of the mind, created in the image of the living God? Are not unclean hands and spotted garments a profanation of the unseen temple within? The care we owe to our own body, and its various organs, consists partly in fitting ourselves for the occupation and mode of life we intend to pursue, mechanical or literary, and partly in the general unfolding and culture of all our bodily capacities. On this account I consider gymnastic exercise as a duty belonging to the young in particular, but in some degree to man at every period of life. For, if properly and systematically begun and continued, this methodical exercise of every part of the human frame, is the only way to make the body a sure and well-trained servant of the mind, always ready to obey its master's call. Together with the exercise of the organs of motion, those of the senses are entitled to a care and cultivation, of which our present systems of education have yet to learn the rudiments. As, among the organs of motion, the hands and the voice, so among those of the senses, the eye and the ear, claim the chief attention and intelligent care. The comparative value of the things which belong to our animal existence, determines their relative moral worth. Life is more valuable than health, health more than comfort, lasting comfort more than either of our limbs which are not necessary for life, and our limbs are more valuable than the external things which we procure and adapt to preserve and improve our physical existence, such as clothing, houses, and

furniture. Accordingly, where one of these things cannot be procured, or preserved, without giving up another, the law of duty enjoins the sacrifice of the less important good for that of higher value; our property for our limbs; these for our real comfort; comfort for health; health for life; and life itself for those objects which are of greater value than all the possessions and hopes of earth combined, the cause of truth, justice, freedom, and religion. This is, of course, only an average estimation, which in many cases requires to be modified, always, however, according to the principle, that the value of any thing that belongs to our physical existence, is determined by the more important objects and interests of the mind; and that all the things of this earth, however valuable, are to be accounted as ballast, and unhesitatingly thrown overboard, for the safety and well-being of the immortal soul. To this great subject I shall once more have to turn your attention, in treating of the duty of self-sacrifice. The attention and care which man owes to his animal nature, may be considered, indirectly, as duties toward himself as an intelligent and moral being. It is in this capacity that we shall now have to consider him, endeavouring to describe the circle of those obligations which flow directly from his spiritual nature. According to the classification of the faculties of the mind previously given, I shall speak, first, of the duties he owes to himself on account of his intellect, then of those which relate to his feelings, and lastly, of those which belong particularly to the will. When I speak of duties of

the intellect, the feelings, and the will, I, of course, do not mean duties which belong to either of these powers exclusively, but such only as regard one of these faculties more particularly than the others.

With regard to the intellect, it is the duty of every one to exercise, with ever-increasing zeal, its three essential functions, the powers of perception, imagination, and reason. By means of his senses, he should acquaint himself with the phenomena of the world without; by his consciousness or internal sense, with the events in the history of his own mind. While he is thus possessing himself of all the facts he can collect, his imagination should go forth beyond the limited horizon of his knowledge, and, boldly taking her stand on the top-mast of experience, should be looking all round to see, whether in the vast expanse of possibility and conjecture, she may espy any thing that provident reason should take to be a sign of distant shores, and direct the course of life to the unknown land of promise. It is not only in the whole, but in every department of life, in the smallest occupation in which we wish to succeed and excel, that we have to use the faculties of perception, imagination, and judgment. We should ascertain, first, the manner in which any business or office is actually performed; then, by our imagination we should try to conceive of other ways in which it may be done; until our judgment fixes upon one as a decided improvement, or at least as worth an experiment.

While we thus consider the united exercise of all his intellectual powers as the duty of every human be-

ing, we find that by their peculiar constitution, capacity, and taste, some are destined to devote themselves to the cultivation of one branch in preference to another; and thus nature has marked out for each individual the peculiar sphere in which he can be most efficient, and advance to perfection and happiness. Some may rise to eminence as observers, some as poets, some as reasoners. In every great department of knowledge an incalculable number and variety of pursuits are included, each of which is worthy to be made the main object of the life of an individual. Of the advantage which accrues to society from this division of pursuits, I shall speak hereafter. Each of these various occupations enjoins upon those who engage in them several indispensable duties. They all require in the first place, faithful application, ardent and persevering industry, sober enthusiasm. General Montecuculi being asked, what he required in order to carry on a war, said, there were many things he wanted, but three of them he thought indispensable. "And what are they?" "In the first place money." "And what next?" "Money." "But what then?" "Money." And so if we were asked what we thought most important for success in any pursuit whatever, and indispensable to a literary man, as a soldier of truth, to carry on a successful warfare against ignorance and error, we should say to him, many things are expedient to you in your undertaking, but there is one thing needful for the beginning, middle, and end; and this one thing is study, study, study. Furthermore, the qualities that characterize

the true student, such a one as every man can and should be, whether he be called so or not, are fearless independence, modesty, firmness, and singleness of purpose. Conscious that he is accountable to no one but his conscience and his God, he is fearless in his inquiries, shunning neither the open enmity of self-conceited prejudice, nor the insidious assaults of doubt waylaying him in his independent course. But conscious, at the same time, of the fallibility of his judgment, he is modest and humble with regard to the results at which he has arrived ; he is docile, always open to conviction, anxious to reconsider, and on better grounds to reform, every article of his practical and literary, his religious, political, and philosophical creed. But, on the other hand, so long as he is convinced of the truth of a principle, he must hold it fast ; and whether there be many to back him, or the whole world be against him, he must stand his ground, and defend it as if it were the last strong-hold of truth upon earth, of which he alone held the keys. Finally, the true student is characterized by singleness of purpose, having no end in view but simple and all-sufficient truth.

From this view of the duties of man to himself, as respects his intellect, I now pass to a consideration of those which belong to his feelings, or emotions of pain, pleasure, and desire. With regard to these, it is important to keep in mind, that feelings, such as love, esteem, and devotion, cannot be urged upon any one as direct dictates of duty, because our feelings are not under the direct influence of the will. You can, indeed, move your hand, or direct your

thoughts to a certain object, by your own free determination ; and therefore the use of the body, and the exercise of the intellectual powers, can, at least in some degree, be enjoined as a direct command of duty. But you cannot arbitrarily prevail upon yourself to be moved, to feel pleased or grieved by something you hear or read, or to esteem and love, or to despise and hate, a person. Still we can exercise an indirect influence over our feelings by the direct power we possess over our body and our intellect. For it depends upon us, upon our own will, to turn away from the sight or thought that gives us pain, and to fix our attention and our eye upon that which gives us pleasure, and excites our desire after it. Accordingly, by refraining from those thoughts and actions which excite and gratify our lower desires at the expense of those which lead to a more perfect, though distant good, we can place ourselves in a state of mind, in which only the best feelings of our nature arise and reign within us. Thus, indirectly, even our states of feeling are objects of duty, or such a conduct as is likely to yield the highest happiness of which we are susceptible.

Those feelings on which the improvement of man mainly depends, I have already considered. In examining the internal impulses which have an influence upon his conduct, we have seen, that there are, in his nature, finite desires, the appetites, which he has in common with the animal ; and passions, the object of which is partly finite and partly infinite ; and the pure principle of love, or interest in perfection. I

have shown, also, how, by the collision of the passions, the struggle between the finite and the infinite principles in man, the moral feeling is called forth, impelling him to strive, in conformity to the spiritual desires, after the greatest happiness, though distant, and attainable only by the utmost exertion of the will. Besides impelling him to the most perfect mode of action, in opposition to the tempting prospect of easy and present gratification, conscience rewards or punishes him by self-satisfaction or remorse, for having obeyed or disregarded that moral impulse.

In connexion with these feelings I will mention only a few others, which have a preëminent influence upon our progress. As it would be impossible to give here even a summary account of all the states of feeling which we experience, I mention, first, the feelings of pride and humility, shame and self-respect. The praying pharisee and the publican, in Scripture, are examples of pride and of humility. The prayer, "God, I thank thee that I am not as other men are," showed a disposition, even in the presence of the all-perfect One, to see only his own supposed perfections, and disown his faults. The prayer of the publican, "God be merciful unto me a sinner," broke forth from an humble and contrite spirit, willing to see and confess his own imperfections. But when Jesus said, "Which of you convinceth me of sin?" he was not more proud or less humble, than when he confessed "My Father is greater than I." Humility does not consist in ascribing to ourselves faults of which we are not conscious; such ascrip-

tions, arising either from hypocrisy or a mistaken piety, are proofs only of false humility. Humility, then, consists in the willingness, and pride in the unwillingness, of man to perceive and acknowledge his own imperfections.

The feeling of self-respect is sometimes confounded with pride, and the feeling of humility with shame. Self-respect consists in the satisfaction we experience from the consciousness of having done the whole of what we considered our duty. It is that pleasure which arises from conscientious effort. Shame, on the contrary, true shame, is the painful feeling of unworthiness, arising from a conscious neglect of duty. It is evident, that a man can feel, at the same time, humility and self-respect; that is, he may be willing to see all his faults, and nevertheless, or rather on this very account, rejoice in the consciousness of deserving the esteem of others, as well as the approbation of his own conscience. Nay, though he should be conscious of faults which cover him with shame, the consciousness of his humility, or willingness to see and own them, keeps up the principle of self-respect.

The feeling of humility, which awakes in peculiar power, when contemplating the standard of perfection in whose likeness we are created, and the desire of self-respect, founded on our continual approach to the divine original, are among the most powerful incitements to moral action, or the greatest possible efficiency. Pride retards the moral progress, and must be converted into shame, and supplanted by

true humility, before the self-elated mind can become capable of true elevation and noble self-respect.

Among the duties in which the exercise of the will is prominent, I mention, first, the formation of habits, and the freedom from habit, as particularly important for the moral progress of man. The importance of forming certain habits in every occupation and pursuit, in private, domestic, and public life, is too evident, and too well understood, to need any comment. I have shown before, that virtue is not to be confounded with moral habit; for the essence of virtue is exertion, and the object of the formation of habits is no other, than by frequent repetition to render those things easy, which, at first, required exertion, but not for the purpose of depriving the mind of its highest happiness, which flows from the greatest possible exertion, but in order to save its strength for higher displays of power. Thus, by reducing those employments which consist in a round of similar actions, for example, our daily domestic occupations, to an habitual order, we gain strength as well as time, to do more for our own improvement and the happiness of others.

But this very ease, which is the attendant of habit, becomes a temptation to man to rest satisfied with his present attainments, to become the creature of habit, instead of looking upon it as his creation. Our conscience, therefore, impels us to acquire habits, that they may be the servants, and not the enslavers, of the mind; not to lose the infinite end in finite means, but, by making that easy which once was hard, to save our strength for higher effort.

# LECTURE XIII.

THE duties which man owes to nature, to the Deity, and to himself, have been the subject of previous investigation. In order to complete the circle of human obligations, it now remains for us to consider the social duties, or those which man owes to his fellow-man.

We have seen that both the social and personal obligations of man, are comprehended in the general sphere of duties which he owes to human nature. The whole territory of social obligations is only an enlargement of our personal duties. If it is true that industry, love of truth, purity of heart, humility, patience, and fortitude, are duties which man owes to himself, it is evident, that our duties to others consist in endeavouring to make them industrious, lovers of truth, single-hearted, humble, patient, and firm. Thus by ascertaining the private obligations of man, we have formed a scale by which to graduate, and have gained an eminence from which we can survey, the whole extent of the duties which man owes to mankind. Those obligations also, which the individual owes to nature, and to the Deity, are at the same time the elements

of important social duties. For it is an object of duty to secure to each individual such a dominion over nature, or the lower orders of beings, as is consistent with the claims of other men, by establishing that civil order which we call the state. On the other hand, the duty of each individual toward God, operates also, as a social obligation; it gives rise to institutions for promoting religion among men. Thus we see in the social duties of man, a completion of those which he owes to nature, to God, and to himself. And as we have learned to look upon duty, not as an irksome restraint, but as the highest privilege of man, and upon the moral law, not as a depressing and inthralling, but as an elevating and redeeming principle, — we now see before us the great patrimony of freedom, the whole inheritance of glory, which the creator and designer of all things has promised to each one of his children, in giving him a free and immortal nature like unto his own.

Summing up the result of these considerations, we can state the whole amount of our social duties in this one principle; it is the duty of man to use his power to enable and induce his fellow men to do justice to themselves in all their relations to nature, to mankind, and to God. But simple as this principle is, the relations in which men are placed to one another, and which are to be determined by it, are infinitely various and complicated. And however important and solemn it may be to lay the corner stone, and mark out the ground plot of an edifice, it is more difficult, certainly, to calculate the parts and pro-

portions of the whole, with reference to use and beauty, the joint elements of perfection. As long as your building exists only in your imagination, or on paper, it is easy enough to enlarge, or retrench, or alter; but this freedom is considerably curtailed when your thoughts have once become stone and mortar. The difficulty is increased, and much greater caution, of course, is required, when the building you undertake is to consist of living materials, of men, of human interests and passions, each of which demands a place in the wide edifice of social life.

With regard to the intercourse of men, it is particularly important to settle the question, what means they are to use in influencing one another; whether, or how far, one or many are allowed to use force against another whose views and pursuits of happiness are opposed to theirs. However confident we may be that our own views of right and wrong, which we derive from the exercise of our reason, are the truth, yet we know that every one has a reason of his own, and that no man's judgment is infallible, while there is no external standard of duty which all must acknowledge.

In order to settle this great question, in what manner men are allowed and obliged to influence one another, my first step must be to ascertain all the ways and means by which they can operate upon each other.

It is evident that man has no other way of communicating with, or operating upon man, than by the use of his body, his hand, or his voice, making an

impression upon the senses of another. A state of being, in which mind can operate upon mind without the instrumentality of bodily organs, where, instead of speaking and hearing, thought and perception will be the language of our disembodied spirits, such a state of being may be looked forward to in another stage of our progress; but, in our present condition, we have to make known to each other our thoughts, feelings, and resolutions, by impressions made and received by our bodily organs of action and perception. Now, in order to operate upon another person, we can use our bodily power in two different ways. In making an impression upon another person, we may use our own body as a mere instrument of power, or as a sign to convey a certain meaning to his mind, by his senses. If a person utters inarticulate sounds merely to exercise his voice, or touches another with his hand inadvertently, he makes an impression upon his senses, as well as when he speaks or strikes another to insult him. But, in the first case, he does nothing more than produce a sensation, while in the latter, the impression he makes upon the senses is merely the means or instrument to convey a thought or intention to another mind. All those ways in which the corporeal organs are used to convey a meaning to the mind of another person, may be comprehended under the general name of language; whether the means of conveyance consist in sounds, or letters, or gestures, or any thing else. Even the influence of example is a kind of language, by which the deeds and lives, even of the

dead, speak to the living. All history is a language that connects the past, the present, and the future, through all the generations of man. Even the impression which one person produces upon the mind of another through his senses, may be the means for a more remote object, and one thought be made the instrument of expressing another. Thus if I ask a good reader to read to me some favorite passage, his reading may have the double intention, first, by a correct delivery, to impress me with the true meaning of the author, and also, by complying with my desire, to confer a favor.

There is another still more important distinction between different modes of influencing other men. In the first place, a person may use physical force against another, as by attacking his person, or repelling force by force. In the second place, a person may use means to influence another's will, by presenting to him motives of action, advantages or pleasures to be attained, evils or pain to be avoided. Now these considerations, whether they be pleasures to be received, or evils to be averted, by which you wish to induce another person to act in a certain manner, may be either adventitious or moral. If you endeavour to persuade your child to study his lesson in order to gratify you, you present to him an adventitious good, as a motive to action. But if you remind him of the satisfaction he has felt on previous occasions, in the same exercise of his mind, you present to him a moral motive. If a teacher stimulates the pupils in his school by the view of rank and standing in their

class, he is presenting adventitious motives; but if he endeavours to rouse in them the desire after that pleasure, that self-satisfaction, which always accompanies and follows the most perfect exercise of their faculties, he is treating them as moral free agents. Again, if a person warn a friend against doing a dishonest action on account of the danger of detection, which makes honesty the best policy, he is setting before him an adventitious inducement; while by reminding him of the unseen sufferings which must attend prosperous, as well as unsuccessful falsehood, he excites the moral principle within him. This difference in the manner of influencing others, by adventitious and moral motives, is evidently founded on the two kinds and sources of happiness, of which man is susceptible. Those desires are moral, which have for their object that pleasure which is connected with the consciousness of having used our own powers in the most perfect, that is, the most efficient, or various and harmonious manner. All other motives, desires, and pleasures, are adventitious.

The expression, physical force, naturally implies its being employed against the will of another. Moral and adventitious means may be used, either with, or contrary to the will of him who is the object of their influence. He who knows he is about to be seized by a violent paroxysm, may desire you to bind his hands; the true penitent will thank you for representing to him all the external evils he has brought on himself, and rousing in his own soul the sense of self-degradation. The question now arises, whether,

or how far, man is allowed and obliged, in his intercourse with others, to use moral or adventitious inducements, with, or without, or against their will, or to employ physical force. What is the relative moral value of each of these means of influence? We answer, in general, that he who endeavours to influence another as a free agent, by moral motives, exercises a higher privilege and duty, than he who endeavours to influence him as an animal, by holding out adventitious good, or evil; and he who makes use of these means of influence acts in a more perfect manner than he who employs physical force.

Accordingly, if I can prevent a person from injuring another, by means of his own reason and conscience, I feel bound to do so in preference to deterring him by threatening physical force to restrain him; and it is only when the threatened evil or promised good fails of producing the desired effect, that I feel at liberty, and under the obligation, actually to employ it. This gradation follows simply from the consideration that in operating upon another as a free agent, you act in a more perfect manner, you exercise greater power, than by treating another human being in a manner in which you can exercise an influence over any animal, by presenting adventitious good or evil; which still is a more perfect mode than to treat him as you do an inanimate body or any material object, by using actual force. It is clear, also, that in general it is our duty to act rather in conformity to the will of another, than without or against it, and rather without than against it, in any case in which

both are interested. A person who carries on some business or trade in partnership with another, has no right to make a purchase or a sale against his partner's will, or even without it, where it is in his power to consult him; and if this should not be in his power, he must act with a view to what his partner would probably approve, from his manner of judging and acting in other cases. Now it is evident, that with regard to all the great interests of human life, the promotion of truth, goodness, and religion, all men are partners, and, if possible, should act as partners. Wherever, therefore, the will of the community can be consulted, it is in general true that it should be. For we have seen that our duty, that is, the most perfect exercise of our powers, consists in calling forth as many of our fellow-men as possible to free and generous actions.

But this answer, true as it is in most cases, is by no means always so. Against the robber, who is aiming a pistol at me or another person; against the enemy who invades our land without declaration of war, or against our just remonstrance, it is much better to repel force by force, than to submit to it, — because it is breaking the reign of brute force among men, in order to establish that of justice and kindness. It is evident, therefore, that the general principle of duty, to act as much as possible in conformity, or with reference, to the will of others, is not sufficient to decide every case aright; but that, for this purpose, some further inquiry is necessary.

Thus far we have only considered the nature of the various means of action, and in this respect we have

found it a more perfect kind of influence, to act in conformity, rather than contrary, to the will of others, and by gentle means rather than by force. We have now to consider the nature of the cases in which, and particularly the objects for which, these means of influence may be used.

What is the highest object of man in society? The substance of his social duties consists in enabling and inducing his fellow-men to attain to the highest happiness of which they are susceptible, by the most perfect mode of action or the greatest possible efficiency. Now we have seen that we enlarge or confine our sphere of action and efficiency, in proportion to our entering into, or counteracting, that universal plan of perfection which nature has laid out in the constitution and endowments of every being. We contract our own sphere of action if we wantonly destroy animal life, or other traces of perfection in nature; if we cramp the powers of our fellow-men by injuring them in their person, health, property, the esteem, and the friendship of others; while we promote our own power and happiness by not injuring, but advancing, that of other beings. Human action and conduct are the more perfect the more they are the fruit of choice and free effort. Accordingly, all our efforts at promoting the interest of others, must have for their chief object, to induce them to do of their own accord what is most conducive to their own perfection; to enable and induce them to judge of themselves, and choose for themselves, whatever mode of life they think most satisfactory to them-

selves. But it is evident, that this duty which we owe to one human being, to enable him to live and act as he may think best, is limited by the same freedom being the right of each individual. Our duty, or that mode of action which permits the greatest exercise of power, evidently consists in securing this freedom to as many individuals as possible; — the object of our duty is, if you will allow the bold expression, the cause of perfection throughout the universe. If a person act within that sphere of freedom which belongs to him, though his conduct should be contrary to what I think most conducive to his happiness, I may endeavour to convince him of his error; but he has as good a right to think me in error as I have to think the same of him; and, at any rate, I have no right to force him to a different mode of conduct, because it is much better that he should make a wrong use of his rightful dominion, than that any other person should be allowed to interfere with it. But if he should exceed these bounds, and encroach upon that state of perfection which nature has designed for his fellow-beings, it is the duty of every one to check his criminal attempt, if possible by persuasion, but if necessary, by threatening and actual force. This duty you owe not only to the offended, but to the offender, as well as to society at large, so far as the force you use is calculated to secure to all a state of freedom from force.

From these observations it is easy to infer the supreme principle of justice, right, and law, and the extent to which we are justified in using force and

morally obliged to use it, in order to maintain the right. The definition of right itself, which has been a subject of dispute for thousands of years, is at the same time, the principle on which the science of natural law is founded, and upon which all positive laws, the whole constitution and existence of the state or the civil community, should be established.

The great question, then, is, what is right? I do not speak now of right in its widest sense, in which it is synonymous with morality, and means every thing that is conformable to duty; nor do I take it in its strictest sense, in which it denotes all those privileges which are sanctioned by the laws of the state. I speak of those rights which the law and the state are designed to secure; that standard of right in human nature by which all positive regulations and institutions are to be judged; those rights which belong to each human being as such, and which the unanimous vote of society can never give nor take away. Right, in this its most important sense, is the equal liberty of every human being to act in any way that is consistent with the state of perfection designed by nature for other beings.

The essence of right is liberty, that is, the power of man to be determined in his conduct by his own choice. It belongs to each human being, from the first moment of his existence to the last, whether he be able to exercise it or not. Even before his limbs and faculties are formed, nature declares, in every stage of the gradual developement of his being, her sovereign design and high behest to respect this frame

she is building as the property of him who is to live in it. It is this silent, but explicit declaration, of the great design of nature in the formation of man, which makes us look upon the human body, as the sacred cradle of liberty, and which serves as a warrant to all who have the power to protect the life, and the present and future possessions, of him who cannot speak and act for himself. All the restraints which are necessary in education, have no other object than that of the supporters to which you tie the tender stem of a young tree; you use restraints now, in order to render them unnecessary hereafter; you govern and make your child obey you strictly and cheerfully, that he may learn to govern and obey himself. You deprive the madman of his freedom, in order to guard it for him, as a sacred deposit to be returned to him as soon as he is able to use it. You imprison the offender, in order to fit him, by a corrective discipline, for liberty.

We consider every one who infringes the rights of any individual as an enemy to society, who is to be resisted, and, if necessary, destroyed, by the united power of all. But what if society, if a whole people, intrusted with the guardianship and defence of the rights of each individual, should conspire against their helpless wards, and should use the civil power, designed to be the right hand of justice, to wield the sword of oppression, to make society a jail, in which none are free but the jailers, — for no other reason than that our common mother, in providing clothing for her children, has dressed some in white, and others in black, and others in red. For this reason

society has said to the one, "The black skin with which nature hath clothed thee, shall be to thee, and thy children, and thy children's children, a perpetual mourning." And to the other she has said, "Thy red skin shall be to thee like the bloody shirt of Nessus, eating deeper into thy flesh as thou wouldst tear it off, and consuming thy herculean strength, until thou shalt thyself gather the fuel for thy funeral pile, and seek coolness and refreshment in the flames of sacrifice." But they who maintain that they constitute society, that they are the state, have said, "We are the children of light, we are the elect of this world! Seeing, then, that these, our unfortunate fellow-creatures, are fit for nothing so well as to cultivate the swamps, let us not take them out of their natural element; let us not throw away the goodly inheritance which our forefathers have left us, particularly as they alone are answerable for its evils. And though some fanatical priests and moral philosophers cry out against us, saying that we are 'treasuring up wrath against the day of wrath,' what do we care for them? We are not priest-ridden, we are no theorizers; at home we are the majority, and abroad, — why, some cents less on every pound of cotton will satisfy the sensible and practical people all over the world, that slave labor is useful, and slavery is right."

I shall not enter into all the reasons for and against the pretended right of slavery, on the ground of color, birth, or capture, simply because, on this subject, there is no room for argument, in a moral point of view.

Prescription, long-settled usage, may alter the boundaries of property, but it cannot abolish the difference between man and beast; it cannot prevail against the rights of human nature; for no prescription, though it be time out of mind, holds good against eternity.

I allow that slaveholders, amongst themselves, may settle, with the strictest justice, the rights of every freeman; but I confess, that when I hear the great principles of liberty and equality proclaimed by slaveholders and advocates of slavery, I know not whether to rejoice at this meritorious inconsistency, or to mourn to see liberty thus wounded in the house of her friends.

I return to my exposition of the principle and definition of right; the essence of which consists, as I have shown, in that liberty which belongs to every human being. The moral limits of this liberty I have already mentioned.

Every one is entitled to freedom from force and restraint, or any kind of interference with his will, so far as his conduct is consistent with the state of perfection which nature has designed for other beings, and particularly with the equal freedom of all men. His right extends to a rational use of animals; he can tame them for his service, he can kill them for his support. But he has no right to abuse them to gratify his wanton pleasure or selfishness.

The boundaries of the liberty of each human being with regard to his fellow-men are not so easily defined. It is sometimes said, that every one has a

natural right to demand for himself the same liberty which others enjoy, or demand for themselves. But this is a false or uncertain standard of right, founded upon a misconception of that equality, which every one justly claims as his birthright. This man is rich, that man holds a high office ; why have not I as good a right as they to be rich and in office ? With the same justice and propriety I might say, this man is virtuous, that man is intelligent ; why have I not as good a right to be wise and good ? It is evident, that the actual possession of an individual is not the true standard of equality, or the legitimate measure of right. Every one is entitled by nature to such a mode of existence and action as is conducive to his happiness ; to a sphere of freedom, in which he can fully unfold and exercise all his faculties ; and, for this purpose, he demands that the means of happiness should be equally within the reach of every individual. This principle comprehends, I believe, the whole ground and extent of the natural rights of man, of which I now intend to give a general view.

This doctrine of the rights of man, of legislation, jurisdiction, and all the branches of civil government, has been much obscured, partly by legislative acts, made to meet the pressure of the moment, without a guiding and organizing principle, and partly by the barbarous terminology, the perverse subtilties of law writers, and, above all, by legal fictions, which still hover, like spectres, among the grave realities of the law, perverting the nature of things, and constituting a part of the system, which deserves to be called

the demonology of jurisprudence. In the following sketch, I wish to exhibit some of the essential features of the true system of law and government; having no higher object in view than to draw from nature, without aiming at any technical finish or professional modes of expression.

In the first place, then, we can speak of right and wrong, in the strict sense of these words, wherever it is possible that the mode of existence and action of a person, or the liberty to which he lays claim, may be disputed and infringed by another. Now it is a fact, that every thing which can be held in possession, or be performed by any man, can also be interfered with by another. The sole dominion, which belongs to the inhabitant of a desolate island, could not, indeed, be considered as a matter involving right and wrong, were it not for the possibility, that another person should arrive, and, in virtue of his being a man, demand as much of it as would be necessary to his existence. Even our most secret thoughts are, or may thus become, a matter of right. For if a person should avail himself of the weak state of another's mind, for example, in his dying hour, to torment him with horrible imaginings, or to persuade him to wrong his nearest relatives, in his last will, for the benefit of the church, — he would offend against the personal rights of another. Accordingly, the sphere of right, and of the law that is to enforce it, extends, in fact, to every object of possession or action. Now we know, that the influence of each individual extends, or may extend, over his own person, over the things, or ex-

ternal objects, by which he is surrounded, and over other persons.

Accordingly, every human being possesses three essential sets of rights; personal rights, a right to the use of things, or property in the widest sense of the term, and social rights. The extent of each of these rights of man is to be determined by the general principle of right, according to which every one is entitled to act in any way that is not inconsistent with the state of perfection, designed by nature for other beings.

In the first place, then, his personal rights, which comprehend his life and his health, constitute him the master of the faculties of his body and his mind, to move, act, speak, and think as he pleases, provided he refrain from encroaching upon the rightful claims of others.

In the second place, he is entitled to the most extensive use of things, or external objects, that is consistent with the rights of his fellow-beings. There are some things, which can be enjoyed only as the undivided property of all men; such as the air, the light, and the ocean; others may, according to their nature, become the exclusive property of individuals, such as the habitable land, plants, and animals. On the important question, whether it be better that these things, too, should be possessed in common, or be made the exclusive possession of individuals, I shall make some remarks in my next lecture.

Besides these two natural rights, which assign to man the mastery over his own person, and the free

use of external things, he is entitled, in the third place, on the ground of his social rights, to enter, with his fellow-men, into the most various relations, private, domestic, political, commercial, literary, and religious. But the extent of his social rights depends, essentially, on what I before said with regard to the means by which individuals are able to act upon one another. All men have a natural right to enter into all kinds of voluntary relations which are not prejudicial to the rights of others. But men have a right to use force against others, only where force is necessary to establish and secure the actual rights of man, in defence of his person, his property, and his social privileges. Now there are several means, by which men can be prevented from violating the rights of others, and the use of these means constitutes one of the essential social rights of man.

In the first place, in order to prepare men for doing right, you must educate them ; and you have a right to use all the means within your reach for the education of the young, though it were on no other ground, than that they should not grow up enemies of society.

In the second place, you have a right to declare, by law, what you think to be right, and what means of correction and compulsion shall be used to enforce the law. The mere expression of the principle of right is sufficient to induce the righteous to compliance ; the threats of punishment to correct the offender, and of force to compel the violent, are neces-

sary for those who would not obey of their own accord.

Thirdly, you have a right to exercise a constant vigilance over the conduct of others, and, without interfering with their actual rights, to remove dangers and temptations to crime, and to bring to light the secret transgression and the transgressor.

Fourthly, you have a right, in any given case, to exercise judgment according to law; to settle the contested right, and remove error by civil jurisdiction; to pronounce the penal sentence in defence of right against crime; and to declare war against forcible invasion.

Fifthly, you have a right to execute your law and your sentence. For all these various purposes of education, legislation, police, jurisdiction, and execution, you have a right to demand of every one, according to his ability, services and contributions.

All these various rights belong, by nature, to each human being. But in order to exercise them more perfectly, in order to make the law a concentration of all the intellectual light, and of all the physical strength, that can be derived from the greatest number of individuals, men form themselves into a society for maintaining the rights of all by common legislation and administration. This is the origin, the essence, and the object of the state, in the pure and perfect form of a commonwealth.

Some important points in the civil condition of man, together with some of his social duties, will form the subject of my next lecture.

# LECTURE XIV.

FROM the observations I have made in my last lecture, with regard to the social relations of men, it is apparent that there are some actions which no man can be forced to do, while there are others, which admit of force being used to induce men to their performance. Modesty, charity, and other virtuous actions or dispositions cannot exist, unless they are the free offspring of the soul. But all external actions may in some degree be produced by force. You may force a man to pay his just debt, though you cannot force him to be just from a love of justice. Force may be employed either directly, as in repelling a robber who attacks your person, or indirectly, by threatening punishment to the offender. A moral title for the use of force against another person, exists only in those cases in which force is necessary to defend the rights of man, his personal independence, his property, and his social privileges. Every right, strictly speaking, implies an authority to use force, if other means be not sufficient to induce men to respect it. Moralists have called those obligations imperfect which do not admit of force; while those

which men can be induced to perform, not only by persuasion, but also by threats or compulsion, have on this account been called perfect obligations. The distinction is true, though the terms, perfect and imperfect, are ill chosen. For we have seen that in general the use of gentle means, the influence upon the understanding and the heart of another, treating him as a rational and moral being, is a more perfect mode of action than the use of force, which, even in those obligations which can be enforced, should be resorted to, only when all other means prove insufficient.

The distinction itself, however, is true, and of great importance. In the history of human errors, there is not one which has been productive of so much mischief, as the disregard of this simple truth, that the use of force is allowable only in defence of actual rights. There is no error that has proved so injurious, particularly to Christianity, as the belief, that the more the object of human endeavours is pure and holy, so much the more are men justified in using force in order to realize it. "Our doctrine," it has been argued, "is true and simple; a criminal perversion of mind and heart alone can prevent you from adopting it; and it is right to use force against criminals. Our cause is the cause of God, how much the more then are we justified in defending it with the sword, which we think right even in defence of earthly interests. Nay, it is meritorious, it is the greatest charity to deter men from damnable heresy,

even by the dungeon, the sword, and the faggot, in order to save their immortal souls."

This doctrine, which for more than a thousand years has been the standing and ruling maxim of the Christian world, is older than Christianity ; — it is the same doctrine that nailed Jesus to the cross. It is this doctrine which, by its powerful enchantment of ambition and fanaticism, has succeeded in converting the enlivening rays of the sun of truth, into destructive lightnings. Of all the principles of society, this is unquestionably the most essential and indispensable, that force should never be used, whether directly by compulsion, or indirectly by threats, — except where it is necessary to establish and secure the rights of men. Thus a war for the purpose of introducing or supporting a certain religion, though it be the only true faith, instead of being a just and a holy war, is, in truth, nothing more than an enterprise of robbery and murder on a large scale. The conscientious motive from which it is undertaken, though it exculpate the doer, can never justify the deed. But, on the other hand, a war in defence of the rights of conscience, for the free exercise of a religion which allows to every one his own, is a holy war, because it is a just one; whether the doctrine be true or false, and whether the object of contention be an article of faith, or merely a religious ceremony, as in the war of the Hussites for partaking of the cup in the Lord's Supper.

The only obligations, then, which admit of force being used as the last resort, are those which arise

from the rights of man, of which I have given a summary account in my last lecture. I have shown that there are three essential rights belonging by nature to every human being; first, the personal rights which constitute him the absolute master of his own faculties of body and mind; then the rights of property, or the use of things; and the social rights which entitle him to enter with his fellow-men into all kinds of relations, and to use all the means which are necessary for asserting and securing the rights of all, partly by his own individual efforts, and more particularly by forming or supporting a society for maintaining justice among men, by a common legislation and administration. This society we call the civil community, or the state, whose principal powers or functions I have enumerated.

Let us first endeavour to obtain a definite idea of the main object of the state, and of the coöperation of some of its various powers or functions. I fear that to not a few persons, who are otherwise distinguished for their love of knowledge and refinement, I could hardly mention a subject less palatable than the study of the civil condition of man, doubly hidden as it is under the artificial darkness of the law, and the dazzling blaze of politics. A knowledge of the human body, with all the discouraging apparatus of anatomy, seems far more interesting than an insight into the body politic; though it is this living organism in which we all, as its members, live, and move, and have our being. As a matter of curiosity and wonder, this partiality for the study of the finished

works of nature, is well founded ; but on the higher ground of duty, in reference to the greatest possible efficiency of the human mind, the study of the social, and particularly of the civil state of man, with all its imperfections, is far more important and truly interesting. This study begins where that of the natural historian ends, with an inquiry into human nature. For this is the only true ground of the civil condition, which, instead of being an artificial contrivance, is the only natural state of man.

Still more, the study of the true politician, that is, of an inquirer into the civil state of man as one of the most important departments of morality, is not confined to the mere observation and classification of facts. What he aims at is a creative knowledge of man ; or a system of practical information and philosophy, which, when his thoughts are converted into realities, may be recognised as the genuine product of human nature, supplying the wants, securing the interests, and aiding the progressive efforts of man. I can throw out here only a few hints, to direct attention to the true object of the state, and of each of its essential departments ; but even a superficial knowledge of the clockwork that marks the hours of the political day, seems to me more desirable than a certain foreknowledge of the individuals who are to wind it up during the coming season, or to regulate it by the dial of the party that shall rule the day.

The main object of the state is the establishment of justice ; and the principal means to effect this purpose consist in a common legislation, by which

the community declare what they consider the right rules of civil conduct, and a common administration, by which the decrees of the legislature are carried into effect. Hence we define the state as the society formed by men, for the establishment of right by a common legislation and administration.

The establishment of justice comprehends, as I have before observed, the education of the young, as an essential branch of government; it takes in, also, the care of the community for the support of those who have not the power or the opportunity to gain a living by useful labor, either by colonial settlements or other public institutions. But besides these and other public functions, which are indispensable to the establishment of justice, and, therefore, essential branches of government; there are others which in many states, are made parts of the public administration; such as the care of religion, of the arts and sciences, commerce and manufactures, and all kinds of public improvement.

Now it is undoubtedly the duty of the state, to give to every kind of human enterprise that does not interfere with the equal liberty of others, that support which secures it against encroachment. It is the duty of government to protect one religious party against the encroachments of another, and to insure a house of worship, as it would every other dwelling, against crime. But the state itself should not actually engage in either of these pursuits; it should not be either a religionist, or a merchant, or a manufacturer, — for this simple reason, that the exercise of

justice which the government is appointed to maintain, allows and requires the use of force; and it is highly desirable, that those who have to command what is to be carried into effect by compulsion or punishment, should not be allowed to command any thing except a practical regard for the rights of each individual; nor to prohibit any thing but crime. How much mischief has been done to the cause of justice and religion, by the combination of church and state, and the establishment of a state religion, or even by taxing the inhabitants, for the support of public worship, need not be mentioned. It is true, the functions intrusted to a magistrate, besides those of justice, may be such as to be productive of little or no evil; as when the chief magistrate orders a "Te Deum" to be sung, or a day of public thanksgiving or fast to be celebrated. But even these functions, which do not properly belong to government, though usually harmless, may become mischievous, as was the case on the continent of Europe, when public thanksgivings for the victories of Napoleon were ordered, and the religion of the Redeemer was profaned to celebrate the success of the enslaver of men. But whenever and as long as such and similar powers are intrusted to government as the organ of public opinion, it is important that in the exercise of these functions they should not be considered as officers of the state, commanding only what they have a right to enforce. It is an erroneous supposition that man, on becoming a member of a civil community, gives up all or any of his natural rights. In the first place, if

it were possible for man to resign his natural rights, there is no person to whom he could give them up. I know it is said, that the state itself, or the government, is a person distinct from the individuals who are its subjects. But where is this being, called the state? The eye of sense and of reason discovers only a number of individuals, each of them consisting of body and mind, having a will of his own, which makes him a person, and possessing powers which call for a sphere of action which, when within the natural bounds of equality, we call his right. Where, then, are those persons to be found, who go by the names of the body politic, the state, the government, the legislature, the executive, and the whole family of corporations, or public functions personified; — where, except in the imagination of some priests of the law, which has peopled the civil world with a host of fabulous characters, which, so far as they are believed in, actually rule the civil life of man.

It is certainly convenient to be able to speak of the state or the legislature, without the trouble of mentioning every time the elements of which they are composed, or the process of composition. But we, inhabitants of the western world, Europeans and Americans, with whom any figure of speech is apt to become an abstract conception and a dogma, — we, in whose minds the flowers of the imagination find no soil rich and warm enough to keep them alive, but soon become dry specimens of science, preserved in the rarefied atmosphere of the understanding, — we should never for-

get, that names and titles are not realities; we should never forget that church and state, corporations and colleges, are not real personages, having, each of them, an individual will, reason, and conscience, distinct from the men who compose them, and who, not unfrequently, throw the whole responsibility of their actions upon that personified nothing of which they act as the visible representatives, leaving to those whose rights they violate, the liberty to hunt the scape-goat in the wilderness. If it be said, then, that men, as members of a civil community, resign their natural rights to the state, it is saying no more than, that they resign them to themselves. On the contrary, men form themselves into a civil community for no other purpose than to exercise their natural rights more fully and securely in common than each of them could by himself.

The immediate objects for which the state is formed by men are evidently these, to unite their intellectual powers in order to ascertain that which is right, and their physical strength to carry it into effect. It is evident to all, that the reasoning of every man is fallible; that there is no external standard of truth and right which all must acknowledge; that there is no certainty that the opinion of one man should always, or in any particular case, be better than that of his neighbour; and that, at any rate, every one, generally, has as good a right as another to think his opinion the only true one. Whenever, therefore, the opinions of men disagree as to what is right, and what are the most effectual means to carry

it into effect, they must come to this self-evident conclusion, that many eyes generally see better, and many arms hold faster, than two. Who shall be the ruler? Some say, those who descend from certain families; others say, the wealthiest; others, the wisest and the best. But sense and goodness are neither bought nor inherited; and as to the wisest and the best, the question remains undecided who they are. Is every one who thinks himself, or is thought by another to be so, of this favored class? The wisest and best, those who are wisest and best in every particular, are a class of beings of which, without paradox, it may be said, that it does not exist among men.

The only common measure of right which remains, the majority of opinions, is certainly a fallible standard; and if the saying, that the voice of the people is the voice of God, mean any thing more than that it is the highest standard to which all can refer, it is false. Nevertheless, the majority have a natural right to establish and enforce their view as a law over all, chiefly for these two reasons. In the first place, wherever there is no general standard of truth, that of probability must decide, and, according to this principle, that opinion of right, which satisfies most minds, must be presumed to be the most correct view that can be obtained at the time. In the second place, in order to make a minority rule over the majority, you must violate the equality of rights, by giving to certain individuals, singled out in some way or other, greater freedom than to the rest; whereas every one

may, at any time, be in the majority, without any settled distinction.

Besides these two reasons of natural law on which the right of the majority rests, there are others; and among them, particularly this, that in some respects, all the evils which may arise from the rule of the majority may be converted into greater good. First, a conviction of the contagious influence which ignorance and vice may exercise among men, is the most powerful incentive to those who think themselves wiser and better, to deserve, at least, their own opinion of themselves, by exerting all their power of talent and character for the improvement of the people. It has been the ruin of many a republic, and may prove fatal to ours, that those individuals who are in some respects distinguished above the rest, instead of striving after the highest influence by entering into the actual state of the interests and feelings of the people, by interesting themselves in public education, and resting upon it their lever of moral and intellectual strength, thereby to raise them above themselves, prefer to stand aloof from the rest, as if the touch of a hard-working hand must make the man of a higher caste impure, looking on with a supercilious indifference, when others, with the shrewd zeal of the unjust steward, bribe the people by flattery, so that they may thrive in their corruption; tempt them to do wrong by persuading them, that all they may do must be right, and, at last, reap the reward of their servility, by making themselves the indispensable servants, that

is, the absolute masters, of their deluded sovereign. A commonwealth, a republic, is the only state that is worthy of man, — not because it makes him better and happier, but because it is the most responsible condition of man in society, and, consequently, most truly a moral state, in which every action, good or bad, must be ascribed to the whole people.

The only true object of legislation is to determine and declare what is right, and by what means it shall be carried into effect; to establish the primitive rights of man; to be the most perfect expression of the law of nature or reason. In this conformity to natural justice consists the binding power of every established law. With this view I will make a few additional remarks on each of the natural rights of man.

First, personal rights. Nothing but crime can deprive any one of his personal rights. The law which establishes slavery, or imprisonment for debt, the contract by which a man sells himself or another into slavery, is absolutely void. The use of his personal liberty consists in free will within the sphere of his right; and no one can by any disposition, any act of his will, destroy or abolish the will itself. The ancient Roman law expressly acknowledged that slavery was contrary to natural justice, an arbitrary institution of society, while by nature, as one of the ancient jurists says, all men are free and equal. The Roman, or civil, law goes so far in its acknowledgment of the inalienable nature of personal rights, that

every compact by which one person promises another to perform an action for him, be it to go a journey for him, or give him his services in any manner, — every compact of this kind is considered as having for its object, not the performance of the promised action, to which no one shall or can be forced, but merely to provide a compensation for that loss which the creditor in this compact may suffer from the disappointment of his just expectation.

The second natural right of man consists in the use of things, or property in the widest sense of the word. Some things, as I have already observed, can be possessed and enjoyed only in common ; such as the air, the light, and the ocean. With regard to those things which, according to their nature, can be the objects of the exclusive possession of individuals, it is a question of the greatest importance and difficulty, in what manner they shall be distributed or disposed of among men, so as to allow to every one, in an equal proportion, the greatest possible freedom in the use of those things. The common opinion, which is established by all the laws of men of which we have knowledge, ascribes, under certain restrictions, to every one the natural right to retain as his own any thing that he has occupied before any other person, with the express view of keeping it as his own ; particularly if he has made it the object of his care, and invested in it the capital of his industry. The same laws ascribe to every one a full right to dispose of that which is his own, to use it, alter it, or destroy it, or to convey

his property to another, either by contract, or by his own individual will. This may be exercised with the assent of all, declared in a law previously made, as in the case of a last will; or carried into effect by the law itself, as in the case of intestate death; for in this case the law which regulates the order of succession, must be considered as the last will of all those who live under it, unless any one make for himself another disposition. A very different theory, however, has been maintained by Plato in his "Republic," by the Abbé Mably, by the party of the "Mountain," in the French revolution, at the close of the last century, and is now maintained by Mr. Owen and his associates; namely, that all persons have a right to possess and enjoy all things in common, and that exclusive individual property is an encroachment on the rights of man.

The intrinsic difficulties of this important question, have been much increased by want of discrimination on both sides, by selfish views, and still more by the imputation of selfish motives. A full discussion of the subject would far exceed the bounds of this lecture; but a few remarks may direct the attention to the most important points to be considered. A careful investigation of the nature of the cases in question, leads to the conclusion, that there exists a natural gradation in the relative importance of different kinds of property, or the use of things.

To the shipwrecked sailor, a plank in the ocean, or the overhanging branch of a tree, is of greater im-

portance than to the owner; to him who is dying with hunger, and without the means of satisfying it in any other way, the dishes on another man's table are of greater importance than to the entertainer or his invited guests; and, during a time of famine, the grain in store-houses, so far as it exceeds the wants of its owners, is of less importance to them, than to those who are perishing from the want of it. Accordingly, in many states an established principle of law at the time of a siege or a famine, is to oblige the owners of grain to part with their store, at a certain price within the reach of all, with the security for future full compensation; and in the same manner he who takes food that belongs to another, merely to satisfy his hunger, when he is not able to procure it in any other way, is not considered as having committed a theft. And with regard to the first-mentioned case, though it is maintained by one of the defenders of an unlimited right of property, that the owner of the tree has a right to cut off the branch which the shipwrecked man has taken hold of, I doubt whether the plea of this absolute right over his tree would save him from the charge of wilful murder. In a war of self-defence, also, those things which are necessary for the support of the army can be raised if necessary, by forced contribution, but under the obligation of future and full compensation.

Accordingly, it seems to be a principle of natural justice, that every individual has an absolute right to the use of any thing that is necessary to save his

life, which is the substance of his personal rights. It is indifferent whether this right be exercised by an individual, or by a whole nation in a war of self-defence. But this right to the use of things, which follows with necessity from the personal rights of man, extends only to the actual state of danger, and leaves all other cases undetermined.

In the second place, every one has a right to such a use of things as is necessary to enable him to avert future as well as present danger. For this purpose, several measures are necessary or useful on the part of the community. Among the most important of them are these. The government has to take care that every child should receive such an education as will fit him to render himself independent by useful labor. Another measure consists in furnishing those who are setting out in life with the means of commencing their trade or profession. To this class of means belong also, institutions for the support of those who are unable to gain their living by useful labor, on account of sickness, old age, or want of employment.

Another aid consists in allowing every debtor who has become insolvent without guilt, to retain so much of what he possesses as may be necessary to support him and those who depend, and have a right to depend, on his support.

In the third place, the community are obliged to do all that is in their power to give to those who are in want, opportunity to support themselves by useful

labor. For this purpose, in ancient times, colonies were sent out by Tyre, Carthage, Greece, and Rome, to secure at once the actual state of property in the mother country, and the lives and prospects of the indigent citizens. At the same time, many hands and minds were usefully employed in the construction of public edifices, in which the ancient world built up and sustained its own greatness, rising high above modern times, in which the meanness of public buildings is sadly set off by private magnificence. Useful labor is all that can be required of any one, in order to entitle him to a competency, secured against the vicissitudes of blind chance.

These, then, I believe are the preëminent natural rights of each individual to the use of things. First, the use of every thing that may be necessary to save himself from actual danger; second, a security against cases of distress, arising from inability to provide for himself; third, opportunity for useful labor.

But these demands of each individual being secured by the law, I think it far more conducive to the most perfect use of all things by all men, that every one should be left to work and provide for himself, and to possess and enjoy every thing he acquires, according to his own taste and mind, — than that all things should be held in common. For this requires, either a state of things, in which those who are disposed to be lazy may eat the bread earned by the industrious; or that distributors of labor and of the

profits of labor, should be appointed by the community, with the power to control the peculiar desires and free choice of individuals. It is evident that such a state cuts off the very nerve of enjoyment; whereas, a condition of society, which secures to every one that which he acquires by occupation or contract, contains the two main requisites for the perfect use and enjoyment of things; first, facility of acquiring things, and second, the possibility of calculating upon their free and constant use. It is evident, then, that the present state of society with regard to the use of things, being founded upon individual property, though faulty in some particulars, is right in the main, and far better calculated for free and universal enjoyment, than a community of all things, which destroys or cramps all individual power, taste, and choice. Where the support of individuals is secured by law, their dependence on the free will of others, and on chance, for a part of their success, developes all the faculties of man for new contrivances and means to evade or improve unforeseen events. It is therefore necessary that the most ample freedom in the use and conveyance of property should be secured. Only violence and fraud should be prevented. In the making of contracts, whether they be donations or those which imply a mutual obligation, as that of buyer and seller, the agreement of the parties must decide the object of conveyance; — and it is not required by natural justice that the advantages which the two parties derive, should be equally great.

A contrary supposition has led some to the extravagant opinion, that the buyer and seller are bound to disclose to one another, on making a contract, all the advantages which each expects to derive from his bargain. The Roman, or Civil Law, contains no such requisite, as has been supposed by some modern writers, but merely makes the seller responsible for defects in the article sold for good, and for any false expectations raised by him. The simple fact, that the Romans were in latter times, not only a warlike, but also a commercial people, would be sufficient to discredit the supposition, that every one was obliged by law, on making a contract, to disclose to the other party all that induced him to it; but it would be easy to show, if this were the place for it, that the passages which are supposed to contain such an injunction, have been misunderstood. Each of the parties has a right not to sell or buy unless the other discloses all the advantages he expects to derive from the agreement; and if this disclosure be promised and not fulfilled, the contract is void. But if the article be sold or bought without such a previous demand, the contract is valid, whatever unexpected advantages may arise from it to either party.

I have examined some of the principles of natural law, with regard to personal rights and the right to the use of things, or property. I shall add some remarks on the third essential right of man, his social, and particularly his political privileges.

Among these I have mentioned first, as the foun-

dation of the security of all rights, and in itself the greatest social privilege, the education of the young. Parents are guilty of a violation of the personal rights of their children, if they do not support and educate them with a view to make them independent of themselves as well as of others. But besides the parents, every one is entitled to intercede for the rights of every child, for the elements of all individual and social privileges which already exist in his nature. Every one has a right to insist that, so far as the means which are at the disposition of society can effect the purpose, children should enjoy the complete exercise of their rights in the only way in which it is possible they can do so, — by as perfect an education as the actual state of society can afford. This is the great task and holy trust which the creator of man has assigned to each generation of men, as his fellow-laborers in the work of perfection. Every generation, bearing the marks of the education it has received, rises in judgment for or against its predecessors ; who are themselves the monuments of the age that saw them rise into being. Much has been done for the education of the young ; much, if it be compared with the achievements of the past ; little, if it be held up against the eternal standard of education. Free schools have been established for the children of the poor, to fit them for useful labor. But moral philosophy looks forward to a time when all the children intrusted to the care of a community, shall be educated without any reference to the means and circumstances of their parents, or friends, with the sole

view to the nature with which God has endowed them ; — when nothing but nature, and education acting as the interpreter and plenipotentiary of nature, shall assign to each one a place in society, which by his own character alone can be retained or lost.

It is the object of education to unfold, strengthen, and refine all the faculties of the child; those which he has in common with others, and those which distinguish him as an individual. There is hardly any human being, in whom there is not some peculiar element of perfection in which he may excel. It is the duty of the parent and the teacher, while they endeavour to call every faculty into life and action, to ascertain those buds which are to bear blossoms and fruits, and to cultivate them with peculiar care. And it is the duty of society, to open to every one a sphere of action in which his general and special endowments may contribute their share to the perfection of society, which is made up of the individual excellence of its members.

Domestic and public education are the two great elements which must coöperate in the formation of man. Without domestic education, man becomes a creature of the state, as in Sparta ; whereas, in truth, the state was made for man, and not man for the state. Without public education, man hardly ever rises beyond the finite circle of knowledge and virtue, or the settled prejudices and selfish designs, of his own family. He indeed loses his highest domestic privilege, — which is, to think, and feel, and act, as one of the great family of man.

If a child be deprived of the inestimable good of a domestic education, by the death or the crime of his parents, it is the duty of government to provide a fit guardian, not only such a one as will be most likely to take care of the pecuniary interests of the orphan child, but one in whose family he may receive early those pure, direct, and uniform impressions and habits, which prevent the character of the individual from losing, amidst the dazzling appearances and changing fashions of the world, its own original and only becoming shape.

The same reasons which make it desirable that the foundations of a child's character, in sentiment and manners, should be laid at the domestic fireside, before he is placed under the more various impressions of a school, the same reason calls for a different plan, on which the institutions designed for different information, should be constructed. Instead of abstract reasoning on this practical subject, allow me to call your attention to one remarkable feature in the institutions designed for instruction in Germany, which I have not seen noticed by those who have written on this subject. There exists an essential difference between those institutions which are intended to finish the education of a man, and to fit him directly for the profession he has chosen, and those which are preparatory to them. Those who choose a trade, or mechanical profession, after they have served their apprenticeship with one master, travel about for several years, from city to city, working under different masters, with a view to learn the most va-

rious and approved modes of workmanship. Those who wish to devote themselves to any of the learned professions, or to gain a liberal education for its own sake, leave the preparatory school for the University. Care is taken, that among the teachers of the preparatory school, there should be no essential difference in their practical views of education, which might distract the minds of their pupils; they being yet incompetent to judge and choose for themselves. This maturity they are supposed to have acquired on entering the University, which is, on this account, constructed upon an entirely different plan. For, as he who has served his apprenticeship travels about to learn from different masters, so the student going to the University, has for his object to hear the different teachers who are most distinguished in the department he has chosen. For this purpose, in all the great universities of Germany, it has been hitherto the plan to appoint, in each department, the most able and celebrated teachers; and if there exist in the same department, different systems or schools, as in philosophy, medicine, law, and theology, those who are charged with the appointment of the professors, make it a rule to choose the ablest advocates of opposing systems, that the student may prove all doctrines, and hold fast what he thinks good. Thus, in theology, it is thought important to appoint an orthodox teacher, a rationalist, and a mystic, as members of the same board. The same view prevails in constituting the medical and philosophical faculties, with reference to a standing predilection of some for theo-

retical, and of others for experimental science; so that you find a phrenologist, and an advocate of animal magnetism, lecturing at the same place with the strongest opposers of these doctrines. The same system also prevails with regard to jurisprudence, so far as the want of political freedom allows this regard for difference in opinions. So far as one university does not provide all the means of becoming acquainted with different doctrines, the deficiency is made up by the custom with students, after having heard, in one university, those teachers who are particularly distinguished in their department, to go to reside in another, or several others, in order to pursue and complete their course.

Thus the stream of intellectual culture, springing from the pure fountain of domestic love, should collect the running waters far and near, from all quarters, until it is strong and deep enough to bear all the burdens, and floating treasures, and far-reaching designs of life.

I have given here some of the great outlines of a system of education as it exists in Germany, coupled with many defects which can be avoided only in a country like ours, in which religion and politics are bounded by no other limits than the equal liberty of all. How far these principles, which I would recommend, not on their historical, but on their truly philosophical ground, can be established and naturalized in this country, I do not feel competent to decide. But there are many here present, to whose judgment I gladly commit the system of liberal education which

I advocate, the system of German universities, free from its native defects, perfected by the genius of American freedom. May the time soon come when our present colleges shall be preparatory schools to the national University, calling together from all quarters, as to an intellectual Congress, the ablest representatives of every department of science and literature.

# LECTURE XV.

I HAVE treated, in my last lecture, of the civil obligations, or those social duties, the performance of which may be compelled by force, if the influence of reason and conscience prove insufficient to settle the boundaries of right between man and man. It now remains to speak of those social duties, which cannot be enforced, and which cannot come into existence, unless they proceed from the spontaneous effort, the good will, of the agent; which can be called forth only by kind and persuasive influences upon the mind and heart. How can you make others, and how can you be yourself, generous, charitable, just, and pious, from compulsion, or fear? What justice demands of you, you can be forced to perform; but even justice itself, as I have already observed, can no more be the result of constraint, than any other kind affection or virtuous disposition. The civil power can only break the hard ground that is to be the flower-bed of heavenly graces.

The kind affections, with which the Giver of every good and perfect gift has enriched the human heart, form so numerous a family, so united amongst

themselves, and yet each characterized by such peculiar attractions, that it seems difficult to select one of this blessed sisterhood, either for your own most intimate companion in life, or to be the muse of your dearest song, or to be the head of your concluding chapter on moral philosophy. But if, of the various ways in which men can benefit one another, you have to make choice of one, that shall fill all the vacancies in a course of moral action or speculation, you must ascend to the fountain-head of truth, goodness, and beauty, that flows from the garden of God to gladden and to bless every path of life. The elements of religion I have already endeavoured to point out, in considering it as growing out of the private relation between the individual and the Supreme Object of worship. I have now to consider it as a social duty, upon the general principle, that if it be my duty to establish an intimate relation between myself and the highest Mind, it is my duty, also, to influence others, or to be influenced by them, in any way that may be likely to make religion felt, understood, and acted upon, by all men.

I have shown, that religion is founded on the feeling of dependence for all we are, and all we possess, on a power which is not our own. A very short and imperfect experience is sufficient to impress every one with the fact, that his existence, the exercise of his powers, and every enjoyment of which he is susceptible, continually depend on a providential constitution and direction of the universe, suited to, and securing the destiny of man. Now if religion, as a principle of action by itself, consist in the direction

of the mind to that providential arrangement of all things, it is evident, that the social duties, growing out of it, consist in kindly receiving from other men, or imparting to them, whatever can satisfy the intense desire of the mind to stretch beyond the bounded horizon of the past and the present, into the endless realms of futurity.

In a state of ignorance, when every uncommon event, an earthquake, or an eclipse, seems to him a foreboding wonder, man inquires, with the utmost anxiety, after the cause and object of it; he listens to the sounds of the invisible power of the wind, and the swellings of the waters, to discover whether they do not convey to him some knowledge of the future; he endeavours to read his fate in the stars, in the flight of birds, the feeding or the entrails of animals; he attends, with intense curiosity and child-like credulity, to the explanations of those, among his fellow-men, who are distinguished for their age, their experience, their wisdom, or success. They become his priests, his oracles, his rulers. Hence, the very early existence of hierarchical states recorded in history. From the same intense desire after light on the unknown future of our being, it may be explained, how men, even in a state of freedom and civilization, are sometimes satisfied with the grossest doctrines or laws, imposed upon them by those they venerate, who are frequently the honest and self-deceived deceivers of those who are more credulous, though no more ignorant, than they are themselves. But whilst the religious desire, as the mightiest motive to belief and action, may be used as an instrument of the most

degrading tyranny over the minds of men, it may form, also, and was certainly intended to form, the foundation of the most beneficent mutual influence. As I speak to Christians, I need not say any thing more in illustration of this truth;—they know how frequently a word from the lips of pious eloquence has calmed and gladdened the troubled waters of the soul; and how sometimes a single deed of faith and love, performed in secret, where the left hand knew not what the right hand was doing, has sunk deeper into the heart of the unobserved beholder, than the most powerful appeals, and the most endearing accents, that the tongue of man or angel could utter. Indeed the smallest service, though rendered without any express or conscious reference to the Supreme Being, yea, a cup of cold water, pledged in the spirit of kindness, is a revelation of his love. The ways, in which men may benefit each other, as religious beings, by word and example, are numberless and endless. The human heart, though it was made free to choose, free to poison the very issues of life, and to betray the Son of God by a kiss, was surely designed by him to be an apostle of his love, to teach and bless all nations.

With regard to the manner in which men can be influenced by one another in a religious point of view, we know that religion is an object that concerns all men, and engages the soul with all its faculties. But in the social exercise of religion, sometimes the understanding, and sometimes the heart, is chiefly addressed; and a greater or less number of persons

may be engaged in it. The number of persons, and the particular faculties of the soul, which you wish to engage in the exercise, must, in a great measure, determine the mode of religious intercourse and worship. Much, also, depends on the peculiar disposition, taste, degree of information, and state of mind, of individuals ; and much on the occasion. In the following remarks on the various modes of religious intercourse and worship, I can attend only to those points which seem most important in most cases, and for men in general.

In the first place, if a person be himself religious, and therefore desirous to exercise a religious influence over other men, be they many or few in number, he has to consider both the object he wishes to effect, and the condition of those whom he addresses.

These, then, are the topics we have now to consider ; first, the chief object of religious intercourse, and then the actual condition of men, which must determine the mode in which they are to be addressed and acted upon, in order to carry that object into effect. The first object to be attained is to excite the interest of men in religion. You, indeed, cannot create in others, or in yourself, a religious impulse and desire ; but you may be certain, that every one can, in some way or other, be interested in religion, who can be interested in any thing. To be interested, means to be affected or excited to pleasure or pain by something that concerns our happiness. Our happiness depends, partly on the exercise of our faculties, and partly on the condition in which we

are placed. The first of these two facts, on which our happiness depends, is the foundation of morality, which consists in the most perfect exercise of our faculties ; the second is the basis of religion. For all religion turns upon this great question ; — is the world so constituted and governed, as to secure to man a condition, in which, by the use of his powers, he can attain to happiness ? Is the destiny of man a necessary part of the system of the universe, so that his capacities and desires for perpetual progress shall find always an appropriate sphere for existence and action ? If it be true, then, that to be interested means nothing more or less than to be pleasantly or painfully affected by any thing that concerns our happiness, and if it be the object of religion to ascertain whether the world be so regulated, that we shall always find ourselves in such a condition as is necessary for happiness, it is evident, that every one can be interested in religion, — that man is born with a religious capacity or sensibility. The first great object of religious intercourse, then, is to touch the religious sensibility, to excite a strong interest in the subject, by showing, that the natural desire of man after perpetual happiness depends on the reality of religion. Unless you touch the religious sensibility of a man, and excite his interest in the subject, all your preaching will be to him a mere sound, all your wisdom, folly, all your zeal, fanaticism. But as soon as you have made him truly interested in religion, it becomes his own concern, in which all his faculties, with all his fears and his hopes, are deeply and permanently en-

gaged. To awake in the heart of another a true interest in religion, is sometimes a task like that of obtaining a well of water from a hard rock, which divine power alone can call forth at a single stroke, while from human strength it requires long and faithful toil. You have to dig long and deep, until you strike the hidden well of living water in the hardened heart; but, once opened, it bursts forth and flows on of its own accord, drawing constant supplies from the everlasting fountains of Heaven.

An interest in religion is the highest form or manifestation of love, or the vital interest of man in perfection. He feels his wants, his imperfections, to be the bitter source of pain, which can be changed into joy only by the certainty or hope, that there is a Being that can wipe away all tears, a Power that watches over these imperfect beginnings of our being, and has secured to them, wherever we may be in this vast universe, a sphere of usefulness and an eternal home. Hence it is, that to the mind in which an interest in religion is once enkindled, every indication of design, every trace of perfection in the works of nature, is a token and a pledge, that He, who has planted in his nature the capacity and desire for endless progress, will not suffer it to perish, but preserve the seed of perfection, which, in this land of probation, can send forth but scanty shoots, and transplant it to more blessed regions. It is the love of perfection, or harmonious variety, which makes us seek satisfaction, both in moral action, and in a condition suited to our moral nature, such as religion promises to all men, as

a part of that system of perfection that lies at the foundation of the universe. Hence religion operates as the most powerful incentive to the exercise of every faculty. It excites the love of knowledge, impelling reason to search after perfect information or wisdom. It incites the taste and the imagination to the highest conception and enjoyment of beauty. It leads the feelings to piety, or devotedness of the soul to God; and impels the will to moral action, as the only ground on which man can aspire to a state of being suited to his moral nature. Thus, religion wakes in the soul of man the power of heavenly love, the love of truth, goodness, and beauty; the love of nature, of man, and of God. Hence every attainment in knowledge, though the subject appear ever so remote from religion, every perception of beauty, every virtuous deed, though performed without any reference to the express commands or promised rewards of religion, becomes as it were a mysterious rite, initiating us into the secret union of all beings; every trace of perfection, whether it take the garment of truth, goodness, or beauty, becomes a familiar angel, introducing us into the presence of God. The philosopher, the artist, whose contemplations do not rise to God, because their love of perfection finds satisfaction in beholding the wisdom and beauty of his works; do they not declare to all who know him the praise of him whom they deny? Is not the benevolence of an atheist, unknown to himself, a worship of the God of love? Accordingly, in our religious intercourse with others, we should

never forget, that religion is not a solitary principle in the soul, but that it flows from the same source, to which you trace the love of knowledge, of beauty, and of virtue, even the principle of love itself, or interest in perfection.

If you wish, then, to minister to another in building up his religious character, you have to address his curiosity, his taste, and his conscience, or, in other words, his love of knowledge, beauty, and virtue. That the love of virtue is essential to religion, is generally acknowledged. Virtue, as we have seen, is the foundation of religious hope; for religion promises to every one, as the condition best suited to his endless moral progress, such a state of being, such happiness or misery, as he deserves. Morality, it is true, can exist without religion; and a man cannot be said to be virtuous because he is religious. But to him who believes in that just retribution which religion promises, virtue has a double value; and he is therefore more to be trusted, than a man who has no other cause of hope or fear than the retribution of his own conscience. Still his religion, his belief in a future distribution of adventitious, as well as moral good and evil, does not diminish, but increase his responsibility; so that religion, being founded on morality, is at the same time the highest incentive to virtue. That the love of knowledge, as well as that of virtue, is essential to religion, is generally recognised, though not to the full extent that it should be. That sublime saying, "Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed," has been sadly misun-

derstood. Faith, belief, in the religious sense of the term, does not mean blind confidence, trust without, or even against knowledge. On the contrary, belief, or faith, signifies the deepest insight and knowledge of which we are capable ; to believe, to have faith, means to look upon those things which are not seen, to know God, to know the soul of man, and all those principles and truths, which are not temporal, but eternal. There is reason to apprehend, that, notwithstanding the wide distribution of the Scriptures, and the freedom of conscience, the faith of many is the result of chance, fear, or that blind confidence, misnamed faith, which makes the religion of thousands a precarious tenure, based upon the credit of a few leading individuals.

It is the appointed lot of the human mind to pass through the twilight of doubt, from the night of ignorance, to the daylight of truth. Why, then, will you fear doubt and skepticism, seeing that the transient twilight is in fact the daybreak of truth ? If you deduct the credit which skeptical writers on religion have derived from persecution, either by the arm of power, or by public opinion, I venture to say, that they have done, and are likely to do, more to establish, than to subvert, the principles of faith. It is the superstitious dread of skepticism that makes it formidable ; try it with the sounding line of reason, and you will find it dangerous only from its shallows, and not on account of its depth. It is a true saying, and one that will never lose its value, let it pass through ever so many hands, that " a slight sip of philosophy may tempt

the mind to unbelief, but a deep and full draught will bring it back to God." Philosophy has been justly termed the science of sciences; for its object is the investigation of the essence, the first cause, and the mutual relation of all things. Accordingly, one of the essential means to lead the mind to religion, consists in exciting and enlarging the natural curiosity, until the love of wisdom find its highest object, and become one with the love of God.

Together with virtue and the love of knowledge, I have mentioned the cultivation of the taste, or the love of the beautiful, as one of the guides to religious piety, and as one of the ministers of religion. Harmony and variety are the two constituents of beauty. Variety, without harmony, is confusion, a chaotic state, which may indeed be calculated to set off the beautiful harmony that is to arise from it, and thus be made subservient to beauty, but is in itself destitute of beauty. A painting, exhibiting a number of figures, or parts of scenery, without that unity of action which belongs to an historical picture, or that unity of prospect which forms a landscape; a variety of sounds without a leading tune; a play in which many plots are introduced, so as to distract the attention from the want of a general solution; a public building that looks like a standing committee of all the styles of architecture in the world; — all these and similar examples are illustrations of variety without harmony, and, consequently, without beauty. On the other hand, harmony without variety is tame uniformity. A landscape without hills and valleys, or

woods and water ; an unmeaning repetition of thought or expression in composition ; a tone in reading ; the periodical recurrence of sighs, tears, and blushes in a novel ; and many other examples might be adduced as specimens of uniformity, or harmony without variety, and therefore without beauty. Beauty, then, may be defined as harmonious variety. The greatest beauty consists in a union of the greatest variety that is consistent with harmony, and the greatest harmony that is consistent with variety. This absolute beauty is found only in the universe, which unites the greatest number and variety of beings in comprehensive harmony. Individual things are always limited, and characterized by a peculiar mode of existence ; and we can speak of them as more or less beautiful, as, within their limited sphere, they are more or less distinguished by a harmonious variety of properties and powers. Every individual thing, however, may be perfectly beautiful in its kind, as a plant, or an animal, each of which is characterized, within its limited mode of existence, by the most various and harmonious qualities.

I believe that the taste or judgment of all men agrees, as to the two constituent properties of beauty being variety and harmony ; but men differ in their perceptions of beauty in particular objects, or at particular times, chiefly because they bring to the subject different previous impressions and states of mind, and even thus prove the correctness of our idea of beauty. To him who has been incessantly engaged in town, in a crowd of occupations, the mere sight of

the country, be it ever so plain, affords an enjoyment of beauty ; to him whose ears are ringing with the fashionable noises of a tea party, a moment of silence is the friend in need, whom his taste, as well as his heart, longs for. Yet dead silence, and a flat country without scenery, will soon change the temper of his taste, and make him find beauty in the wildest scenery in nature, and in the stir of human life. Thus, we generally bring to the contemplation of any object a partiality, either for harmony, if we have suffered from too great a variety, or for variety, if we have been previously dissatisfied with a too great uniformity of impressions. Hence the difference which exists in individuals, as to their taste and perception of beauty ; while the cause of this difference shows, that all agree as to the elements of beauty, for which all require that harmony should be added to variety, or variety to harmony.

Taste, or the sense of beauty, is not only a power of perception, but also of creative energy, which is manifested chiefly in the fine arts, in music, poetry, and eloquence, in painting, sculpture, and architecture, which convey to the mind, partly in sounds, and partly in forms, the invisible and inaudible idea of beauty. It is this that gives to material things an ideal, and, in one respect, an absolute or incomparable value. For, as in nature, the whole congregation of created beings, with one accord, respond to the Creator's word, that "all is good," so in the masterpieces of human genius, itself the best of heavenly gifts, in the highest conceptions of a Raphael, a Shakspeare, a Mozart, or any one of those, who, in

the secret workshops of nature, have learned the art and mystery of their noble trade, we do not feel tempted either to alter, or to compare, seeing that every thing is "very good." The sense of beauty, however, is active not in those only who exercise what are properly called the fine arts, which, though designed for the delight, refinement, and elevation of all, are committed to the ministry of a few; — those, also, in whom these divine instincts are not developed, all men without exception, may actively employ their taste in every arrangement and occupation of life; and as the duty of man consists in striving after perfection, he is in conscience bound to attend, not only to the substance, but also to the form of perfection, which is beauty.

In thus urging attention to matters of taste, as a social duty, I do not think that we, in this enlightened age, as we call it, have much reason to congratulate ourselves upon our attainments, except so far as we confound the beautiful with that which is fashionable or rich. What is rich, in the fashionable sense of the word? That which costs so much money, that few only can procure it. And what is fashionable? The savage sells his precious fur, his gold, and his pearls, for glass, beads, bells, and toys; and the civilized man of Europe and America strips himself of his own sound judgment and individual taste, in order to take the livery of some beaux and belles, parading in Hyde Park or in Long Champs. But it is true, not only of spiritual, but even of material things, that the true riches are not to be found

either in far distant regions, or in the bowels of the earth, or at the bottom of the sea, but around us and within us. Could my voice gain the ear of those who are the leaders of the public taste amongst us, I would say to them;—If you would possess yourselves of riches far greater than all which the ends of the earth and the unexplored deep can afford you, resolve, at once, not to use a single article of dress or furniture, but what comes up to your own idea of usefulness and beauty; and your wants and your means will open the inexhaustible riches of individual capacity, and native taste, skill, and industry, which now lie as a talent, hidden in the earth, unenjoyed and unknown.

The simple principle, by which the degree of attention we owe to beauty should be determined, seems to be this; the more worthy and elevated the object, the more perfect should be the form. Hence, in general, public buildings deserve a higher degree of attention to beauty than private houses; and of all public edifices, the highest honor belongs to the temple of God. It is irreverent to erect a house of worship without a conscientious regard to its object and to its form; that there may be nothing that does not remind man of his own destiny and duty, by showing him, in every pillar and every arch, a striving after perfection. All the fine arts have attained to the highest perfection and glory in the service of religion. The Grecian temple and the Gothic dome, the statues of the gods, the paintings of the holy family, the poetry of Job and of the Psalms, and the sacred music of Italy and Germa-

ny, are the immortal witnesses of this truth. And it is natural that it should be so; for the most beautiful appearance is the simplest and most natural expression for the highest conceptions of the mind and the heart. The pious mind will recognise perfection in the smallest thing, in the lily of the field that spins not and toils not; and, on the other hand, he who recognises and truly loves perfection in the smallest thing, has caught the first rays of religion, which will illumine his path below, and guide his soul upward to the fountain-head of beauty, goodness, and truth.

True, the spirit of religion may exist in the most homely form, the frankincense of the heart may arise from the meanest as well as the most splendid censer; and so may the highest virtue be clothed in rags. But the question is here not about the "To be or not to be" of religion and virtue; but we ask whether virtue would, as a matter of taste, choose the dress of rags in preference to a whole and beautiful garment. — True, also, the grand and beautiful appearance of worship, the sublime arches, the statues, and paintings, the music, the festal processions, standards, and garments, may turn religion into idolatry by inducing men to take the form for the substance. But this very fact, that the beautiful form may become an idol, shows that it is the most natural appearance of the spirit of religion. That, at the time of the reformation of the church, when religion had degenerated into a worship of images, forms, and ceremonies, the zealots for the simple, naked truth of religion, should commence with destroying the se-

ductive forms, was natural enough, considering, that in human affairs one extreme is generally cured by the opposite. But the fact that poison requires an antidote to counteract it, does not prevent the antidote from operating as a poison if it be taken by itself as common food. Surrounded as we are by mean and tasteless forms of religion, we can hardly calculate their injurious influence, particularly upon children, and in fact upon all, who, as the Redeemer says, should become like little children. For as such, they naturally expect that the outside should be the true expression of the substance of religion, and that wherever the light of life is shining, it should cover the darkest spot with flowers.

It is hard that the child should have to learn the first lesson of abstraction at church, viz. that this is the house of God, which would otherwise have been taken for a lecture room, a bank, or a storehouse, or a theatre. Is not the simple truth of the Gospel decked out with the most delicate and the most brilliant imagery? And should Christian theologians condemn taste, and proscribe beauty from their books, from their sermons, their hymns, and their churches, —so that it may well be said of them that they resemble those herdsmen of the Alps, who never look beyond their flocks and their pastures, except to watch the signs of good or bad weather, and who are astonished to learn, from strangers, that they inhabit the most sublime and beautiful spots on the earth. Allow then to the fine arts a place, though it be but a place of honor, among the ser-

vants of religion, together with virtue and philosophy.

Yet it is to be remembered, that beautiful forms, virtue, and true principles of faith, are only guides to, or manifestations of, religion. Even thanksgiving and prayer are only forms of the spiritual essence of faith. Religion itself consists in devotion, which is an act of inward recognition, a direct, intimate, and entire communion with that infinite and ever-present Spirit, in whom we live, and move, and have our being.

This inward elevation of the soul to the Father of spirits, cannot be taught by other men, because it cannot be taught at all. Still, as the seed of devotion is in every mind, it can be enlivened by the encouraging smile, and watered by the sympathizing tears, of those whom the good spirit has called to this blessed ministry of the soul. But for the exercise of this highest branch of pastoral care, no rules can be laid down. That prayer alone is good which makes you pray. It is devotion alone, which, by a kind of divine contagion, can kindle and feed the fire of devotion in others. To sum up the previous remarks, I would say, that the religious influence which one human being can exercise over another, consists in operating upon his intellect, his heart, and his will, so as to lead him to contemplate, to love, and to obey God.

I have said before that the religious influence of men over one another is determined partly by the object in view, and partly by the condition of those who are to be operated upon.

Of religious influences, as determined by their ob-

ject, I have already spoken, and shall now consider some of the conditions and circumstances which must affect the means that are to be used. The means of religion are to be adapted to the great natural divisions among men, the young and the old, the ignorant and the learned, the virtuous and the vicious, and to all the peculiar modifications of sentiment and disposition which characterize individuals.

The religious education of the young has of late been made the subject of so many investigations, that I shall only touch upon its most essential principle. It is this, that religion is not any thing to be put into the mind of a child by others, but that all these can do, consists in watching and aiding the natural unfolding and growth of the religious principle in the mind. The feeling of dependence which binds the child to his parents or his friends, whose care makes him independent of other men and circumstances, this feeling of dependence and trust, which the ancients have very significantly called "filial piety," is the root of all religion. Cherish this principle; raise and enlarge it; and the child will of himself learn to look upon all men as his brothers and sisters, he will, as by intuition, and from his own experience, understand, embrace, and act upon the fundamental doctrine of Christianity. "The spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God."

The truth, that the means of religious influence should be adapted to the actual condition of the individual, applies to grown persons as well as to chil-

dren. This principle seems to have been frequently disregarded by the Christian missionaries, and the failure of many of their undertakings is to be ascribed to this cause. Instead of inquiring diligently into the religious sentiments of the Indian or Hindoo, and encouraging him to hold fast all those principles of his faith which are consistent with the truth, they have, in their zeal to extirpate error, not been sufficiently mindful of the warning, not to root up the wheat while they were gathering up the tares. They did not imitate the example of the Apostle Paul, who, when he was declaring to the Athenians the unknown God, did not disdain to quote a saying of their poets in support of the great doctrine that we are the offspring of God. There may be cases where it is necessary to lay the axe to the tree of superstition; but generally it is far better to prune it and graft upon it a noble branch. We know of no superstition or idolatry among men, in any age or part of the world, which does not contain some religious truth, like that of the divine unity in the Hindoo Scriptures, or that of the great Spirit among the Indians. This may be made an instrument to clear the religious principle in the soul from the weeds of error, until it expands freely in the glorious liberty of the children of God.

The principle of accommodating the means of religious influence to the actual conditions and wants of individuals, forms, or should form, also, the basis of religious associations. Among the manifold considerations which this interesting subject presents, there are two principles which seem to me of great impor-

tance, and, as yet, but partially recognised, and carried into effect. Wherever freedom of conscience prevails, the number of individuals which form a religious society must depend upon how far they agree in their religious sentiments. The more principles they agree in, so much the smaller will be the religious society; there will be many circles within one another, until you come to the smallest of all, the individual, who has perhaps some religious sentiments in which he cannot associate with any one.

Now both the agreement, and the difference of sentiments, are calculated to promote religious improvement. By associating with those whose opinions differ from our own, we are enabled to correct their errors, or our own. By communing with those who hold essentially the same principles with our own, we consider these as a common starting-point, for higher attainments in religion. This point of view must determine our judgment with regard to the numerous divisions and subdivisions in the religious world, particularly in a country like this, where liberty of conscience is recognised by the law, and the sentiment of the people, as an inalienable right of each individual. If the creeds upon which each of these societies is expressly or tacitly formed, are really used by each, as a common starting-point for greater attainments, they must be considered as beneficial. But if these creeds be made the instruments to confine the individuals composing a society to the present limited state of religious attainment, and to separate them from a common religious sympathy and brother-

hood with those from whom they differ on certain points, they must prove baneful to all religious union and improvement. In our religious divisions, however useful in themselves, we are tempted to forget that there is one ground, on which all men can meet as members of the same religious society. They all have the same religious nature, the capacity to be interested in religion. For, as I have already shown, the great question to be answered is this, whether the world be so constituted and governed, as to secure to man the means of perpetual existence, progress, and happiness. All men, then, can meet on this ground of a common religious capacity and interest, and can benefit one another by a free mutual communication of their doubts and convictions, their hopes and their fears, and strengthen their natural love, by a continual experience of all they can do for each other. Whenever men meet simply as men, to enlighten one another with regard to their common religious interests, they do not, or should not, consider themselves, or one another, as members of particular societies, but as individuals, each professing his own faith or his own doubts, and endeavouring to convert, and ready to be converted to the truth. I do not see that the present state of society affords any opportunity for individuals to hold such intercourse together on the subject of their highest interests. Evils may indeed arise from such an intercourse among those who differ from each other, if they meet as enemies, rather than as dissenting brethren. But free discussion heals the wounds which free discus-

sion inflicts; and if the common object be fully recognised, the principles in which the most decided antagonists in religion agree will in the end prove stronger than the cause of their dissensions. I for this reason believe, that society needs, for its progress in religion, two kinds of union. It needs special societies, each of them founded upon its own creed as a common starting-point for higher attainments; and general unions of individuals, on the broad ground of their common religious nature. There is another point which I can only touch upon. Our religious intercourse, our public meetings, seem to require both the aid of a learned ministry, and the spontaneous contributions of individual minds. He, who makes religion the chief study of his life, is able to present to all, the various views which are and have been held by different individuals and nations, together with the results of his own experience and contemplation. But the views he has to present must be submitted to the free judgment of each individual, and there is hardly any one, whose judgment cannot throw light on some particular case, though it be only by his honest questions. Without a learned ministry there will be a want of religious culture; without an opportunity for each individual freely to express his own views to the society, the clergy may become the religious legislators and judges of the people. This danger is indeed, at least in part, removed, by the liberty of the press, and an extensive religious literature. Still the dead letter is not a full compensation for the living word; and sometimes in the midst of a

congregation of Christians, I cannot resist the thought, how much light there is hidden in the pews as under a bushel, simply because there is but one candlestick provided, and a single light that is expected to illumine the whole house.

The manner in which these improvements, if such they be, are to be introduced, I feel neither competent, nor desirous to point out; — but I confidently commit these, and all the other views I have presented, to the sound sense and right spirit of society.

# FRAGMENT

OF

# A WORK ON PSYCHOLOGY.

THE following fragment has been thought worthy of preservation, though it contains but little more than the Introduction to the Treatise intended by the author. A particular interest may attach to it, when it is known that the work which he was only permitted to commence was one that had strongly engaged his mind, and to which he was ready to devote his powers, when he was interrupted by death. *Moriturus nos salutat.* The All-wise Disposer appointed that his inquiries should be pursued in a higher state of being.

# ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY

OR THE

# SCIENCE OF THE SOUL.

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## INTRODUCTION.

## CHAPTER I.

PSYCHOLOGY * is the science or systematic knowledge of the soul. Of what importance is the study of this science?

It is said of knowledge, that it is better than "choice gold"; and of the soul it is written, "What is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" Thus the importance of the knowledge of the soul is determined by the value of knowledge and the worth of the soul.

We ascribe to Psychology an *intrinsic* and an *extrinsic* value.

When we say that "honesty is the best policy," we speak of the extrinsic value of honesty; we mean that honesty, whether it be good in itself or not, is certainly good for something else, inasmuch as it is the surest way to credit and success in the world.

* This term is compounded of the two Greek words ψυχή, (psyche,) *soul*, and λόγος, *word*, or *doctrine*.

But when we speak of the intrinsic value of this virtue, we mean that honesty is good and excellent in itself, for its own sake, apart from any external advantages. In the same sense we ascribe to Psychology an intrinsic and an extrinsic value; that is, we maintain that the knowledge of the soul is something good in itself and on its own account, as well as good for something else.

"Know thyself," is a commandment applicable both to our visible and invisible self. It is important as a direction to study the human body, whose structure and operations are highly interesting in themselves, and on the intelligent use of which, our health, comfort, and usefulness depend. But that oracular admonition is most important in its application to our own souls. The mind being the source of all knowledge, must itself be the principal object of knowledge. Among all the wonders of creation, what is there so worthy of observation and reflection, as the constitution, the inward enconomy, and progress of the soul? It is the province of the psychologist to notice the manifold impressions, recollections, and forebodings; the divers perceptions, reflections and imaginings; the ever-varying inclinations, temptations, and struggles of the soul; in short all that is stirring, striving, and going on within us; and to trace all to its elements, its original constitution, and intended harmonious progression. It is the province of the psychologist to show how impressions call forth thoughts, and excite rival desires; and how these inward struggles end in the enslavement or enfranchisement of the soul.

It is the high calling of the observer of the mind to watch its progress, from the dawn of intelligence, the unfolding of the affections, and the first experiments of the will, through all the mistakes, the selfish desires, and occasional defections from duty, onward to the lofty discoveries, the generous devotion, and moral conquests of the soul. Psychology leads us to the hidden sources of every action, every science, and art, by making us acquainted with the motives which prompt, and the faculties which enable human beings to conceive of and carry into effect any practical and scientific, or literary undertaking. The calculation of the orbit of a comet is an achievement, which, to him who has not advanced much beyond the multiplication table, would appear impossible, if he were not obliged to admit it as a fact. Yet an accurate knowledge of the power by which the orbits of the celestial bodies are revealed to man, would convince him, that the same capacity which enables him to cast his private accounts, is fitted to ascertain the courses of the stars. A poetic composition like "Hamlet," or the "Midsummer Night's Dream," is something so wholly beyond the ordinary attainments of men, that the author must appear more than human, if an intimate acquaintance with the soul did not convince us, that the power which enables us to understand and enjoy a single line of those compositions, is the same that formed a Shakspeare. And thus the resolution of a child, rather to expose himself to punishment than to tell a falsehood, may be shown, by a strict psychological analysis, to be es-

sentially the same that enables the martyr to endure the cross rather than deny his faith.

Again, the endless diversity of religious sentiments, creeds, and observances, in the world, so unlike each other in different countries and ages, may tempt the superficial observer to consider every system and form of faith as an arbitrary contrivance, or a product of accidental circumstances, of education, or of the institutions of society. But Psychology enables us to trace all those phenomena, however various and discordant, to one and the same principle in the soul, which, as it may happen to be connected either with ignorance and error, or with knowledge and reason, with the senses, or the feelings, or the imagination, brings forth all the different forms of religion and superstition.

Moreover, it is a fact, that there is hardly a principle, either speculative or practical, religious or profane, that has not been believed by some men, and denied or doubted by others; nay, the very existence of the things we see, hear, and handle, has been called in question by men of powerful intellect. In view of these facts, we should be in danger of falling into endless skepticism, if the knowledge of the soul did not reveal the legitimate function and the just limits of every faculty;—of sense, and reason; feeling, and imagination; faith and doubt.

These are some of the reasons which make Psychology an object of intrinsic value, a subject worthy to be studied on its own account. The extrinsic value, the practical importance of this science, are

too obvious to require much elucidation. The better we are acquainted with our own souls, their actual condition, disposition, and capacity, so much the fitter are we to apply our faculties to any given purpose, to control our passions, and cultivate our intellectual and moral nature. The more thoroughly we know ourselves, so much the less are we liable to undertake any thing that is really beyond our reach; or to give up an undertaking as impracticable, because we have never tried and measured our strength. In our intercourse with our fellow-men, our ability to benefit ourselves and others, is proportioned to our acquaintance with the faculties and wants, the hopes and fears, the inclinations and motives of men. The man of business regulates his conduct by his knowledge of the dispositions of those with whom he has to deal; the parent or teacher adapts his instruction and discipline to the peculiar wants and capacity of the child; the lawgiver and statesman have regard to national character, as well as to abstract principles of right, in regulating public affairs. An insight into the soul is required in the treatment of the insane as well as the sane. The abolition of chains and straight jackets, which has proved so successful in many hospitals, was a psychological experiment, proving the soul-subduing power of an enlightened and devoted confidence in man. The same magnanimous experiment has been tried upon criminals, and infuriated multitudes; and the result has enriched the science of the soul, as well as displayed its practical importance.

These are some of the advantages showing forth the extensive value of Psychology. It is true a deep insight into the motives and dispositions of men is useful to the dishonest as well as to the honest; to the selfish as well as to the benevolent man. But he who studies human nature, and searches the deep things of the soul, for a philanthropic purpose, has a decided advantage over the selfish observer. The expansion of the affections enlarges the mind; and the pure mind alone is a true mirror of the good and the evil that is in the world. It is free alike from weak credulity and heartless distrust. On the other hand, the selfish observer of men may be keen-sighted in descrying the evil that is in others; but he naturally shrinks from seeing the good, and endeavours to explain it away by the supposition of selfish motives; because the truth condemns himself. Often the shrewdest calculators, the most wary and wily politicians, have been baffled, and their best contrived plans have been disconcerted, by the straight-forward measures of a single-hearted devotion to principle. Their far-reaching calculations took in the most remote and complicated motives of a selfish nature; but they were not prepared for the "foolishness" of simple honesty, of patriotic virtue, and self-sacrificing philanthropy.

These remarks may suffice to establish the intrinsic value of Psychology, inasmuch as the soul is in itself the most interesting object of knowledge; as well as its extrinsic or practical importance, inasmuch as it

enables us to cultivate our faculties, and regulate our conduct, with a view to our own improvement and that of our fellow-men.

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## CHAPTER II.

### On the Sources of Psychology.

#### § 1. *The direct source.*

Often when I look up at the moon, I remember the question of a little boy to his mother; "What is it that keeps the moon up in the air?" — and I am led to meditate on the stability and harmony in the constitution of the universe. I am certain that the moon is there; for if I would, I could not disbelieve her presence, which is impressed on the sense of sight, by the image reflected in my eyes. I am sure, also, that I saw the little boy, and heard him ask that question, though I do not see and hear him now; and I am equally certain of my being engaged in meditations on the universe, which were induced by that question. I am certain of these things, because I am conscious of possessing in my own mind an exact recollection of what I then saw and heard, as well as a clear conception of my present thoughts and meditations.

Again; the tune of Old Hundred inspires me with the manly fervor, the Sicilian Mariner's Hymn, with the tender longing of piety; the Marseilles Hymn,

with patriotic devotion ; the tune of Auld Lang Syne, with affectionate trust in the lastingness of early friendship. Whenever I hear one of these tunes, I am compelled to admit the existence of the sounds, which come to my ear. And I feel compelled, in the same manner, by my own self-conscious mind, to believe in the reality of the different emotions excited by those compositions.

The smell of the orange blossom reminds the Italian exile of the balmy and tuneful groves of his native land. The scent of the violet and the lily of the valley reminds the German emigrant of the green hedges and the lofty beech woods, where those flowers grow freely, and once blossomed for him, in the blessed May of his life. In these cases, the scent of the flowers is a matter of sensation ; the olfactory organs being affected by the aëriform particles exhaled from the plant; but the painfully sweet recollection of childhood and home, though called up by an impression made on the organ of smell, is a fact which we feel compelled to admit on the simple evidence of our own consciousness.

Again ; if I eat or drink something from which my reason bids me to abstain, the sense of taste enables me to discriminate and relish the forbidden article ; while the upbraidings of conscience, which disturb my enjoyment, are not a matter of taste, but a fact of consciousness.

In the last place, if a parting friend, by the pressure of the hand, assure you, that he will not forget you, the sense of touch informs you only of the

pressure on the hand; while the impression made on your mind, the thoughts and feelings called forth by this bodily sensation, are known to you only by that self-perceiving power of the mind, which we call consciousness.

The various examples here presented will be sufficient to point out the two different sources, and the two different kinds of objects, of human knowledge. I have mentioned the sight of the moon, and the meditations to which it led; the hearing of certain songs and tunes, and the emotions called forth by the sounds; the smell of a flower, and the feelings of regret and fond desire it excited; the taste of a favorite but injurious article of food, and the upbraidings of conscience by which it was attended; finally the pressure of the hand, and the thoughts and feelings to which it gave rise. There are evidently two modes of perception, by which we acquire knowledge of two distinct classes of things. Sensation, or the exercise of the five senses, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, makes us acquainted with one class, which we call corporeal or material things; and consciousness, or the self-perceiving power of the mind, reveals another, which we call incorporeal, immaterial, or spiritual things. By our senses we perceive our own body, and other bodies; through consciousness we know the workings of that internal power which we designate by various names, as soul, mind, spirit, the inner man, our inmost being, our invisible self.

To obtain and to impart a discriminating and com-

prehensive knowledge of the various facts or phenomena of consciousness, is the object of Psychology, the doctrine or science of the soul. Consciousness, then, is the direct source of Psychology.

### § 2. *The indirect sources.*

As we bid the thirsty man go to drink at the fountain, so we direct the student of Psychology to the living contents of his own consciousness as the fountain-head of this science. His own consciousness is, to every human being, the only source of direct knowledge, and the ultimate standard of truth, with regard to every thing that relates to the operations and capacities of the soul.

But besides this, there are some ways in which we may indirectly obtain information on this subject. We may increase the knowledge derived from our own consciousness, first, by studying the words and actions of our fellow-men, both those which fall within our own observation, and such as are reported by others, and recorded in history. In the second place, we may gain instruction from works on Psychology. Moreover, as the soul is intimately connected with the body, Psychology cannot be successfully cultivated without a competent knowledge of the human frame ; for which reason the study of anatomy and physiology is to be considered as one of the indirect sources of this science.

First. The words and actions of other men.

The self-perceiving power, which affords to the

individual a direct insight into what is going on in his own soul, does not extend to the souls of others. He is not conscious of their thoughts, their feelings, their purposes. I become acquainted with the sentiments and intentions of other men by their words and actions. Now these are perceived directly only by the senses ; I hear them speak, or laugh, or lament ; I see them act, or smile, or blush, or weep ; but I cannot look into their souls, and witness their thoughts and emotions. But being conscious of my own thoughts and feelings, I know, that when I laugh, it is from joy, when I weep, it is from sorrow, and that I use certain words and actions as expressions of certain sentiments and intentions. Hence I infer, that the same sounds and motions, when employed by others, are expressions or indications of the same feelings, ideas, or purposes, existing in their minds. It is through my senses, that I perceive these signs ; my own consciousness enables me to interpret them, and thus to add, to the direct knowledge of my own soul, an indirect acquaintance with the souls of my fellow-beings.

The rich domain of psychological learning is not confined to our own immediate observation. We study the souls of those we have never seen, from the accounts of other men, from the records of history, and from the monuments they have left of their minds. Thus, the student of the soul lives, at the same time, in every part and every age of the world ; and whatever has, anywhere or at any time, caused human beings to mourn or to rejoice, to hope or to

fear, to doubt or to believe, to submit or to resist, strikes an harmonious chord in our own soul, and tends to solve the mysteries of our being.

It is evident, that, if we were not conscious of possessing souls ourselves, we should not know of the existence of other souls. If we were not conscious of thoughts which we may or may not express in words, the words of others would be to us sounds without meaning ; if we were not conscious of intentions which we may or may not carry out in action, the actions of others would be to us motions without design. We understand, we enter into the highest virtues, and the lowest vices of other men, because, although we have neither attained to the excellence of some, nor sunk to the degradation of others, we possess, in our own souls, the seeds of every greatness and every littleness ever manifested by man. We may not possess the heroic devotion to freedom, which induced the young Lafayette to cast away the sure prospects of aristocratic eminence at home, for a share in the desperate struggle of a foreign people for their natural rights ; and, on the other hand, we may be free from the servile ambition which led the traitor Arnold to sell his republican honor for the degrading favor of the royal oppressor of his country. But we enter into the springs of the conduct of each of these men ; because we are neither destitute of the generous impulses that inspired the one, nor wholly free from the selfish motives which tempted the other. In short, we could not understand and appreciate any thing that passes in the souls of our fellow-

men, if we were not conscious of possessing in our own, something that, under similar circumstances, might manifest itself in similar results.

It follows from these considerations, that self-observation, that is, the observation of his own soul, furnishes to each human being the true standard for judging of what others may assert or deny to be a part of their inward experience. If a person assert that he believes in nothing that he cannot see, or hear, or smell, or taste, or touch, you may endeavour to convince him of the contrary, by asking him whether he has not in his memory images of things and events; or whether he is not conscious of thoughts, emotions, wishes, and purposes, which neither he, nor any other human being, can discover by any one of the five senses. But if he should deny all acquaintance with these invisible realities, it would be impossible to convince him; because the facts of consciousness are objects of immediate perception, and cannot be proved, any more than the existence of sounds and colors.

The same remark applies to the well-known controversy among moralists, concerning the motives of human actions. One person asserts that the soul of man is capable of benevolent exertions, without any reference to himself; another maintains that every human effort is prompted by self-interest. In this case it is possible that the experience of the one may lead the other to a more thorough self-observation, which may induce him to change his opinion. But it is impossible for either to prove his position to the

satisfaction of the other, if his self-observation bring him to a different result.

The same mode of reasoning applies to the much vexed question concerning man's moral free agency. One asserts that man possesses a free choice between different motives of action; and the other that he is in every case necessarily determined by that, which, without any effort of his will, is at the time the most powerful motive in his mind. Each of the disputants may aid the other in stimulating him to a more thorough self-observation; but in the end, each must decide the question for himself, according to his own inward experience. It is not in the power of either to convince the other by argument, any more than to convince him that a color which to him seems green is in reality blue.

Accordingly, he who wishes to acquire an accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the human soul, should examine in the first place, his own soul. The result of this investigation, will enable him to find out from the words and actions of others what may be passing in their souls; and every apparent discovery he should bring again to the test of his own consciousness, and consider only those assertions or suppositions as satisfactorily proved to himself, as facts of consciousness, which are confirmed by his own inward experience.

Second. Works on Psychology.

The reasons for putting the results of our study of the words and actions of others as expressions of their minds, to the test of our own consciousness,

before we admit them as facts, apply also, of course, to professed works and treatises on Psychology. To the student of the soul, all the works and actions of other men are, as it were, unpremeditated treatises on Psychology. Although books expressly written for this purpose are fitted to embody in a small compass the results of extensive observation and reflection, and although it is much easier to study Psychology from books, than from life and actual experience; yet great care and caution are necessary in resorting to these compendiums of the soul. It must always be borne in mind, that the highest pretension of books on the soul is that of being faithful copies; and that, consequently, their whole authority consists in their agreement with the living original, which each one possesses within himself. — With this precaution, the student may derive extensive information and aid for self-observation, from the literature of this department of knowledge.

Third. The study of the human frame.

It is from the joint testimony of his senses and his consciousness, that man derives the knowledge that he possesses a body and a mind, — that he is both a natural and a spiritual being. Hence Anthropology, * or the Science of Man, embraces these two branches; Somatology, † or the systematic knowledge of the Body; and Psychology, or the doctrine of the Soul.

* From ἄνθρωπος (anthropos), *man*; and λόγος (logos), *doctrine*.
† From σῶμα (soma), *body*; and λόγος.

Somatology again comprises several distinct branches. On examining the human body, we find that every part of it, like all other animal and vegetable matter, may be reduced, by the aid of chemistry, to certain simple substances or material elements. These corporeal elements of the human frame form the subject matter of chemical Somatology.

But the human body, in its natural state, does not exhibit those simple material elements to which it may be reduced by chemical analysis ; but we find them compounded and formed into distinct parts, which we call organs or instruments, on account of their fitness for their appropriate functions in the economy of life. It is by the aid of anatomy, or the science of dissection, that we ascertain the structure and relations of the various organs, both of those which are comparatively simple, such as bones, muscles, and nerves ; and those which are formed by the different combinations of the simple organs, such as the stomach, the lungs, the eye, ear, hand, and foot. — To discover the organic structure of the different parts of the body, is the object of anatomy, or anatomical Somatology.

To complete the knowledge of the human body, and to connect it with that of the mind, it is necessary to understand the manner in which the various material elements and organs are made to subserve all the different functions of animal, intellectual, and moral life. It is necessary to understand how the lungs, and the stomach, are fitted to supply the system with such materials, both fluid and solid, as are

fitted for its sustenance, renovation, and growth; how the various bones, muscles, and nerves, that compose the hand, work together in performing the most skilful operations devised by human ingenuity; and how the different lenses, together with the whole apparatus that forms the eye, are adapted to make it a living optical instrument. To obtain and to impart a discriminating and comprehensive knowledge of all these various natural processes; of sensation, motion, respiration, digestion, assimilation, and rejection, are the objects of Physiology. *

Somatology, then, consists of three departments. Chemical Somatology exhibits the material elements, Anatomy the organic structure, and Physiology the appropriate functions, of every part of the human frame.

It is by the mutual adaptation and coöperation of all the various faculties of soul and body, that man exists, thinks, feels, and acts, as one individual being; and thus the several departments of Somatology and Psychology form but one consistent science, — the Science of Man, or Anthropology.

Psychology being a part of the Science of Man, every branch of which is intimately connected with every other, it is manifest that the study of the soul cannot be successfully presented but in conjunction with that of the body, particularly with anatomy and physiology, for the purpose of ascertaining the organic structure and the appropriate function of

* From φύσις (physis), *nature*, and λόγος.

every part. The fitness of these three sciences, by their coöperation to complete the knowledge of man, may be easily perceived. We are conscious of many and various ideas derived from impressions upon our senses, as well as of feelings and determinations which we express by words and actions. These ideas, feelings, and determinations, being objects of consciousness, fall within the range of Pyschology; while the impressions and expressions depend on the organic structure of the body. Anatomy demonstrates all the various organs; the physiologist endeavours to ascertain by which of them, and by what process, a certain result is produced. Thus if you tread upon a snake, hear its hissing, and see it coil up to attack you, three senses at once apprize you of the enemy; and you start back, and seize a weapon of defence. In this case you are conscious of danger, and of your determination to avert it; and you observe an almost instantaneous succession and harmonious coöperation of sensations and motions for the same object. This coöperation of perceptive and motive powers, so far as it depends on the instrumentality of the body, is physiologically explained by the function of the nerves, which serve the purposes both of sensation and motion, and, being concentrated in the brain, and thence extending to every part of the body, enable the self-conscious and self-determining mind to receive impressions from, and give directions to, every part of the frame. Thus the forementioned case of danger perceived and resisted is explained by the joint labors of the ana-

tomist, who lays open the organic structure of every part of the body; the physiologist, who shows by the use of what organs the idea of danger is conveyed to the mind, and its consequent determination is carried into effect; and the psychologist, who notices the ideas and determinations of which we are conscious.

These considerations are sufficient to show the importance of a competent knowledge of anatomy and physiology, to a successful study of the science of the soul.

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## CHAPTER III.

### On the Substance of Psychology.

#### § 1. *Facts of Consciousness.*

The phenomena of the soul, which are objects of consciousness, are the substance or subject matter of Psychology. They are facts, that is, events or things, the existence of which we are not able to admit or deny at will; but our consciousness, by its construction, its receptive and reflective nature, is forced to acknowledge their reality. For if I form the idea of a man with a hundred eyes, I feel constrained to acknowledge the existence of the idea itself in my mind, as truly as if there existed a being out of my imagination really answering to the ideal image.

All those phenomena which are objects of consciousness lie within the scope of this science. Some of these facts are more, others are less dependent, on the organization and actual state of the body. Thus the pleasure derived from eating and drinking is certainly more dependent on the body than that which springs from knowledge and virtue. Yet we are conscious of both of these kinds of pleasure; both therefore are subjects of psychological investigation.

On the other hand, all phenomena which are not objects of consciousness, are excluded from the range of Psychology. For this reason the physical processes of taking food, respiration, and motion, do not belong to the science of the soul; although the knowledge of these organic functions is important to the psychologist; because they serve to explain a variety of emotions connected with those physical processes, that is, certain pleasures, pains, and desires, of which we are conscious, and which on this account are within the limits of this science.

In order to form correct ideas of the operations of the mind, it is necessary to view them, both in their intimate connexion with, and their essential difference from, things pertaining to the body.

### § 2. *On the intimate connexion between the objects of consciousness and of sensation.*

Soul and body are intimately connected with each other in all their operations in this life. The intimacy of this connexion has been already set forth, and might be illustrated by many examples. In conver-

sation, for example, the ear, which can be seen, conveys the sound, with which the mind combines thoughts, which are objects of consciousness; and again, the mind embodies thoughts of its own in articulate sounds, by means of the organs of speech, which, like the ear, are objects of sight. And thus through the organs of sensation, which we perceive by our senses, we receive an infinite variety of ideas; and again ideas, feelings, and determinations, which in themselves are objects of consciousness, are made visible, audible, and tangible, by the organs of speech and action.

Still the objects of sense and of consciousness, while intimately and efficiently connected with each other, are distinct in themselves, and differ from each other both in the manner in which they are perceived, and in the qualities by which they are characterized.

§ 3. *The objects of consciousness cannot be perceived by the senses, nor those of sensation by consciousness.*

It is evident from preceding observations, (Ch. II. § 1,) that the soul and its operations cannot be perceived by the senses; that thoughts, emotions, and resolutions, memory and reason, joy and sorrow, conscience and passion, cannot be seen, or heard, or smelled, or tasted, or touched. It is equally plain, on the other hand, that the objects of sense cannot be known merely by the self-perceiving power of the mind which we call consciousness. Thus I am conscious of having in my mind an accurate image of the

tree that is standing before me. This image remains an object of consciousness, that is, I continue to perceive it in my own mind, whether I have my eyes open and fixed on the tree, or turn them away, or shut them; and whether I be present or absent. What I perceive through consciousness, in this case, is merely the image in my mind, not the tree itself, which cannot be perceived by me, unless I actually see it; and I cannot see it unless I be present, having the use of my eyes, opening and fixing them on the tree. In the same manner I preserve in my mind the idea of many a song, both the words and the music, whether I actually hear them or not. It is only the idea of each song which is an object of consciousness. This consciousness of the idea does not afford a perception of the song itself; the sounds of the words and the notes require actual hearing. The same is true of the other senses. We may be conscious of the impression which the taste, or smell, or touch of certain things has left on our minds, so that by a mere effort of memory we may place a distinct idea of each before our conscious minds; but in order to perceive the things themselves, we must actually smell, taste, or touch them.

It is true, then, that objects of consciousness cannot be apprehended by the senses; nor the objects of sense by mere consciousness.

§ 4. *The characteristic qualities of material objects do not belong to spiritual, nor those of spiritual to material, objects.*

By the sense of sight we perceive light and color,

and the forms of things. We distinguish white, red, and yellow flowers; we discriminate circles, and squares, and an endless variety of figures. But what should we think, if a person were to speak to us of red or white ideas or affections, or of round or triangular purposes or passions. We indeed sometimes speak of bright thoughts, of dark designs, of black and white lies, of high and low purposes or affections. But in these cases, the words by which we qualify these objects of consciousness, are evidently not used strictly but figuratively. For if we were to take them in their strict sense, it would be as absurd to speak of high and low purposes, as of round and triangular purposes. By the sense of hearing we distinguish sounds, loud and low, high and deep, harsh and soft; by the sense of smell and taste we perceive sweet, and bitter, and acid things; by the touch, or sense of feeling, we judge of what is hard and soft, light and heavy, warm and cold. It is obvious, that not one of these qualities can be properly attached to objects of consciousness; so that when we speak of the whispers of conscience, of a sweet disposition, of heaviness of mind, of warm affections, we do not speak strictly but figuratively.

Accordingly, the characteristic qualities of the objects of sense do not belong to those of consciousness. Spiritual things differ from material things, not only in degree, but in kind. No degree of light or shade can transform an object of sight into an object of consciousness; no sound, however loud or low, no smell, taste, or touch, however strong, or how-

ever faint, can become a spiritual thing. Paleness and the blush, which are seen in the face, and the sentiments of fear and of shame, of which the mind is conscious, are things essentially different, though one be called forth by the other.

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## CHAPTER IV.

### On the Scientific Form of Psychology.

It requires but a superficial acquaintance with the spiritual and the material world, to make us sensible of the infinite variety of objects belonging to each of these two great hemispheres of human knowledge. Who can enumerate the different objects that fall under the cognizance of a single sense ; for example, the varieties of color or of sound ? Or who can calculate how many different thoughts, or emotions, such as pleasure and pain, hope and fear, gratitude and resentment, love and hatred, selfish and generous motives, may be stirring within us, and thus become objects of consciousness ?

Now consciousness brings before us the manifold phenomena of our minds, not according to a concerted plan, but reflects, like a mirror, now a serious consideration, now a random conjecture and a sanguine expectation, hope and fear, likes and dislikes, satisfaction, regret, determination, or change of purpose, just as they happen to occur within us. At

first sight, there appears no prospect of order, no ground for a satisfactory arrangement, in this endless variety of operations and states of mind. But as Linnæus, by observing the characteristics of plants, was able to classify, that is, to divide and subdivide them according to certain distinctive marks, which more or less of them possess in common, and by which they may be discriminated from others, so, by studying the characteristics of the various mental phenomena, we may arrange them under appropriate heads. Among the objects of consciousness, we find some essentially the same, while others are more or less different from each other. Our thoughts, for example, however various, have this in common, that they are thoughts, and, as such, are not to be confounded with other operations of the soul, such as purposes and passions. Thus we distinguish between the perceptive and the imaginative, and between the intellectual and the moral powers. And in this way we are enabled to put in proper order all the various phenomena and faculties of the mind, according to their inherent similarity and dissimilarity ; and, by this process of classification, to give to the multifarious aggregate of facts the systematic form, which is necessary to make it a science.

Accordingly, Psychology, or the science of the soul, may be defined as the systematic knowledge of the various objects of consciousness.

It is the object of this science, not only to exhibit, in a systematic form, the facts on which it rests, but to enable the student to deduce from these

facts certain principles explanatory of the nature of the soul. Hence, this work on the elements of Psychology is divided into two books. The first book treats of the materials of this science, that is, of the divers operations which are the objects of consciousness; and for this reason it is called Phenomenology, or the doctrine of the phenomena of the soul. The second book treats of the philosophy of the soul, being an inquiry into its nature, as far as this can be inferred from the phenomena.

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## SUMMARY.

THE first chapter of the Introduction is designed to establish the intrinsic and extrinsic value of Psychology, by setting forth the reasons that make it a subject of interest and importance, both for its own sake, and on account of the personal and social advantages arising from an enlarged and accurate knowledge of the soul.

The three following chapters of the Introduction set forth the source, the substance, and the form of Psychology. They show, that consciousness is the source, the objects of consciousness are the substance, and their systematic arrangement is the form, of this science.

With regard to the source of this science, we have seen, in the second chapter, that consciousness is the source of all direct information, and the ultimate

standard of all assertions and conjectures concerning the nature and the operations of the soul; but that this information may be increased by studying the souls of other men, from their actions and from psychological works, as well as by a competent knowledge of the human frame, particularly by the study of anatomy and physiology.

With regard to the substance of Psychology, the third chapter points out the scope of this science, including all objects of consciousness, whether more or less dependent on the state of the body, and excluding all others. It also sets forth that the objects of consciousness, and those of sensation, though intimately connected, are essentially different from each other, inasmuch as they become known to us by two distinct powers of observation, and the characteristic qualities of each of these two classes of objects are not found to belong to the other.

With regard to the form of Psychology, the fourth chapter points out the manner in which the multifarious knowledge of the phenomena of the soul may be systematically arranged, and thus reduced to a science, the object of which is not only to exhibit the facts, but, by conclusions from them, to reveal the nature of the soul.

# FIRST BOOK.

## PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOUL.

### Preliminary Remarks on the various Phenomena and Powers of the Soul, and their systematic Arrangement.

One day I was walking toward a river, when my attention was excited by a crowd of persons on the shore. I hastened to the spot, and saw a man in the water, crying for help. There was no boat near, and no person seemed willing to jump into the water, and risk his own life in attempting to save that of another. An indescribable pain seized me, and a strong desire to save the man. But I was terrified by the steep banks and the rapid current, and thoughts of my family at home strengthened the motives of fear. I had reason to think, that my skill in swimming was sufficient to carry the man to the shore, where the assistance of others might be relied upon. My conscience now upbraided me with cowardice, and in an instant brought before my mind the resolution I had often formed with regard to my conduct, in case I should be called upon thus to hazard my life; nay, it mocked me with the generous dreams of self-sacrifice with which I had flattered myself when in safety and at ease. These opposing thoughts and emotions passed through my mind in an incredi-

bly short time. After a severe struggle with fears and temptations, I prevailed, jumped into the water, and, with the assistance of others, whom my example had stimulated to like exertion, succeeded in bringing the sufferer safe to land. Never shall I forget the joy with which I welcomed the first breath of the reviving man. I remembered what had passed in my mind; and I felt as if the life of my own soul had been saved from the fatal waves of fear and temptation.

I remember all the circumstances which I have related with equal assurance of their reality. Now, if I ask myself on what this assurance is grounded, I find, that my walking to the river side, my observing the man in the water, hearing his cries for help, making a sudden motion to jump, starting back, stopping for some minutes, then jumping into the water, swimming with him to the shore, hearing and feeling his first breath, — these facts I receive as true on the evidence of my senses. But the attention that was excited in me by the sight of the crowd, the pain I felt when I saw the unfortunate man, the desire to save him, the fears that tempted me to relinquish my benevolent desire; again, the reasons I had for hope of success, together with the monitions and upbraidings of conscience, the dreams of heroism in which I had once indulged, the inward struggle and striving of my will, till I had formed the determination, and executed it, and, at last, the joy of a successful effort of soul and body; — all these successive workings of the soul were not perceived by the senses;

yet they are as certain to me as any phenomena that are so perceived, simply because I was conscious of them. I was conscious of attention, of sympathizing pain, of benevolent desire, of reasoning on the probability of success, of hopes, and fears, and upbraidings of conscience ; of inward struggles, of decision, and effort of will, and, at last, of sympathizing and self-approving joy.

It is the first object of the psychologist to examine these various facts of consciousness, with a view to reduce them to their spiritual elements, and then to classify them according to their comparative similarity or dissimilarity.

Some of these facts of consciousness are merely simple, uncompounded phenomena ; such as ideas or conceptions of the intellect ; desires and determinations, or acts of the will ; and the feelings of pain, joy, and desire. These simple phenomena of the soul cannot be defined, any more than sounds, and colors, or any other immediate objects of sensation. For to define a thing means to describe it by more simple and elementary conceptions and terms. But some of the facts of consciousness, which have been mentioned, are of a complicated nature, such as attention, sympathy, hope, and fear, the approbation and disapprobation of conscience. Attention is the action of the will upon the intellect, that is, of the power of self-determination upon the power of forming ideas. Sympathy is the pain excited in us by the idea of the pain of another. Hope is the joy that attends the idea of future good ; fear is the pain connected with

the idea of coming evil. Those emotions, which we designate as moral feelings, or as the manifestations of an approving or disapproving conscience, are feelings of joy and of pain excited by the ideas of duty performed or neglected. All these phenomena of the soul may be reduced to the simple elements of ideas, feelings, and volitions.

Under ideas are comprehended divers operations of the mind, such as perception, imagination, and reasoning. If I think of an earthquake, for instance, whether I have been actually present and perceived it, or have only imagined the scene, or whether I reason on the causes of this event, all these divers operations of the mind, perceiving, imagining, reasoning, are characterized as different modes of forming ideas.

Feelings consist of the primary emotions of pleasure, pain, and desire, to which all the different inclinations and affections may be reduced as their elements. All kinds of feelings are comprehended under the common term of the heart, in the spiritual sense of the word.

Volitions, or acts of the will, are certain determinations which affect the thoughts, feelings, and actions. These determinations are characterized by the idea accompanying them, that it is in our power to make or not to make them. It was the exercise of the will, by which, in the case of the drowning man, I directed my thoughts, struggled with my fears, and moved my body according to the determination I had formed, knowing that it was still in my power to give it up, as well as not to have made it at first.

Ideas, feelings, and volitions, are the spiritual elements, into which all the various phenomena of the soul may be resolved. All the subject matter of this science may be properly arranged under these three heads, — the intellect, the heart, and the will.

We speak of the will, the heart, and the intellect as the three essential powers, capacities, or faculties of the soul. As these words will be used in this work, it must be borne in mind that in the First Book, which treats merely of the phenomena themselves, which are the objects of consciousness, we mean by powers, or capacities, or faculties, only modes of action or operation. Speculations concerning the nature of these operations find their place in the Second Book, which treats of the Philosophy of the Soul. To the same Book is reserved the question, whether that which we call the Soul or the Mind, be only an aggregate of various operations, powers, or principles; or essentially one individual being, endowed with various powers, or manifesting itself in various ways.

The First Book is divided into two Parts. The First Part contains the Essential Phenomena of the Mind; the Second treats of the Incidental Phenomena, that is, of certain changes and modifications induced by circumstances, such as climate, state of health, sleep, age, peculiar talents, inclinations, and temper, education, mode of life, habits, and other influences, by which the essential operations of the will, the feelings, and the intellect, are affected and modified.

# PART FIRST.

## ESSENTIAL PHENOMENA OF THE SOUL.

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## CHAPTER I.

### THE INTELLECT.

**Perception, Imagination, Understanding, Reason, Judgment.**

I STAND opposite a castle built upon a rock; it excites my attention or desire to perceive; I see it. I shut my eyes; and when I reflect, that is, when I bend my attention again upon what I have perceived, I find that I still retain the image of the castle on the rock. I have an idea of it when fixing my eyes upon it; and I have an idea of it after they are shut; I remember what I have seen. I try whether I cannot by an effort of my will persuade myself that the castle does not stand there before my open eyes; or whether I cannot, after having shut them, make myself believe that I have not seen it, or that I have seen something else instead. But I find that with all effort, I cannot prevail either upon my open eyes not to see, or to see any thing different from what they do see; or upon my memory to deny that I have seen it. The idea of the castle then is forced upon me; I feel compelled to admit it as it presents itself to me.

And how does the idea of what I call a castle on a rock present itself to me? The idea of the castle presents itself to me as the impress of something corresponding to my idea, which is not the idea itself; of something then, to which I feel constrained to ascribe a reality, that is, an existence out of my own idea.

But, on the other hand, I can, by a mere act of my will, form the idea of a castle that does not need a rock for its foundation. I can build a castle in the air. Now the castle in the air exists in my mind, as truly as the castle on the rock; that is, I feel compelled in both cases, to admit the ideas as objects or facts of consciousness. But while the idea of the castle on the rock presents itself to me not only as an idea, as something in my mind, but as the representation, the impression of something not in my mind; the idea of the castle in the air does not urge upon me the belief in any thing besides the existence of the idea itself. Nay, more, I can by an arbitrary act of the will, change the castle in the air into a log house, or into a nut shell, or dissolve it into air, — while I cannot by any voluntary effort change my impression of the castle on the rock in any way, without being conscious, that so far as I have changed it, it ceases to present itself to me as an impression.

I have an idea of the pen in my hand, of the figures I am forming on the page before me, of the thoughts I am endeavouring to express by these signs; of the moral effort, as well as pleasurable excitement that attend my work. I have an idea of the horse stand-

ing before the gate, that has borne me on my morning ride. I have an idea also, of the hippogryph on which the poets of old soared into the highest heavens ; and just now the idea occurred to me, that the hobby on which my little boy is taking a ride, might be only a make-believe horse of wood, which might at any time stretch forth a pair of wings, and carry the little high-flier skyward, in spite of the cares and anxieties that would hold him back.

Here is a great variety of ideas. The pen, the hand, the page, the figures, the thoughts, the effort of will, the pleasure, the gate, the horse, the morning ride, the hippogryph, the hobby-horse, and many other ideas, more or less unlike each other, are contained in those few examples. These ideas differ first with regard to the objects which they represent. A pen, a thought, a morning ride, a hippogryph, or a flying hobby, present a variety of objects, forms, or images, to the mind.

Ideas which we can form, change, and destroy at will, and which do not impress us with the reality of their objects, we call imaginations. Ideas which present themselves as representations of objects existing out of our ideas, and which we cannot alter without being conscious of their ceasing to be representations of objects existing out of our ideas, are called perceptions.

This distinction applies not only to objects of sight, such as the castle on the rock ; but to all objects of sensation and of consciousness. We form ideas of real and imaginary colors, sounds, smells, tastes, as

well as of real and imaginary joys and sorrows, passions, thoughts, and determinations. The joy I feel at the sight of a friend, which is an object of consciousness, is to me as truly a reality as the object of sight before me. For although the idea of joy does not present to me an image, or impression, such as sights and sounds call forth; yet like these ideas, that of joy is forced upon me such as it is, as the opposite of pain, and distinct from every other operation of the mind. The idea of joy presents itself to me not only as an idea, but as the representation of something that has an existence out of my idea; and I cannot arbitrarily change it into that of pain, or of any other emotion, without being conscious of its ceasing to be the representation of something that has an existence out of, as well as in, my ideas. On the contrary, as to any imaginary joy or sorrow, I am conscious that my will has called it forth, and may at any time change it into any other idea or emotion. It is when we determine to refrain from all arbitrary interference in the formation of our ideas, that we receive the most distinct impressions of forms, colors, and sounds, as well as thoughts, feelings, and volitions.

There are accordingly two kinds and sources of ideas; perception, which includes sensation and consciousness; and imagination. All our ideas of real objects are derived from perception; while our imagination furnishes all ideas of merely possible or conceivable objects.

But there are other important points of difference

to be observed in these ideas. If you take, for example, the idea of a hippogryph, you perceive that it is made up of other ideas. It is a compound of horse and bird. Now, instead of joining together horse's legs and bird's wings, you may, if you please, attach the wings to a man, and thus endue him with what is supposed to be the form of an angel; or you may suppose the forms of man and horse combined in the fabulous being called a centaur. You may enlarge the natural figure of a man into a giant, or diminish it to a dwarf. In short, take any idea you possess, and you have it in your power, by an arbitrary act of your will, to modify it any how, and compound it with other ideas. Now these ideas, the formation of which depends solely on a person's pleasure or will, we call imaginations or fancies.

But if you inquire how you came by the simple idea of a man, which your imagination magnifies, or diminishes, or compounds with other ideas; or by the idea of a bird, or of certain colors, and sounds, or thoughts, and feelings; you will find that these are not the creatures or contrivances of your pleasure and arbitrary will. It does indeed depend on your will to open or shut your eyes; but with your eyes open, you cannot, by any effort, make an object appear to you otherwise than you actually see it. And if you fix your attention upon the objects of consciousness, you cannot make yourself to be conscious of pleasure when you feel pain, or of a moral effort where you know yourself guilty of weak indulgence. It is when we determine to refrain from all partial

and arbitrary interference in the formation of our ideas, that we have the most distinct conceptions of colors, forms, sounds, as well as thoughts, feelings, volitions, and all those ideas which are not mere modifications or compositions of others. These simple ideas are accompanied with the characteristic feeling of our being compelled to form them; they appear to us as impressions made upon us, and as such, urge upon us the belief in the reality of the objects which they represent. These ideas are called perceptions, of which there are two kinds. For as we have already seen, we perceive partly by means of certain organs, and we designate this mode of perception by the name of sensation; and partly by the self-perceiving power of the mind, which we call consciousness.

If you compare perceptions with imaginations, the idea of a hippogryph, for example, with that of a horse, and a bird, you find that the hippogryph is the creature of our own pleasure and will; and therefore, while you are conscious of the idea itself, that is, of its existence in your mind, you do not ascribe to it an existence out of your mind. But the ideas of a bird, and a horse were impressed upon you while conscious of refraining from all arbitrary interference; you therefore believe that there is, corresponding to these ideas, something that produces these impressions, and that consequently exists out of your own ideas. It is the same with objects of consciousness. You are conscious of thinking and feeling, that is, you have an idea of ideas and feelings whose exis-

tence in your mind is not the creature of your will, but is urged upon your consciousness, and has, therefore to you, not merely an imaginary, but a real existence.

Imaginations and perceptions, the hyppogryph, as well as the horse and the bird, the castle in the air, as well as the castle on the rock, are ideas, which, as such, according to the testimony of your consciousness, have a real existence in your mind. But with regard to their objects, the things we perceive are pressed upon our minds just as they are represented in our ideas; while our imaginations are subject to our desire or will; we ascribe to objects of our perception, an existence out of, as well as in our ideas; while we believe those of our imagination to exist only in our ideas.

If we examine our imaginations, we find that they are only arbitrary modifications or compositions of our perceptions. We may magnify the idea of a giant till his head strikes against the stars, or reduce that of the dwarf to the smallest possible dimensions, they are still but modifications of the idea of a man, derived from perception; we may, like the ancient heathens, picture to ourselves a whole world of gods; yet it will ever be but an imaginary reproduction of the known world of men. We may join together in one image the most discordant features, or separate things which in reality are inseparable; we may roam through all the realms of creation, change harmony into chaos, and chaos into harmony; still if we examine this vast and various imagery, the most sublime and

the most absurd, the most beautiful and the most monstrous phantasies and dreams, are made up of materials furnished by our own experience, which is nothing else than the sum total of our perceptions.

Perception precedes imagination. Horses and birds were known before the idea of a hippogryph was conceived in a poet's mind. Real horses were in use before an imitation was attempted in wood, and the wooden reality again gave rise to the nursery vision of a flying hobby. * * *

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END OF VOL. III.